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Since its first nuclear test in October 1964, China has maintained a modest nuclear 
force to achieve limited deterrence goals. In many ways, China’s limited nuclear 
arsenal and restrained posture have made it an outlier in the nuclear world. In recent 
years, however, new trends have turned China’s outlier status on its head; while the 
established nuclear states, especially the United States and Russia, have reduced their 
nuclear inventories, China has increased the numbers of its strategic missiles and war-
heads and dramatically improved the quality of its force. Understanding the future of 
China’s nuclear forces, doctrine, and policy is critical to shaping an appropriate U.S. 
approach to strategic issues.
This report examines the key drivers, including both external and internal forces, 
that will shape Chinese nuclear decisionmaking over the next ten years. While it pays 
particular attention to China’s strategic relationship with the United States, which 
remains Beijing’s primary focus in formulating policy, it also considers the role that 
developments in third countries might play—a topic other studies have seldom treated 
and never systematically. In this context, China’s emergent nuclear relationship with 
India and dynamics on the South Asian subcontinent are likely to be particularly 
important. The analysis of internal drivers addresses the potential impacts of bureau-
cratic politics, organizational processes, and the availability of resources. This research 
should be of interest to nuclear specialists, Asian foreign policy and security experts, 
policymakers, military officers, and anyone interested in Chinese or nuclear issues.
The work was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND 
Project AIR FORCE. The draft report was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. 
Air Force subject-matter experts.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. 
Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. 
PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting 
the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future 
air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Moderniza-
tion and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; 
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and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract 
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China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is expanding and improving its nuclear inven-
tory, and a range of international and domestic drivers is likely to accelerate that trend 
over the coming decade. To be sure, important elements of continuity will almost 
certainly persist. China’s general approach to nuclear policy has been remarkably con-
sistent since its first nuclear test in 1964. Over the years, Chinese military publica-
tions, official statements, and defense white papers have highlighted the key elements 
of China’s nuclear policy, including no-first-use of nuclear weapons and an emphasis 
on maintaining a limited number of nuclear weapons—what China calls a “lean and 
effective” [jinggan youxiao] deterrent capability—to deter nuclear attack. Although 
Beijing is unlikely to abandon these formal elements of policy, China appears to be 
increasing emphasis on nuclear deterrence, and a number of important drivers may 
lead to shifts in the way policies are interpreted and operationalized. China appears 
to be moving away from an approach to deterrence that deems the ability to impose 
some risk of a second strike sufficient. It is moving toward a more calculated strategy 
of assured retaliation.
Before turning to the external and internal drivers that may be shaping this evo-
lution, it is worth noting that improved capabilities already give China new strategic 
options. Chinese nuclear forces have undergone a significant transformation over the 
past 30 years, characterized by a shift from primary reliance on intermediate- and 
medium-range missiles to a force of intercontinental and medium-range nuclear sys-
tems. The pace of change has increased over the past decade, with the maturation 
of new technologies and the growth of the Chinese defense budget. With the recent 
addition of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), improved nuclear-
powered ballistic-missile submarines, and multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicles (MIRVs)–capable silo-based ICBMs, as well as the ongoing development of 
hypersonic-glide vehicles and MIRV-capable mobile ICBMs, China is fielding a more 
capable nuclear deterrent force.
External drivers are likely to affect the future development of this force and how 
China operationalizes its nuclear policy. Chinese strategists adopt a dualistic view of 
the current external security environment. China views its future as inextricably linked 
to the international community and perceives that the international security environ-
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ment is generally peaceful and stable. But Chinese strategists highlight a range of 
increasingly severe threats to China. The United States is the central driver of China’s 
nuclear calculus. Beijing has welcomed some recent adjustments to U.S. policy, such 
as the commitment made in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to deemphasize nuclear 
weapons. But Chinese strategists remain deeply concerned that developments in U.S. 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; conventional prompt global strike; and 
ballistic missile defense may jeopardize China’s retaliatory capability. In large part 
because of this, Chinese strategists suggest the PLA will continue to pursue a portfolio 
of qualitative and quantitative enhancements to its nuclear inventory.
While China continues to focus primarily on the United States, other regional 
nuclear states are becoming more prominent in PLA thinking. The development of 
Indian nuclear forces has recently garnered increased attention from Chinese strate-
gists, who previously discounted Indian military potential. Although China has long 
accepted nuclear asymmetry vis-à-vis the United States and Russia, Chinese interlocu-
tors acknowledge that, for cultural and historical reasons, Beijing might be unwilling 
to accept Indian nuclear parity with China. More generally, multilateral dynamics 
associated with nested regional security dilemmas can affect China’s security interests. 
For example, U.S. and Japanese concerns about North Korea’s nuclear programs will 
continue to drive missile defense developments that Chinese analysts fear could under-
mine the credibility of China’s deterrent capability. Chinese strategists do not view 
Russia as an immediate potential threat. But they do see it as shaping larger global 
nuclear trends and are concerned by the expanded role that nuclear weapons playing 
in Russian security policy.
Internal drivers are also likely to provide added impetus for the evolution of Chi-
nese nuclear forces and practice. Over the last decade, the PLA Second Artillery Force, 
PLA Navy, and PLA Air Force increased their influence within the PLA. Second Artil-
lery commanders gained an institutionalized seat on the Central Military Commis-
sion, and Second Artillery delegations grew relative to the overall size of PLA repre-
sentation within important political bodies. During military reforms announced on 
December 31, 2015, Second Artillery was renamed as the Rocket Force and elevated 
from a military branch [兵种] to a military service [军中]. Former Second Artillery offi-
cers were also appointed to the command and deputy command of the new Strategic 
Support Force, which gained control of most Chinese military satellites and of cyber 
and information warfare functions.
Structurally, the lack of firewalls between the conventional and nuclear compo-
nents of the Rocket Force may have important implications for the future develop-
ment of China’s deterrent. Recent advances in the accuracy and lethality of China’s 
conventional missile technology will, if applied to China’s nuclear missile capabilities, 
introduce previously unavailable policy options for Chinese military strategists. They 
could, for example, provide the PLA with limited nuclear warfighting options that were 
unavailable in the past because of the inadequacy of Chinese nuclear force structure.
Summary   xiii
Resource constraints are not likely to limit China’s ability to modernize, though 
they are likely to limit the pace and scale of growth in numbers. Most economists 
agree that Chinese economic growth rates will continue to decline in the years ahead, 
and the military may have to compete with rising social demands on these resources. 
Barring a more serious crisis in the Chinese economy, however, military budgets are 
likely to continue rising, if more slowly than they have in the past. And should nuclear 
weapons be accorded a somewhat higher priority within the military establishment, as 
the creation of the Rocket Force suggests they might, financial resources would likely 
be adequate for continued improvement. Most credible public analyses of fissile mate-
rial stocks suggest the available Chinese stocks of such material are likely limited but 
nevertheless sufficient for the significant but measured modernization efforts currently 
under way. However, a full-scale “breakout” designed to create forces rivaling those of 
the United States or Russia would likely require China to create new reprocessing or 
enrichment capabilities, which would take years to construct.
Most of the factors examined here suggest that China will pay more, rather than 
less, attention to nuclear issues in the coming years. Barring significant retrenchments 
in U.S. strategic programs—and especially in missile defenses—China will continue 
to plan conservatively against the uncertainties associated with current and future U.S. 
capabilities. At the same time, the nuclear forces of other states, including some that 
have only recently begun to register in Beijing, are also likely to loom larger in the near 
future. Internally, without strong Chinese central leadership intervention to prevent 
the application of technologies developed for China’s conventional missile force to its 
nuclear forces, such spin-on is likely to occur. Further, even if senior civilian leaders 
remained committed to the historically limited Chinese view of nuclear requirements 
(an open question), there is reason to doubt that today’s leaders are as involved in 
detailed oversight as their predecessors, opening the door to heavier influence from 
scientific and bureaucratic actors.
China’s nuclear force modernization could provide PLA leaders options they pre-
viously lacked, and these developments would have important implications for the 
United States. Certain types of changes, including any move toward even limited war-
fighting ideas, could undermine crisis stability. A broader array of changes, such as 
more MIRVing of warheads and increasing the pace of missile development, could have 
implications for arms control efforts more generally, as well as for regional stability. The 
enhancement of Chinese nuclear capabilities, together with a shifting conventional 
balance, is likely to affect regional perceptions of Chinese intentions and of the cred-
ibility of U.S. commitments, complicating the U.S. task of assuring allies and partners. 
U.S. military officials should understand that nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence 
are likely to remain key issues in the Asia-Pacific region and may increase in salience, 
requiring ongoing attention to declaratory policy, force structure, and military diplo-
macy. As U.S. leaders take measures to reassure allies and partners, they should engage 
China on developments most likely to diminish stability, increase escalation risks, or 
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undermine prospects for arms control. Given the U.S. Air Force’s nuclear deterrence 
responsibilities, senior Air Force leaders will have a leading role in setting this agenda.
xv
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China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Introduction
How will Chinese nuclear forces evolve through the 2020s, and what factors are most 
likely to affect their evolution? The development of Chinese nuclear forces has received 
far less attention than the modernization of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conven-
tional capabilities. This is, in part, because China’s nuclear modernization has pro-
ceeded more slowly than the modernization of its conventional forces. However, a 
number of factors suggest that the pace of change in Chinese nuclear forces and think-
ing is accelerating and could quicken further over the next 15 years. This report exam-
ines a broad range of domestic and international drivers that may affect the pace and 
direction of Chinese nuclear forces and thinking in the coming years.
U.S. strategic capabilities and posture will almost certainly remain the most 
important single consideration for Chinese planners, but other factors, including some 
that register only faintly today, are likely to become more important. These factors 
include security competition with India; nuclear developments in other regional states; 
and organizational factors, such as the elevation in status of the nuclear forces and the 
possible transfer of technologies from the conventional missile forces to the nuclear 
side. Most, though not all, of these factors will encourage China to expand its inven-
tory and diversify its capabilities. Although China is unlikely to abandon adherence 
to both its no-first-use policy and a “lean and effective” nuclear force structure, it will 
likely acquire capabilities more relevant to warfighting doctrines and may begin to 
discuss or interpret its policies and practices in ways that could accommodate using 
nuclear weapons for a wider range of purposes.
This chapter provides background on Chinese nuclear forces and direction. We 
briefly review the existing analytical literature on the topic, noting particular areas of 
strength and weakness and highlighting the gaps that this report seeks to fill. We then 
comment on the source material employed in preparing the report. Finally, we outline 
the sequence of chapters and summarize the key findings of the report.
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Background
For years, Chinese nuclear weapons have been more of a boutique topic among China 
and security specialists than a major concern in international relations. Several factors 
have relegated the study of Chinese nuclear forces to a narrow range of specialists: the 
relatively low number of Chinese nuclear warheads (probably in the low hundreds); 
the very large gap in numbers and quality between its forces and those of either the 
United States or Russia;1 the uneven and in many respects slow pace of China’s nuclear 
modernization; Beijing’s commitment to a more restrained nuclear policy and posture, 
as reflected in its no-first-use policy and modest sizing criteria; the U.S. conventional 
advantage; and the absence of heated political competition between Beijing and Wash-
ington. More broadly, nuclear weapons have become less salient in U.S. policy deci-
sions since the end of the Cold War, although maintaining and modernizing the aging 
force have become priorities for U.S. defense planners in recent years. Many of these 
circumstances are evolving, some quickly, and Chinese nuclear forces and thinking are 
likely to factor more prominently in U.S. strategy in the years to come.
The United States is not engaged in an active competition for superiority in the 
nuclear realm and is instead examining ways of reducing the role of nuclear weap-
ons in security policy. The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report states 
that the “role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy 
has been reduced significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should 
be undertaken.”2 Although the 2010 NPR did not include a no-first-use pledge, the 
United States did declare that it would not employ nuclear weapons against members 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) who were in com-
pliance with their obligations under that treaty. Despite this, U.S. concerns about the 
state of America’s aging nuclear inventory, as well as developments elsewhere, have 
grown in recent years, prompting the United States to embark on an ambitious effort 
to modernize its forces. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the costs of 
this program, including those associated with modernizing and maintaining forces, at 
$348 billion between 2015 and 2024.3
Both the United States and Russia have made deep cuts to their nuclear invento-
ries since the end of the Cold War. Because these two states held (and continue to hold) 
a large majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, the reductions in their inventories have 
1 Russia and the United States are each limited to 1,550 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), but each has about 5,000 when nondeployed 
warheads are included.
2 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, D.C., April 2010, p. 15. 
One of the eight major sections of that report, “Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” details some of the 
specific measures undertaken toward that end.
3 Michael Bennett, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Budget Office, January 2015.
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also reduced the overall size of global nuclear stockpiles. At its peak in 1987, the U.S. 
stockpile of strategic weapons included 13,600 warheads on 2,000 delivery vehicles 
(bombers and missiles).4 The 1991 START limited both the United States and Russia 
to 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles.5 Under the 2010 New 
START, the new limits are 1,550 warheads deployed on no more than 700 deployed 
missiles and bombers (with another 100 delivery vehicles nondeployed). New START 
allows both countries to maintain a reserve of nondeployed warheads.6 Nevertheless, 
the total U.S. stockpile of roughly 4,500 warheads (including strategic reserves) in 
2016 represents an 86-percent reduction from the 31,255 (including reserves) held in 
1967.7 Russian nuclear holdings have been similarly reduced, from a peak of 40,723 
warheads (including reserves) in 1986 to some 4,490 (including reserves) by the end of 
2016.8
Despite this progress, there is reason to be concerned about global nuclear affairs 
and the rise of what Paul Bracken has termed “the second nuclear age.” More nuclear 
actors, many new, may become engaged in complex multilateral dynamics exacerbated 
by questionable doctrines.9 Since 1998, three new states have tested nuclear weapons—
India, Pakistan, and North Korea—effectively joining the nuclear club that had previ-
ously included only the “permanent five” nations of the United Nations (UN) Secu-
rity Council (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China) and Israel, 
which has never officially declared its nuclear status but is thought to have such weap-
ons.10 Concerns persist about Iran’s future intentions, despite the agreement, reached in 
4 Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2013.
5 In the case of bombers, the agreement did not count actual warheads deployed. Instead, it used counting rules 
based on the number of nuclear capable bombers in the inventory.
6 Also, like the 1991 START before it, New START does not attempt to count actual warheads deployed on 
bombers, but rather employs counting rules based on the characteristics of nuclear-capable aircraft.
7 The 1967 figure is from U.S. Department of State, “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” 
fact sheet, Washington, D.C., April 27, 2015. In addition to the total military stockpile, an estimated 2,500 
nuclear weapons have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement. Some 20,000 plutonium cores (pits) and 
5,000 canned assemblies (secondaries) are also in U.S. storage. The 2016 figure is from Hans M. Kristensen and 
Robert S. Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” webpage, Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scien-
tists, May 26, 2016b. 
8 Historical figures for the Soviet Union are from the National Resources Defense Council, “Archive of Nuclear 
Data: Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads,” Washington, D.C., 2002. For the 2016 figure, see Kristensen 
and Norris, 2016b. 
9 Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2013.
10 India’s first nuclear test, subsequently labeled Pokhran I, was conducted in 1974, but India did not proceed 
with weaponization until after its five tests in May 1998, labeled Pokhran II. Pakistan conducted six tests, all 
in May 1998, and proceeded directly with weaponization. North Korea conducted five nuclear tests—in 2006, 
2009, 2013, and two in 2016 (as of September).
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July 2015, limiting Iran’s ability to produce weapon-grade fissile material for 15 years. 
Raising broader questions about the coherence and credibility of the NPT regime are 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in 2003 and the waiver that the 48-member 
Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India in 2008 (at U.S. urging). That waiver permits 
India to trade in civilian nuclear goods despite its nuclear test.
Nuclear doctrines vary as much as the motivations behind them, but some states 
embrace ideas or policies that raise the specter of relatively rapid or easy escalation to 
the nuclear level. Russian nuclear doctrine has fluctuated since the end of the Cold 
War. It regularly conducts large-scale nuclear exercises and appears to rely heavily on 
nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack.11 Since Russia occupied Crimea in Feb-
ruary 2014 and subsequently intervened in the Donbass area of Ukraine, Moscow has 
demonstrated a hybrid approach to conflict, ultimately backstopped by a willingness to 
use nuclear weapons should conflict escalate.12 Moscow has also made nuclear modern-
ization a major military priority.13 Pakistan is even clearer in employing nuclear threats 
to deter or potentially deal with a conventional attack, and both India and Pakistan 
are not only expanding their nuclear inventories but also pursuing nuclear systems that 
provide them with at least limited nuclear warfighting capabilities.14
These changes provide a backdrop that make developments in China’s nuclear 
arsenal and thinking of particular interest to the United States. China is the only per-
manent member of the UN Security Council that is currently increasing the size of its 
strategic nuclear arsenal. The deployment of additional multiple independently targe-
table reentry vehicles (MIRVs) will likely accelerate the growth of China’s strategically 
deliverable warhead inventory. In December 2015, the Second Artillery Force, China’s 
largest nuclear weapons stakeholder, was renamed the Rocket Force and elevated from 
a military branch [兵种] to a military service [军中]. Just as important as either the 
nuclear force’s size or status are its capabilities and the associated operational con-
cepts. In this regard, the transfer of technology and operating practices from China’s 
conventional missile force to its nuclear force could provide the country with limited 
11 On the evolution of Russian nuclear thinking, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Russia: Nuclear,” webpage, 
2015, and Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Stud-
ies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. See also Zachary Keck, “Russia to Conduct More Nuclear Drills,” 
The Diplomat, September 5, 2014; and Ed Adamczyk, “Russia to Revise Military Doctrine, Responding to 
NATO,” United Press International, September 2, 2014.
12 Eldridge Colby, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S.-Russian Relationship, white paper, Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 26, 2016; Stephen J. Blank, “Russia’s Hybrid War: 
Through a Glass Darkly,” Intersection, April 14, 2016.
13 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Vol. 72, No. 3, May 3, 2016a.
14 See Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International 
Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/2010, and Christopher Clary, “The Future of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 
Program,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the 
Second Nuclear Age, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013.
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nuclear warfighting capabilities. This development is made more likely by the extent of 
overlap between conventional and nuclear personnel, the scientific and organizational 
infrastructure, and the apparent lack of firewalls between the nuclear and conventional 
components of the Rocket Force.15
Further spurring the development of China’s nuclear arsenal is China’s location 
in a region with highly complex security dynamics—one characterized by overlapping 
or “nested” security dilemmas in which several states are engaged in security competi-
tion at both the systemic and regional or subregional levels.16 China borders or is close 
to several nuclear weapon states: Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Other 
nearby states, such as Japan and South Korea, are capable of quickly producing nuclear 
weapons, should their policies change. This could occur if the security environment 
deteriorates or if U.S. extended deterrence is brought into serious question. Given this 
complex environment, China may not drive the changes that could, nevertheless, affect 
its own planning. For example, competition between Pakistan and India could drive 
changes in Indian nuclear forces or posture that could affect Chinese thinking on a 
range of nuclear questions.
Regardless of the drivers, changes to the size, nature, and doctrine of Chinese 
nuclear forces will have important implications for U.S. security interests. A significant 
expansion of China’s force structure would make bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control 
more difficult, even in the event that Washington and Moscow were otherwise will-
ing. The United States or, more likely, Russia may balk at further arsenal reductions 
without Chinese participation. Of potentially greatest concern would be intensified 
strategic competition between the United States and China. Arms competition would 
not take the same form or be at the same scale as the Cold War competition between 
the United States and Soviet Union. China’s primary objective would be to ensure 
that it could maintain a survivable and deliverable second-strike capability, although 
many Chinese strategists would also likely see a more robust deterrent as providing 
greater freedom of action in regional affairs. Improvements to and expansion of Chi-
na’s nuclear forces will complicate U.S. regional extended deterrence, perhaps making 
it necessary for the United States to modify specific policies lest confidence falter. 
Nuclear competition need not directly involve the United States to be of concern to 
Washington. An intensified nuclear security competition between China and one or 
more of its nuclear-armed neighbors (most likely India or Russia) could push China to 
consider limited warfighting concepts if those states were pursuing such capabilities.
Changes to Chinese nuclear forces or strategies could also affect crisis stability 
and the potential for vertical escalation. Not all these would necessarily be negative. 
For example, if an expanded inventory led to greater confidence in the survivabil-
15 This point will be addressed in more detail later, in Chapter Four.
16 Christopher P. Twomey, “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers,” 
Asia Policy, Vol. 11, January 2011, pp. 51–78.
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ity of China’s second-strike capability, it might mitigate the “use them or lose them” 
pressures Chinese leaders could feel in the event a conflict began to threaten China’s 
nuclear systems or command and control. However, a number of developments could 
exacerbate risk. If new mobile systems (whether land or submarine based) are difficult 
to differentiate from conventional systems in the confusion of war, the risk that these 
systems might be inadvertently struck would increase—with the resulting possibil-
ity that critical red lines on China’s nuclear use could be accidentally crossed. Higher 
readiness levels, the mating of nuclear warheads with delivery systems, and the deploy-
ment of weapons to operational units could also increase the chances of accidental or 
mistaken use if wartime pressures and confusion led to uncertainties about central 
command authority or orders. And finally, Chinese leaders may believe that a strong 
second-strike capability would greatly diminish the probability of nuclear escalation, 
leading them to accept greater escalation risk at lower levels of conflict.
There is, of course, nothing inevitable about the potential developments out-
lined above. As a number of observers have rightly noted, Chinese nuclear policy has 
remained remarkably consistent over the years, and its forces have, in many ways, 
grown more slowly than might have been expected, given China’s stunning economic 
growth over the last 30 years.17 Moreover, some domestic or internal variables could 
lead to more restraint than our baseline case suggests. U.S.-China engagement on stra-
tegic nuclear issues has intensified in recent years, and it is conceivable that this could 
lead to increased mutual restraint. Alternatively, senior Chinese Communist Party 
leaders could, if so inclined, exercise strong oversight and “intervene” in PLA technical 
decisions to address some of these concerns. China’s nuclear inventory is already evolv-
ing quickly, with the pace of modernization and growth having accelerated over the 
last 20 years as new resources have become available. Most key drivers examined here 
are, on balance, likely to stimulate further evolution. But rather than depict any one 
set of outcomes, our intent here is to explore important variables and their potential 
effects. To the extent that drivers may push potentially troubling developments—as we 
think most of the factors examined are likely to do—we will offer suggestions about 
how to reduce the probability of such outcomes and how to mitigate their impact 
should they nevertheless occur.
Literature Review
Some aspects of Chinese nuclear forces and thinking have been well covered in the 
existing literature, but gaps are also apparent. Some basic facts are often disputed, such 
as the current size of China’s nuclear forces and changes in their composition. China 
17 See, for example, Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less 
Mysterious in the Aggregate,” China Quarterly, Vol. 216, December 2013.
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provides very limited data on many material aspects of its nuclear forces. Several exter-
nal organizations have tried to fill the gaps in data and understanding. The Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, for example, publishes an overview of Chinese nuclear forces 
every year or two, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
includes an analysis and basic data on China’s nuclear weapons.18
Both these and other nongovernmental sources, however, are dependent on data 
published by DoD and the U.S. Air Force, and both the format and details provided 
in these government documents change from year to year.19 For example, through 
2010, the DoD report on Chinese military power included a detailed table of Chinese 
ballistic missiles and capabilities, but details have not been included since 2011. Some-
what better documented in open-source analyses are Chinese nuclear-related concepts 
and lexicon, perhaps because this work relies less heavily on government sources for 
information.20
Some of the most thorough and illuminating work has been on the historical 
development of China’s nuclear forces, much of it published by John Lewis and Xue 
Litai. Exploiting copious Chinese sources, Lewis and Xue provide book-length his-
tories of China’s work on atomic weapons (culminating with China’s first test of an 
atomic weapon in 1964), of its development of a submarine-based nuclear capability 
with the Xia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and its JL-1 submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM), and on the evolution of China’s nuclear command-and- 
control system.21
18 The latest report (as of this writing) on Chinese nuclear forces available from this source is Hans M. Kris-
tensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 4, 
June 13, 2016c.
19 DoD publishes a congressionally mandated annual report on Chinese military power, with information on 
Chinese nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The latest, as of this writing, is Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2016, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2016a. The U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intel-
ligence Center (NASIC) also regularly publishes a report on ballistic and cruise missile threats, which includes 
sections on Chinese developments. See, for example, NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base, Ohio, NASIC-1031-0985-13, 2013. 
20 Scholarly works include Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s 
Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, Fall 2015; Alastair 
Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1995–1996; Michael S. Chase, “China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: 
Implications and Challenges for the United States,” Asia Policy, Vol. 16, July 2013b; Brad Roberts, The Case for 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2016; and M. Taylor Fravel 
and Evan Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and 
Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2, Fall 2010. A proliferation of U.S.-China nuclear track 2 
dialogues also assist in our understanding of Chinese nuclear policies and doctrine, including the US-China 
Strategic Nuclear & Space Security Dialogue, run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the 
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, run by the Naval Postgraduate School.
21 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988, 
traces the history of China’s development of its first nuclear devices; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s 
8    China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
Many more writers have addressed—with greater variability in analytical quality 
and sourcing—the evolution of Chinese nuclear thinking and doctrine. These efforts 
have been primarily devoted to characterizing Chinese concepts of nuclear deterrence 
and sufficiency and assessing possible changes to Chinese concepts and thinking. 
During the mid-1990s, Alastair Iain Johnston observed an apparent trend in Chinese 
thinking, from a “minimum deterrent” strategy toward a limited deterrent one that 
would include limited warfighting capability.22 He ultimately concluded that the inter-
nal Chinese debate had terminated in favor of maintaining a more limited definition of 
sufficiency. Nevertheless, disagreement has continued among Western observers about 
whether Chinese strategists embraced the debate’s resolution as permanent or whether 
Chinese capabilities suggest future nuclear warfighting potential.23
Other recent observers have argued that China’s nuclear modernization has given 
it a more robust, medium, or moderate deterrent capability—but does not necessar-
ily suggest a trend toward embracing warfighting capabilities.24 Taylor Fravel, Evan 
Medeiros, and Fiona Cunningham suggest that China is pursuing a calculated “assured 
retaliation” capability. This would be consistent with China’s own discussion of nuclear 
strategy, as well as the recent development of its nuclear forces, but may represent a 
departure from China’s earlier force structure and from a number of prominent his-
torical Chinese statements that appear to assume the existential deterrent value of even 
small numbers of nuclear weapons.25
There are a number of notable gaps or thin areas in the literature on Chinese 
nuclear forces and thinking. One is the lack of forward-looking assessments that con-
sider future drivers and the overwhelming focus of the literature on recent or con-
temporary developments. Given the Chinese nuclear community’s focus on the U.S. 
threat since the end of the Cold War, Western sources naturally focus on bilateral U.S.-
Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1993, examines the development of China’s Xia-class SSBN; and John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imag-
ined Enemies, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006, looks at command and control issues.
22 Johnston, 1996.
23 Those who have emphasized more limited thinking by Chinese strategists and a higher degree of continuity 
in nuclear policy and doctrine include Fravel and Medeiros, 2010; Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, “China: Dynamic 
Minimum Deterrence,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Cen-
tury Asia, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008; Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future 
of Minimum Deterrence,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 2005. Those who see goals that stretch 
beyond minimum deterrence and signs of discontinuity are Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces 
of the People’s Republic of China,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2009, pp. 244–270; Larry M. Wortzel, 
China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning, Carlisle, Pa.: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.
24 See, for example, Chase, 2013b.
25 Fravel and Medeiros, 2010; Cunningham and Fravel, 2015.
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China nuclear dynamics.26 Chinese nuclear dynamics with third parties are less well 
studied, and most of the writing on these topics is incorporated in volumes on China’s 
broader relationships with individual countries.27 Additionally, unlike assessments of 
U.S.-Soviet dynamics during the Cold War, there has been little structured assessment 
of bureaucratic or other domestic drivers of Chinese nuclear programs, despite the 
materials available on the histories of various Chinese nuclear programs.28
Objectives, Scope, and Boundaries
The current report seeks to fill several of the gaps in the literature. It takes a broad look 
at the internal and external drivers that may be important to the future development 
of Chinese nuclear force structure, policy, and operational practice. In considering the 
external environment, we assess not only China’s appreciation of the perceived threat 
U.S. strategic forces pose but also the potential effect of other international actors. 
Several of these—particularly India but also potentially Russia—are likely to grow in 
the Chinese consciousness. Similarly, because of the nested and overlapping nature of 
nuclear security dilemmas, we also consider the nuclear policies of North Korea, Paki-
stan, and Japan. The report also examines domestic constraints and drivers, including 
available resources and the competition for them, the “ownership” of nuclear weapons 
26 Much of this literature focuses specifically on the effect of U.S. missile defense and, more recently, on conven-
tional prompt global strike (CPGS), reflecting the high degree of concern evinced by the Chinese about these pro-
grams. Some of this work is primarily technical, with some commentary on implications for China, the United 
States, and others. See, for example, Dean A. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense,” Sci-
ence and Global Security, Vol. 12, 2004. Other work focuses more on Chinese perception of potential U.S. threats. 
See, for example, Ian E. Rinhart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-
Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2013; 
Christopher P. Twomey, “Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing,” Nonproliferation 
Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2013; Gregory Kulacki, Chinese Concerns About U.S. Missile Defense, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Union of Concerned Scientists, July 2014; and Lora Saalman, “Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear,” 
Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2014.
27 Most of the literature on China’s nuclear relations with neighbors focuses on China-India dynamics. See, for 
example, the collection of essays in Lora Saalman, ed., The China-India Nuclear Crossroads, Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012. See also George Perkovich, “The Nuclear and Security Bal-
ance,” in Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States 
Needs to Know, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004.
28 A partial exception is Evan S. Medeiros’s work on the evolution of thinking within China’s nonproliferation 
community as an example of an “epistemic community” (Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution 
of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
Examples of assessments of internal Soviet dynamics during the Cold War include Matthew Evangelista, Innova-
tion and the Arms Race: How the United States and Soviet Union Develop New Military Technology, Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1988; Matthew A. Evangelista, “Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do,” World 
Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1984; David Holloway, Technology, Management, and the Soviet Military Establishment, 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 76, 1971; David Holloway, The Soviet 
Union and the Arms Race, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983.
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by different branches of the PLA, shifts in the bureaucratic status of nuclear stakehold-
ers, and the potential application of technologies and ideas from China’s convention-
ally armed missile force to its nuclear one.
This assessment of China’s potential nuclear future is necessarily speculative. In 
part, this is simply because of the forward-looking nature of the enterprise and the 
number and extent of variables in question. In part, however, it is because of the lim-
ited source material. We cannot have access to internal Chinese discussions of potential 
external threats. And even many basic facts about China’s nuclear forces and posture 
are subjects of speculation and debate among scholars and analysts in the United States 
and elsewhere. Given these uncertainties, the primary purpose of this work is not to 
make predictions about where we believe Chinese nuclear forces or thinking will be by 
the end of the 2020s. We do draw general conclusions about where the most important 
drivers are likely to lead and about potential events that could produce other outcomes. 
But our primary purpose is to highlight factors that will be important in shaping that 
future, especially those that may be less well known or appreciated.
In addition to filling a gap in the literature, this report capitalizes on a growing 
volume of new Chinese source material and interviews with Chinese strategists. Some 
types of source material are entirely new, while the reissue of substantially revised serial 
works enables some tracing of evolution in Chinese thinking. The literature includes 
several different constituent parts: white papers, works on general military science with 
nuclear components, authoritative edited works specifically on nuclear strategy, books 
and articles by officers from or affiliated with the Rocket Force, reports from track 1.5 
(semiofficial) and track 2 (unofficial) dialogues, and reports from China’s state and 
commercial media. (Note that, except when specifically discussing historical cases, we 
use the term Rocket Force to refer to both the current Rocket Force and the Second 
Artillery Force that preceded it.) These source types are not all equally important, but 
each is significant in its own way. The Chinese government has published a biannual 
white paper on China’s national defense since 1998, and these documents include basic 
descriptions of nuclear policy and the modernization of nuclear forces. These provide 
the most authoritative, if brief, public statements on policy issues, and their regular 
appearance over 15 years provides some basis for discussing continuity and change in 
Chinese official thinking over time.29
PLA academic institutions publish edited works related to nuclear strategy and 
operational art. Some of these, especially those on more-general strategic subjects, have 
been subsequently revised or entirely rewritten, enabling informed speculation on the 
evolution in PLA thought (with the understanding that the individual views of head 
editors or debates within the PLA could also cause change). Such works include The 
Science of Military Strategy (with books published under this title by both the Academy 
29 The 2015 defense white paper, for example, includes several paragraphs on China’s nuclear strategy and doc-
trine. See State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy, Beijing, May 2015.
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of Military Sciences and the National Defense University in 1987, 1999, 2001, 2013, 
and 2015), and Science of Military Campaigns (published by the National Defense Uni-
versity under different editors in 2000 and 2006).30
Three other edited works are notable. The first is China’s Strategic Missile Force 
Encyclopedia, compiled by the Second Artillery Force and published in 2012.31 The 
work, which followed publication of similar encyclopedias by the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF, 2005) and PLA Navy (PLAN, 1999), runs to 1,190 oversized pages and 
contains 2,997 entries divided into eight themes, including military thought, military 
science, political work, logistics, equipment work, technology, history, and military 
environment for strategic rocket forces. The second is The Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns, a 2004 publication edited by Major General (later Lieutenant General) Yu 
Jixun, who subsequently served as deputy commander of the Second Artillery Force.32 
The work, which is marked as classified [机密] under the Chinese system, provides some 
of the most detailed descriptions of Chinese nuclear operational thinking—as well as 
some ambiguities in Chinese no-first-use policy.33 The third is The Science of Military 
Service Strategy (2006), which has a number of sections with unique content on Rocket 
Force issues.34
A relatively new phenomenon—certainly in terms of the quality and quantity of 
materials available—is the publication of reports and, now, book-length treatments 
of Chinese nuclear issues by Chinese strategists, including think tanks and university 
researchers, members of the Rocket Force, individuals affiliated with China’s nuclear 
science and technology community, and arms control officials. Many of the authors 
are involved in the track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues with U.S. counterparts (discussed 
below). What these materials lack in terms of official imprimatur (compared with 
edited works published by military publishers), they make up for by engaging more 
directly with Western commentary and/or internal Chinese debates. Sun Xiangli, 
with the Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, has written 
30 Those consulted most heavily for this report were 寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], «战略学» [Science of Military 
Strategy 2013], Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2013; 彭光谦, 姚有志 [Peng Guangqian and Yao 
Youzhi], eds., «战略学» [The Science of Military Strategy], Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2001; 张
玉良 [Zhang Yuliang], ed., «战役学» [The Science of Campaigns], 2nd ed., Beijing: National Defense University 
Press, 2006; 王厚卿, 张兴业 [Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye], eds., «战役学» [The Science of Campaigns], 
Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000. 
31 «中国战略导弹部队百科全书» [China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia], Beijing: China Encyclopedia 
Publishing House, 2012.
32 于际训 [Yu Jixun], chief ed., «第二炮兵战役学» [Science of Second Artillery Campaigns], Beijing: People’s 
Liberation Army Press, 2004.
33 The classification level is best translated as “top secret” [机密].
34 霍小勇 [Hou Xiaoyong], «军种战略学» [The Science of Military Service Strategy], Beijing: National Defense 
University Press, 2006. 
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extensively on nuclear issues.35 In 2013, Sun published Strategic Choice in the Nuclear 
Age: On China’s Nuclear Strategy, on choices open to China and on China’s internal 
debates.36 Other prominent contributors to this literature include Yao Yunzhu, Li Bin, 
Fan Jishe, Zhu Feng, and Wu Riqiang.37
Track 1.5 (semiofficial) and track 2 dialogues also provide new sources of insight 
into Chinese thinking on nuclear issues. In recent years, the dialogues have greatly 
expanded the exchange of views between U.S. and Chinese specialists. Track 1.5 meet-
ings, cosponsored on the U.S. side by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, have 
engaged academics, think-tank researchers, military officers, and civilian nuclear spe-
cialists. These meetings, held once or twice a year since 2000, have produced written 
reports and have helped establish relationships between U.S. and Chinese counterparts 
that have enabled other conferences and edited volumes with contributions from both 
sides.38 Articles on Chinese foreign policy and military issues in the Chinese media 
have proliferated over the past three decades. Articles in the official state media con-
tinue to reflect official positions on issues ranging from threat perception to military 
policy. Commercial media outlets have grown rapidly since the period of reform and 
opening (initiated in 1978) and play an increasingly important role in shaping Chinese 
views, in part by reporting on news carried in foreign media sources. Media outlets 
also provide a venue for strategists, military academics, retired military officers, and 
other pundits to express their views. Depending on content and the outlet in question, 
these may be more or less likely to represent official government views or positions.
All this material must be treated in the context of China’s actual force modern-
ization and its operational and training activities. Chinese military strategists and aca-
demics understand nuclear policy but do not make force structure decisions. Looking 
forward, we consider the mutual influences of strategy on forces and forces on strategy, 
as well as the structural conditions and circumstances in China’s external and inter-
nal environment and how those might shape the evolution of the country’s nuclear 
deterrent.
35 The institute is a key component of the China Academy of Engineering Physics, which is responsible for 
China’s nuclear weapons research and development.
36 孙向丽 [Sun Xiangli], «核时代的战略选择: 中国核战略问题研究» [Strategic Choice in the Nuclear Age: On 
China’s Nuclear Strategy], Beijing: China Academy of Engineering Physics Research Center, 2013.
37 See, for example, Yao Yunzhu, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” China-U.S. Focus website, April 
22, 2013; Yao Yunzhu, “China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence,” Air & Space Power Journal, March 1, 2010; 
Li Bin and Nie Hongyi，‹中美战略稳定性的参考› [“Analysis on the Strategic Stability Between China and the 
United States”], «世界经济于政治» [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 2, 2008; 李彬 [Li Bin], “The Impact of 
the U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernization,” working paper, Seoul: Pugwash Workshop on East Asian 
Security, April 2001.
38 Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue: Phase VII Report, 
Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. For examples of edited volumes that include a mix of Chinese 
and U.S. authors, see Christopher P. Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; and Saalman, 2012.
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Findings
This report highlights two broad categories of drivers, external and internal. Likely 
developments in both categories have the potential to drive Chinese nuclear forces, 
policy, and doctrine in directions that may have negative consequences for global non-
proliferation efforts and for other U.S. security interests. Some of the drivers are rela-
tively well understood. For example, U.S.-China nuclear dynamics have been exten-
sively analyzed but nevertheless will continue to pose dilemmas for the foreseeable 
future. A number of Western analysts accept Chinese arguments that U.S. missile 
defense pushes China toward higher offensive force levels to ensure a viable retaliatory 
capability. Yet the United States has other incentives, primarily involving North Korea, 
to pursue such capabilities. Similarly, China’s resource constraints, permitting limited 
growth in the nuclear inventory without restarting large-scale production of fissile 
material, are also reasonably well understood, with allowances for technical uncer-
tainty at the margins.
While some variables have received significant treatment, other potential future 
drivers noted here may be underappreciated. Interviews suggest that Beijing will view a 
rising nuclear India, for example, very differently from the way it views states that had 
established nuclear capabilities before China tested its first nuclear weapon. And while 
Beijing has historically accepted a demonstrably inferior nuclear capability vis-à-vis the 
United States and Russia, China may wish to maintain a degree of superiority against 
India. Although Russia is not publicly viewed as a threat, its nuclear policies influence 
Chinese thinking on global trends. Absent strong central leadership oversight over the 
details of Chinese strategic decisionmaking—and specifically, one that is committed to 
continuity with regard to China’s strategic nuclear doctrine and policy—the continu-
ing development of Chinese conventional ballistic missiles is likely to influence both 
the technical capabilities of nuclear missiles and the thinking of missile commanders, 
whose careers generally involve exposure to both the conventional and nuclear sides of 
China’s strategic missile force.
Organization of This Report
This report is divided into 11 chapters. Chapters Two and Three provide the evolving 
baseline. Chapter Two summarizes Chinese strategic nuclear concepts, notes differ-
ences in Chinese and U.S. perspectives and lexicons, and highlights areas of continuity 
and contestation (which are discussed further in subsequent chapters). Chapter Three 
assesses the current situation with regard to Chinese force structure, noting the accel-
erating pace of modernization apparent in recent years. Chapters Four through Six 
address the likely external drivers for future change, including China’s perception of 
the general nuclear security environment (Chapter Four), its views of U.S. nuclear pos-
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ture and capabilities (Chapter Five), and the nested security dilemmas in which China 
is embedded regionally (Chapter Six). Chapter Seven treats potential internal drivers 
of Chinese nuclear forces and policy, including the role of organizational politics and 
organizational processes. Chapter Eight briefly reviews the extent to which resource 
constraints might affect nuclear modernization. Chapter Nine looks at the types of 
impact that the drivers reviewed earlier could have on doctrine and force structure. 
Chapter Ten describes three scenarios for China’s overall nuclear future and the sets of 
overall conditions under which each might emerge. Chapter Eleven outlines the impli-
cations and recommendations for U.S. leaders.
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CHAPTER TWO
Baseline: China’s Evolving Strategic Nuclear Concepts
To understand where Chinese nuclear forces and policy might go, it is necessary to 
understand the evolution of Beijing’s nuclear thinking to date. Historically, the con-
ceptual thinking that the Chinese leadership has embraced and embedded in policy 
and doctrine documents has had a profound influence over priorities in nuclear devel-
opment and procurement. In recent decades, China’s material resources would have 
enabled it to produce a more substantial nuclear arsenal than it has actually deployed, 
and its thinking on nuclear issues help explain that restraint.1 Nevertheless, many Chi-
nese nuclear concepts are elastic and allow for significantly divergent interpretation. 
Indeed, China now appears to be seeking a more calculated approach to effective retal-
iatory capability, one described here and elsewhere as “assured retaliation.” The causal 
relationship between concepts and material capabilities works both ways, and in the 
future, improved capabilities may influence Chinese conceptual thinking as much as 
the reverse. As the PLA assumes a greater role in procurement policy (see Chapter Five), 
material and technical considerations may increasingly guide strategy.
As is often the case with causality in foreign and security policy, ideas are often 
enduring but not entirely unchanging, and there is a dynamic relationship between 
structure (e.g., material potential and constraints) and concepts. In this chapter, we 
briefly review China’s nuclear policy, thinking on deterrence, and nuclear strategy and 
operational concepts—i.e., the baseline against which future change might be judged. 
In subsequent chapters, we address potential new or increased pressure on policy, capa-
bilities that might influence thinking, and existing debates about nuclear policy that 
might change the nature, if not lexicon, of Chinese nuclear deterrence.
Chinese Nuclear Policy
Over the years, Chinese military publications, official statements, and defense white 
papers have highlighted key elements of China’s nuclear policy, including the lim-
ited function of nuclear weapons, the country’s no-first-use policy, nuclear sufficiency 
1 Fravel and Medeiros, 2010.
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based on the principle that forces should be lean and effective, and the requirement for 
highly centralized command and control of nuclear forces.2 These concepts form an 
intellectually consistent whole and are generally mutually supporting, although there 
is variation in the ways they are discussed in China and some debate among Chinese 
specialists on the interpretation of some specific elements.
The Function of Nuclear Weapons
The touchstone for Beijing’s nuclear policy is its view of nuclear weapons’ function 
in national security. During the Korean War and again in the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
in the mid-1950s, U.S. officials implicitly, but nevertheless clearly, threatened the use 
of nuclear weapons against China. As a consequence, China’s leader, Mao Zedong, 
viewed nuclear capability as critical to both deterring nuclear use against China and 
countering potential coercion by nuclear powers. When Soviet Union Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev proposed that China should come under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, 
Mao, believing it was critical for China have its own deterrent, refused.3 Neverthe-
less, Mao saw nuclear weapons as distinctly limited in function beyond the two basic 
purposes cited earlier, and even today, Chinese sources reflect his views on this topic. 
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy, published by the Chinese Academy of Military 
Science, states simply, “For a long time, the [Chinese] objective of the development and 
employment of nuclear weapons has focused on the prevention of the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons by hostile states.”4
Chinese leaders have expressed a largely existential view of the deterrent effects 
of nuclear weapons. Sun Xiangli, a strategist affiliated with the China Academy of 
Engineering Physics and the author of Strategic Choice in the Nuclear Age, paraphrases 
the thinking of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1957: “Developing nuclear strength 
is chiefly to resolve the [nuclear] ‘existential’ problem [有无问题], and the scale should 
not be too great; China is developing nuclear weapons to oppose nuclear threat, not 
to engage in a nuclear arms race with the nuclear states.”5 That thinking is reflected in 
recent documents, such as the 2013 Science of Military Strategy:
When China first decided to develop nuclear weapons, it was to break the nuclear 
powers’ nuclear monopoly and was the archetypal existential deterrent strategy  
[典型的存在性威慑战略]. The development of nuclear weapons since then has also 
2 For a formal definition of China’s nuclear policy, which encompasses nuclear development, no-first-use, and 
arms control policy, see China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 10–11. Also, see State Council Infor-
mation Office, China’s Nuclear Defense Strategy, Beijing, December 2006.
3 Xu Weidi, “China’s Security Environment and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” in Li Bin and Tong Zhao, eds., 
Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, 
p. 23.
4 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 172.
5 Sun Xiangli, 2013, p. 22.
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abided by the recognition of “you have [them], and I have them too,” i.e., the exis-
tence of nuclear weapons is itself deterrence. Under the new historical conditions, 
it is still the nation’s strategy and the basic goal of nuclear struggle to better exercise 
the existential function of nuclear weapons and to contain nuclear threats and the 
outbreak of nuclear war.6
The use of the term existential deterrent here (and our use of it below to describe 
early Chinese nuclear strategy) emphasizes the value of even small nuclear forces. It 
does not imply any requirement with regard to relative force levels or the certainty of 
retaliation, as, for example, McGeorge Bundy implied in his own discussions of the 
term.7
The views of early People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders on nuclear weapons 
continue to constrain discussion. While subscribing to the view that a small number of 
weapons were sufficient to deter nuclear attack, Mao also believed that nuclear systems 
were relatively weak weapons against committed people’s war.8 His position evolved 
away from viewing nuclear weapons as “paper tigers,” but he nevertheless viewed them 
as political rather than militarily useful weapons, and he presided over initial declara-
tions of no-first-use. As we highlight later in the report, the discussion of nuclear weap-
ons and their utility has widened in China, but Mao’s views and the policies he put in 
place remain important even today.
For the most part, Chinese sources suggest that nuclear weapons are intended to 
address nuclear threats only, rather than to deter the outbreak of war more generally. 
On this point, The Science of Military Strategy is explicit: “Chinese nuclear deterrence 
cannot be used to deter [慑止] hostile nonnuclear military action, and its function in 
other nonnuclear military fields is not obvious [不明显].”9 Sun Xiangli sees the degree 
of differentiation between nuclear and conventional functions as a distinctive feature 
of Chinese nuclear policy.10 Some notable Chinese commentators, however, argue that 
nuclear weapons have some value in conventional deterrence even if China’s no-first-
use policy prevents it from making an explicit nuclear threat. Former PLA Second 
Artillery Force (PLASAF) Deputy Commander Zhao Xijun, for example, notes that 
even major world powers “become very cautious” in contemplating military interven-
tion against nuclear countries. Additionally, he writes, nuclear weapons can help deter 
6 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 172–173. 
7 See, for example, McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, October 1969, 
and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, New York: Random 
House, 1989. For a wider set of definitions, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces: 
The Conceptual Components,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 7, 1999.
8 Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American 
Relations, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010, pp. 64–66.
9 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 172.
10 Sun Xiangli, 2013, p. 133.
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“medium- and high-power conventional strikes on [China’s] important strategic tar-
gets and nuclear facilities,” and they may come into play in the event of extremely seri-
ous threats to national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.11
Finally, many Chinese statements convey the idea that nuclear weapons also 
underpin great-power status. For example, according to the 2013 Science of Mili-
tary Strategy, China’s nuclear forces play an important role in “guaranteeing that 
[China’s] status as a powerful country does not waver, making sure that its core national 
interests are not violated, and creating a secure environment for [China’s] peaceful 
development.”12 In announcing the creation of the Rocket Force in December 2015, 
Xi Jinping echoed the point, emphasizing, “the Rocket Force is our country’s core stra-
tegic deterrent force; it is the strategic support for our country’s major power status; 
and it is an important foundation for safeguarding our nation’s security.”13
No-First-Use
Chinese sources highlight the role of Beijing’s nuclear no-first-use pledge as central to 
all other aspects of its nuclear policy. On October 16, 1964, the day of China’s first 
nuclear test, the Chinese government declared, “China will not at any time or under 
any circumstances employ nuclear weapons first.”14 Since 1964, Beijing has reaffirmed 
its no-first-use pledge many times. China’s 2015 defense white paper states that “China 
has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a 
self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature.”15 First use, in this context 
11 赵锡君 [Zhao Xijun], ed., «慑战: 导弹威慑纵横谈» [Intimidation Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion of 
Missile Deterrence], Beijing: 国防大学出版社 [National Defense University Press], 2005, pp. 41–42.
12 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 148.
13 ‹陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行: 习近平向中国人民解放军陆军火箭军战略支援
部队授予军旗并致训词› [“Meeting to Establish the PLA Army General Command, Rocket Force, and Strate-
gic Support Group Held in Beijing: Xi Jinping Confers Flag and Makes Address”], «人民日报» [People’s Daily], 
January 2, 2016.
14 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 11.
15 State Council Information Office, 2015. China’s 2013 white paper (State Council Information Office, The 
Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Beijing, April 2013) differed from past versions in that it did 
not explicitly mention the no-first-use policy. Some observers initially interpreted this omission as at least an 
implicit departure from no-first-use, if not an outright rejection of the policy. See James M. Acton, “The Under-
ground Great Wall: An Alternate Explanation,” proliferation analysis, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2011. But PLA officers have noted that the “thematic” approach of the April 2013 docu-
ment was a departure from the “comprehensive” format of previous white papers, and hence a discussion of no-
first-use was not required. More importantly, since its publication, several Chinese officials and military officers 
reiterated that the no-first-use policy has not changed. For example, responding to a question during a June 2013 
press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hong Lei restated China’s long-standing nuclear 
policy, including that China “firmly pursues a nuclear strategy solely for self-defense, adheres to the policy of no-
first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstance, and makes the unequivocal commitment 
that it will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and 
nuclear-weapon-free zones.” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Minis-
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of China’s no-first-use policy, refers to the first use of nuclear weapons by others. The 
China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia states, “it only requires that an enemy does 
not employ [nuclear weapons] for China to also not employ them.”16 Thus, first use 
is defined by the weapon employed and not by the assets targeted. In principle, this 
means that a nuclear attack against Chinese conventional (or any other) assets would 
be regarded as first use, while conventional attacks against Chinese nuclear systems 
(or support systems, such as nuclear command and control infrastructure) would not.
This definition has been confirmed by Chinese interlocutors during track 2 dialogues 
with Chinese nuclear strategists, although some participants also acknowledge internal 
Chinese debates (discussed further in Chapter Nine) about whether some conditional-
ity should be attached.17 Western analysts, meanwhile, ask whether such a strict dis-
tinction would be tenable in an actual conflict. The continued adherence to a strict def-
inition of no-first-use indicates a strong desire to avoid “mission creep” in the nuclear 
domain, even if there are doubts about whether strict limits could be maintained in 
all cases or debates about whether it is in China’s interest to continue to adhere to the 
limits.
Finally, most Chinese sources that discuss the no-first-use policy are emphatic 
that China will employ nuclear weapons should nuclear weapons be used against it. 
The 1987 Science of Military Strategy states, “China’s nuclear strategy is defensive in 
nature, but if an enemy is first to use nuclear weapons, China will resolutely implement 
a nuclear counterstrike and carry out nuclear retaliation.”18
Nuclear Sufficiency: Lean and Effective Forces and Assured Retaliation
A second pillar of Chinese nuclear policy is its standard of sufficiency, which Chinese 
documents discuss in terms of building a nuclear force that is lean and effective [精
干有效].19 This phrase was first employed publicly in the 2006 defense white paper.20 
try Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on June 3, 2013,” June 4, 2013. PLA officers have made 
similar statements, such as when Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo reaffirmed the no-first-use policy at the Shangri-
La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2013. “I want to make a solemn statement that the Chinese government will 
never discard our pledge of no first-use of nuclear arms,” Qi said. “We have been sticking to this policy for half 
a century, and its facts have proven that it is not only in the interest of the Chinese people but also of the people 
of all the world.” See “Shangri-La Dialogue: China Reiterates ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Pledge,” Straits Times, June 
2, 2013.
16 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012.
17 Discussions with Chinese nuclear strategists, Beijing, November 9, 2010.
18 高锐 [Gao Rui], ed., «战略学» [The Science of Military Strategy], 1st ed., 军事科学出版社 [Beijing: Military 
Science Press], 1987, p. 237.
19 State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, Beijing, March 31, 2011. See also 靖志
远 [Jing Zhiyuan], ‹建设精干有效战略导弹部队为维护世界和安全贡献力量› [“Creating a Lean and Effec-
tive Strategic Missile Troop Contributes to International Security], «中国军队» [China Military], Vol. 6, No. 2, 
2010, pp. 4–7.
20 State Council Information Office, 2006. 
20    China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
But the idea that the scale of China’s nuclear forces should be limited dates back to 
the inception of the country’s nuclear-weapon program in the 1950s. As noted earlier, 
Premier Zhou Enlai stipulated that the scale of the nuclear force “should not be unsuit-
ably large.”21 Recent explanations of lean and effective, such as the 2006 white paper, 
also emphasize Chinese restraint, the modest size of its nuclear forces, and the desire 
to avoid costly arms races.22
Western analysts frequently describe China’s approach to nuclear strategy and 
sufficiency as one of “minimum deterrence.”23 The standard of sufficiency is the abil-
ity to survive an enemy first strike and launch an effective counterattack. As Chinese 
military scholar Major General Yao Yunzhu notes, “To keep the arsenal lean, China 
has to exercise restraint in developing nuclear weapons; to keep the arsenal effec-
tive, China has to modernize it to ensure credibility after a first nuclear strike.”24 Sun 
Xiangli, of China Academy of Engineering Physics, cautions that the Chinese stan-
dard differs somewhat from European Cold War minimum deterrent strategies. The 
Chinese lean-and-effective concept does not impose specific minimum or maximum 
numerical limits on warheads. Unlike the English or French minimum deterrent con-
cepts, it does not require a specific threshold level of destruction to the population or 
industrial capacity of potential adversaries. Instead, China’s concept of unsustainable 
damage is more subjective and has a much lower threshold—based in part on a con-
cept of “mutual fragility.”25
But while the level of damage that Chinese officials say might be necessary for 
a counterattack may not be high by European or U.S. Cold War standards, both the 
2013 Science of Military Strategy and the 2013 defense white paper focus more on 
required improvements to the nuclear force than they do on ensuring that the force 
remains lean.26 The 2013 Science of Military Strategy, for example, highlights the need 
to improve informatization of systems, command and control, early warning and 
21 Sun Xiangli, 2013, p. 22.
22 State Council Information Office, 2006. The concept of effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent force that is 
highlighted in recent publications can also be traced back to earlier volumes, such as the 1987 edition of Science 
of Military Strategy, which underscores that “China’s nuclear counterstrike must take effectiveness as the founda-
tion.” See Gao Rui, 1987, p. 116.
23 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2007.
24 Yao Yunzhu, 2010.
25 Sun Xiangli, 2013, pp. 137–139.
26 Shou Xiaosong, 2013; and State Council Information Office, 2013. In describing the environment, the 2013 
Science of Military Strategy highlights not only missile defense but also CPGS [kuaisu quanqiu daji] as serious 
concerns for Chinese planners. In particular, it identifies CPGS as a potential conventional strike threat against 
Chinese nuclear forces, which could put China in a “passive position” [beadong diwei] and could “greatly influ-
ence China’s nuclear counterattack capability” [dada yingxiang wo he fanji nengli] and “weaken China’s nuclear 
deterrent function.”
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rapid response capability, penetration capability, and defense and survivability.27 Some 
Chinese individuals and sources suggest that increasing the size of China’s nuclear 
inventory may be necessary. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy stipulates that, when 
combined with other improvements, increasing the number of intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles (ICBMs) and deploying missiles with multiple warheads will enhance the 
effectiveness of China’s deterrent.28
This may, in part, simply reflect the application of existing concepts and thought, 
specifically the requirement for a lean-and-effective force, to modern problems and the 
increasingly “complex nuclear security environment” China faces today. Sun Xiangli 
argues, “The stability of [Chinese] nuclear strategic thought . . . certainly does not mean 
that the scale or employment posture of Chinese nuclear forces will not change” as cir-
cumstances change.29 But there does appear to have been a shift in thought away from 
the existential view of deterrence cited earlier toward a more calculated approach—
one that has been labeled “assured retaliation” by recent Western observers.30 To be 
sure, China never explicitly or uniformly embraced existential deterrence, and recent 
Chinese strategists have yet to articulate a standard of retaliatory destruction against 
which sufficiency is measured, if such a standard exists. But both the direction of 
Chinese thinking and its deployed nuclear forces suggest a changing balance between 
emphasis on “lean,” on the one hand, and “effective,” on the other. As Chapter Three 
and other, more-technical analyses suggest, China’s retaliatory capability has grown far 
more certain and robust in recent years, despite new challenges, so changing perspec-
tives may partly reflect capability—i.e., China can now achieve a calculated assured 
retaliatory capability, so ensuring that it does so has become a priority.31
Centralized Command and Control
Chinese statements insist that nuclear command and control must be highly central-
ized, with all the important decisions resting in the hands of the nation’s top political 
and military leadership. This imperative derives from the enormous power of nuclear 
weapons, their political nature, Leninist views of leadership and authority, and his-
27 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 148. Former PLASAF deputy commander Zhao Xijun (2005, p. 78), enumerates a 
similar list of required improvements.
28 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 233–234.
29 Sun Xiangli, 2013, p. 187.
30 Fravel and Medeiros, 2010, pp. 48–87; Cunningham and Fravel, 2015.
31 For an effort to model second-strike capability in the fact of an adversary first strike, see Eric Heginbotham, 
Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, 
Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-
China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017, Santa Monica, Calif.: 
RAND Corporation, RR-392-AF, 2015, pp. 285–319.
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torical concerns about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of separatists.32 China’s 
no-first-use policy and its strategy of retaliation, rather than launch on warning or 
nuclear warfighting, provide permissive context. The 2006 defense white paper states 
that “China’s nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Com-
mission (CMC).”33 The 2013 Science of Military Strategy emphasizes that all decisions 
about nuclear force employment, whether for deterrence operations or nuclear coun-
terattacks, must be made by the CMC. In the event of a nuclear counterattack, the 
CMC would make all the key decisions, including scale, timing, and targets.34 Simi-
larly, according to Zhao Xijun, nuclear missile deterrence actions must be conducted 
with great caution, and the Supreme Command must make all the relevant decisions.35
Chinese Views on Deterrence
Chinese military doctrinal texts highlight deterrence as a means of protecting China’s 
national security interests, including safeguarding what Chinese leaders define as an 
ongoing “period of strategic opportunity” for China’s development in the early part of 
the 21st century. According to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, PLA “preparations 
for military struggle” must not only improve the PLA’s ability to win future local wars 
but also “strive to establish and strengthen a military deterrence system and military 
deterrence capability to contain the outbreak of war and prevent the escalation of 
war.”36 Within this broader context, PLA publications stress the importance of linking 
deterrence actions to political objectives. According to one source, “Deterrence, like 
war, is a continuation of politics.”37 The fundamental purpose of deterrence is to influ-
ence an adversary’s decisionmaking calculus.38
Strategic deterrence is not synonymous with nuclear deterrence in Chinese mil-
itary writings.39 The military component of strategic deterrence relies not only on 
nuclear weapons, but also space, cyber warfare, and conventional military capabilities.40 
32 Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution, Lanham, Md.: Lexington 
Books, 1988, p. 91.
33 State Council Information Office, 2006.
34 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 228.
35 In contrast, conventional missile deterrence is “more flexible,” and faces fewer restrictions; with conventional 
missiles, “a few actual missile launches” may help achieve the deterrence objectives (Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 41).
36 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 134.
37 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 9.
38 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 12.
39 Dennis Blasko, “Military Parades Demonstrate Chinese Concept of Deterrence,” China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 8, 
April 16, 2009.
40 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 137–140.
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Chinese military publications suggest that, even though conventional military deter-
rence is not as powerful as nuclear deterrence, it is becoming more important as con-
ventional weapons become more capable. The 2013 Science of Strategy contains a discus-
sion of the “conventionalization of deterrence.” It notes that, given the improvements 
to conventional weapons since the end of the Cold War, they have “become a powerful 
deterrence means for achieving political objectives.”41 The authors contend that con-
ventional weapons are becoming more and more capable and offer much greater flex-
ibility than nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Chinese strategists continue to see nuclear 
deterrence as fundamental to national security.
Like their American counterparts, Chinese strategists emphasize that a success-
ful deterrent threat requires capability, will, and effective communication with the 
adversary.42 According to Zhao Xijun, “deterrence must take reliable strength as its 
foundation.”43 Capability is thus seen as the most fundamental and important of these 
three elements of deterrence.44 The will to use force is also critical. Even powerful 
capabilities cannot effectively deter an enemy without the determination to use them. 
There are many possible channels to convey determination, such as statements by lead-
ers, official or unofficial media outlets, hotline phone calls, passing messages via third 
countries, or “directly through an enemy’s spies or satellite overflights.”45 The informa-
tion era, according to this narrative, affords more options for conveying determination, 
thus creating a “wider space for the application of deterrence.”46
Chinese writers focus primarily on displaying the will and capability to use force 
as the key means of deterring an enemy, but some also note that the actual use of force 
can influence future deterrent calculations. Former Second Artillery Force Deputy 
Commander Zhao Xijun has written that deterrence in a given case can be influ-
enced by judgments made previously about the likely results of military contention. 
Consequently, Zhao suggests, the actual use of force can be employed to influence an 
adversary’s future strategic judgment. He cited Israel’s 1981 attack against Iraq’s Osirak 
nuclear reactor as an example of a military operation that also played a role in deterring 
future behavior.47
41 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 137–138.
42 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, 2001, pp. 213–215. See also Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 3–5, 9–10.
43 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 83.
44 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 135–137.
45 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 99.
46 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 3–5, 39. Specifically, China could use radio, TV, newspapers, and the Internet to 
transmit information about its deterrence actions to an adversary. In addition, China could deliberately reveal 
information to an adversary by exposing its actions to enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
satellites or reconnaissance aircraft.
47 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 10–11.
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Of note, the Chinese term weishe, generally translated as deterrence, has a broader 
meaning that also encompasses what political science theorists typically refer to as 
compellence. Accordingly, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of weishe as roughly 
equivalent to Thomas Schelling’s broader concept of coercion, which includes deter-
rence and compellence.48 This difference in terminology complicates the development 
of mutual understanding by the two sides. Although Chinese strategists are perfectly 
capable of adding language clarifying the intended type of coercion being discussed, 
they often do not do so, and the meaning can be ambiguous without it. Perhaps more 
important, the coercive frame of reference places more emphasis on ratcheting up psy-
chological pressure and less on clarity of messaging than is generally found in Western 
concepts of deterrence. Nevertheless, as one Chinese analyst observes, the distinction 
between deterrence and compellence may be overdrawn by Western scholars and not 
always followed by practitioners; in point of fact, it is often difficult to agree which 
party is defending the status quo and which party is challenging it.49
Despite the growing importance of conventional forces, Chinese military publi-
cations suggest that Beijing sees nuclear deterrence as one of the most important forms 
of strategic deterrence. Zhao argues that the deterrence effects of nuclear missiles are 
unmatched by any other weapons.50 Even with a relatively limited nuclear force, as 
long as China is capable of retaliating in the event of a nuclear attack, it has the ability 
to deter a stronger adversary. As Zhao puts it, although China has a limited number 
of strategic missiles, the consequences of Chinese nuclear retaliation would be strong 
enough to guarantee that the enemy would stand to lose much more than it would 
gain.51 As long as strategic missiles are survivable and have strong penetration capabili-
ties, an enemy would face an enormous risk if it attempted to launch a nuclear strike.52
48 On the distinctions between deterrence and compellence, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 69–78. According to Li Bin, “‘weishe’ does not mean deterrence; 
‘weishe’ means coercion: to force others to yield to oneself.” See Li Bin, “China’s Nuclear Strategy,” presentation 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., June 25, 
2007. Similarly, according to the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 270), the goal of missile 
force campaign deterrence operations is to “compel an enemy to accept our will or to contain an enemy’s hostile 
actions.” This appears to include not only deterrence (“contain an enemy’s hostile actions”) but also compellence 
or coercive diplomacy (“compel an enemy to accept our will”).
49 Li Bin, “Differences Between Chinese and U.S. Nuclear Thinking and Their Origins,” in Li Bin and Tong 
Zhao, eds., Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2016, p. 10.
50 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 29–32.
51 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 29–30.
52 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 85–86.
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Escalation and War Control
Chinese military publications suggest that regional wars will begin as limited conven-
tional conflicts, and neither side is likely to seriously consider nuclear threats or the use 
of nuclear weapons early in the conflict. But as war escalates, “the use of nuclear deter-
rence becomes a possibility.”53 Consequently, PLA publications underscore the view 
that modern regional conflicts involving a nuclear-armed adversary will most likely 
take the form of “local wars under nuclear deterrence conditions.” The Chinese Strategic 
Missile Force Encyclopedia defines such conflicts as “local conventional wars backed by 
nuclear force.”54 Under these circumstances, the readiness of nuclear weapons is likely 
to be increased; military forces of one or both sides will be “constantly under the threat 
of nuclear attack”; and there is a serious possibility that the conflict will escalate to the 
nuclear level.55 Within this context, there are four ways a peacetime crisis or regional 
war might escalate to the nuclear level:
• An extremely serious international crisis takes place, and a nuclear imbalance 
between the countries involved leads one side or the other to believe that a nuclear 
first strike will allow it to seize the initiative or accomplish its strategic objectives.
• Conventional war escalates to the nuclear level because “a hegemonic nation that 
possesses nuclear weapons” is losing a conventional war and concludes that it 
must “use nuclear weapons to reverse the situation” or because a country that does 
not have a no-first-use policy and believes its national survival is at stake resorts 
to nuclear escalation.
• “Political errors” lead to nuclear war because “the enemy makes an erroneous stra-
tegic judgment on certain actions, and takes drastic action that causes the situa-
tion to go out of control and leads to nuclear war.”
• “Accidental nuclear war” takes place when, as a result of command and con-
trol errors or malfunctioning weapon systems, “one country mistakenly launches 
nuclear missiles on the territory of another country.”56
According to Zhao Xijun, once a conventional conflict is under way, nuclear 
deterrence can help prevent the conventional war from escalating to the nuclear level, 
and if that fails, it can help deter a limited nuclear exchange from “further escalating.”57 
“When the enemy employs high-tech conventional strikes or considers using nuclear 
weapons,” Zhao writes, “they have to face the fact that the other side has nuclear weap-
53 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 35.
54 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 41.
55 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 41.
56 These four escalation paths are outlined in the entry under “Nuclear War Driving Factors” [核战争驱动因
素] in China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 3. 
57 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 47.
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ons” and is capable of retaliating effectively. The risk of escalation and the possibility of 
nuclear retaliation mean the enemy must make decisions very carefully.58
A number of sources suggest that the degree of deterrence must be appropriate to 
achieve the desired effects without creating unintended consequences. The 2013 Sci-
ence of Military Strategy, for example, cautions that, if China fails to adopt “the correct 
degree” of deterrent threat, “we may, when there are dynamics between the enemy and 
ourselves, have the opposite effect, and prompt escalation that could lead to a nuclear 
clash.”59 Similarly, the authors suggest that, in demonstrating resolve, “we must move 
in keeping with the enemy and not take the initiative in raising the level of nuclear 
confrontation between the enemy and ourselves.”60 This does not mean that China will 
never take the lead in nuclear posturing, but it does indicate an awareness of escalation 
problems and an emphasis on proportionality and caution.
Chinese Nuclear Strategic and Operational Concepts
China publishes little on its nuclear strategy in a specific geographic or political con-
text, but Chinese strategists emphasize that nuclear strategy should flow from larger 
national strategy. According to China’s 2006 defense white paper, “China’s nuclear 
strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military strategy.”61 Because of the 
unique nature of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy is under the direct guidance of 
national strategy and is thus subject to higher-level policy and strategy considerations.62 
Although China is largely silent on the details of nuclear strategy, it publishes much 
more on general conceptual subjects at the campaign and operational levels. In the 
following subsections, we briefly outline principles of PLASAF campaigns and discuss 
two types of operations: nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack.
General Principles
The 2004 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and the 2012 China Strategic Missile 
Force Encyclopedia discuss an identical set of ten general principles that should guide 
the conduct of Second Artillery campaigns:63
58 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 31.
59 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. X. Zhao Xijun similarly cautions that the strength of deterrence measures must be 
appropriate to the occasion. On the one hand, if the degree of deterrence is too light, it will be insufficient to 
influence the enemy’s decision calculus, resulting in a deterrence failure. On the other, “if the degree of deterrence 
is too heavy, the deterred may risk danger out of desperation due to the unbearable psychological pressure,” thus 
triggering escalation. See Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 35.
60 Shou Xiaosong, 2013.
61 State Council Information Office, 2006.
62 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 76.
63 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 130–137; China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 71.
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1. Unified command. Given their strategic and political significance, missile units 
should strictly follow commands under the overall instructions of the Supreme 
Command.
2. Advanced preparation. Given the complexity and difficulties of missile campaigns, 
missile operations must proceed according to plans prepared during peacetime.
3. Meticulous planning. Because of the quick operational tempo during active opera-
tions, peacetime preparation of wartime support measures should be thorough 
and realistic.
4. Integrated deterrence and warfare. Nuclear forces will have to deter nuclear attack 
as conventional forces engage in operations. Success will depend on the scaling 
of forces, functioning of equipment, and training of commanders and command 
systems.
5. Strict protection. In wartime, missile units could be key targets for enemy attacks, 
and there will be a premium on measures to ensure survivability, even as the forces 
remain prepared to undertake counterstrike missions.
6. Concentrated employment. The concentration of weapons is key to success during 
campaigns. Firepower plans should ensure concentrated attacks against key tar-
gets.
7. Rapid response. Modern campaigns develop rapidly, and commanders must be 
able to grasp opportunities quickly, in keeping with the intent of superior officers.
8. Close coordination. In joint campaigns, missile force commanders must coordinate 
with elements of the other services. In independent campaigns, missile and muni-
tions bases should coordinate, with the missile base as the central hub. Launch 
units and support elements should coordinate with launch elements as the hub.
9. Comprehensive support. Given the dispersed nature of missile force operations, a 
complete and comprehensive support system must be developed and maintained.
10. Political work. Political work, including patriotic education and the maintenance 
of military democracy, is a positive tradition and can help overcome enemies.
Nuclear Deterrence Operations
Conducting deterrence operations is a core function of China’s strategic missile force. 
PLA officers write that missiles are uniquely suited to this mission because of their 
ability to launch rapidly, penetrate enemy missile defense systems, and destroy key tar-
gets. Chinese military publications indicate that deterrence actions, like all other mili-
tary activities, should be closely linked with China’s broader “political and diplomatic 
struggles.”64 This link is key to gaining international support, frustrating the enemy’s 
plans, and creating a favorable strategic situation for China.65
64 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 81.
65 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 81.
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The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns defines “Second Artillery campaign 
deterrence” [第二炮兵战役威慑] as a series of military activities in which missile force 
units “create momentum and demonstrate strength” [造势和显势] to “compel an enemy 
to accept our will or to contain an enemy’s hostile actions.”66 PLA publications suggest 
that, when facing a more powerful enemy, China should display both real and false 
capabilities to confound enemy decisionmaking. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy 
notes superior U.S. and Russian capabilities and argues that a degree of ambiguity can 
“increase the difficulty of adversaries’ strategic decisionmaking and increase the effec-
tiveness of China’s limited nuclear forces.”67 Decoys and fake positions can be used 
to increase the enemy’s perceptions of one’s own strength, and multiple spokesmen or 
transmission sources can broadcast different messages.
Chinese military publications indicate that missile force units can use a variety 
of methods to influence enemy decisionmakers.68 The approaches discussed in these 
volumes include media propaganda, raising the level of weapon readiness, displaying 
strength, using the troops to build momentum, exercise launches and warning strikes, 
and lowering the nuclear threshold.
Media Propaganda
One of the most important deterrent methods is media propaganda (exerting pres-
sure through public opinion), and it may be employed in peace or war. During war, 
China can use media propaganda to issue “grave warnings” to the enemy to deter them 
from making nuclear threats against China or from carrying out strategic conventional 
attacks against particularly sensitive targets.69 Early in a crisis, nonauthoritative media 
may be the most appropriate channel for transmitting warnings, while authoritative 
media can be employed subsequently, if needed, to raise the intensity of pressure.70
Raising Readiness Levels
Another method discussed in Intimidation Warfare and Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns is raising the level of weapon preparation, which involves increasing missile 
and warhead technical readiness and elevating the level of missile launch readiness.71 
66 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 270. The language reflects the broader meaning of weishe in that in appears to include 
not only deterrence (“contain an enemy’s hostile actions”) but also compellence or coercive diplomacy (“compel 
an enemy to accept our will”). The authors stress that campaign deterrence operations constitute an important 
component of the Second Artillery’s mission of “dual deterrence and dual operations” [双重威慑,双重作战].
67 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 173.
68 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 281–296; Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 180–187.
69 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 180–182.
70 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 180–181. Zhao notes that it is important to “ensure the appropriate intensity of deter-
rence, knowing when to stop escalating, and quitting when one is ahead,” so as to avoid an excessive media reac-
tion that might strengthen the enemy’s resolve or even trigger unintended escalation of the conflict.
71 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 182; Yu Jixun, 2004.
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Measures may include the assembly, inspection, and testing of missiles and warheads. 
Because such preparations are usually conducted in tunnels or other concealed areas, 
the process should be recorded, and the video should be disseminated to create the 
desired deterrent effect.72
Displaying Strength
Chinese sources suggest that deterrence “is mainly conducted through show of force 
and posturing.”73 One of the most important campaign deterrence methods for the 
missile force is, therefore, “displaying strength” [实力展示]. For example, Second Artil-
lery can send commanders to inspect or review the troops, providing opportunities 
to publicize capabilities. National day parades also provide opportunities for nuclear 
powers to display nuclear missile forces. Defense attachés, foreign military officers, and 
reporters may be invited to visit weapon storage sites, launch pads, and silos (although 
only those that have already been exposed).
Using the Troops to Build Momentum
Closely related to demonstrating strength is the concept of “using the troops to build 
momentum” [兵力造势]. According to Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and Intimi-
dation Warfare, “building momentum” refers to the use of troop deployments to create 
advantage, largely by confusing the enemy about China’s operational intentions.74 
Maneuvering missile launchers and support vehicles when the enemy’s reconnais-
sance satellites are about to pass overhead can enhance deterrence by showing enemy 
leaders that PLA missile forces are prepared to conduct combat operations. Real and 
feint maneuvers, employing fake missiles and other equipment, and simulated mis-
sile launches can be combined to create the impression that a larger force is involved 
than is actually the case or that China’s missile force has reached a heightened state of 
preparedness.75
Exercise Launches
According to authoritative Chinese sources, launching missiles at predetermined 
ground or sea targets could also place psychological pressure on enemy decisionmak-
ers. One option is test-launching missiles close to enemy territory or ships. Conduct-
ing “test launches from both flanks” (i.e., launching missiles at two or more important 
enemy targets) could further heighten the pressure, as could launching a missile across 
an enemy-held island. Still another option is launching one or more missiles close to 
72 Zhao Xijun, 2005, p. 183.
73 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 91–92, 129–130.
74 Zhao Xijun, 2005, pp. 184–186; Yu Jixun, 2004.
75 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 289–290.
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an enemy aircraft carrier that may be intruding into Chinese territorial waters.76 These 
missiles presumably would not carry nuclear warheads, but the launches could convey 
an implicit nuclear threat.
Lowering the Nuclear Threshold
The final campaign deterrence method discussed in Science of Second Artillery Cam-
paigns is “lowering the nuclear deterrence threshold” or “adjusting nuclear policy.”77 
Lowering China’s nuclear deterrence threshold is not necessarily the same as lowering 
its nuclear use threshold, and there has been considerable debate on exactly what this 
provision means. The main emphasis of nuclear deterrence is to impose psychological 
fear on the enemy to deter conventional strikes. It involves increasing Chinese readi-
ness to demonstrate resolve, not using nuclear weapons first or launching nuclear coun-
terattacks.78 The authors suggest that China could announce that it is dropping or 
placing conditions on its long-standing no-first-use policy and discuss four conditions 
under which that might be appropriate:79
• An enemy is threatening to carry out conventional strikes against China’s nuclear 
facilities or nuclear power stations.
• An enemy is threatening to carry out attacks against major strategic targets, such 
as hydroelectric power stations.
• An enemy is threatening to carry out attacks against the capital, major cities, or 
other political or economic centers.80
• China is facing serious danger or impending disaster because it is losing a conven-
tional military conflict in which the stakes are very high.81
76 In addition to creating psychological pressure or even panic on the enemy side and producing the desired 
deterrence effects, launch exercises involve firing real missiles and thus have the added benefit of testing the opera-
tional capabilities of missile force units.
77 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 294.
78 Wu Riqiang, «中美核关系中的生存, 威压与升级» [Issues in Sino-U.S. Nuclear Relations: Survivability, 
Coercion and Escalation], United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, June 21, 2013.
79 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 294–295.
80 Specifically, they state that this method could be used when a powerful nuclear-armed enemy that enjoys 
conventional military superiority conducts continuous medium- or high-intensity air raids against major strate-
gic targets in China. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Command could choose to “adjust” China’s long-
standing no-first-use nuclear deterrence policy and order the missile force to “actively carry out powerful nuclear 
deterrence against the enemy to deter the enemy from continuously launching conventional air raids against 
[China’s] major strategic targets” (Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 294–295).
81 When a conventional conflict is continuing to escalate and when the overall strategic situation is becoming 
extremely disadvantageous for China, national safety and survival may be seriously threatened. In such a situa-
tion, the Supreme Command could adjust China’s nuclear policy and order nuclear missile force units to carry 
out effective deterrence against the enemy.
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If the threat to China is severe enough, Beijing can increase pressure further 
by revealing the aimpoints of its nuclear weapons. Disclosing the potential targets of 
nuclear strikes represents the “highest level of deterrence.”82
There are some important points to consider with regard to how this deterrence 
measure should be interpreted. First, most other sources do not mention lowering the 
deterrence threshold. For example, it is not mentioned in China’s Strategic Missile Force 
Encyclopedia, which was published approximately eight years after the Science of Second 
Artillery Campaigns.83 It is possible that the measure has been dropped as potentially 
destabilizing or inconsistent with Chinese policy. Alternatively, the measure might 
simply be regarded as too sensitive to mention in open sources. The Science of Second 
Artillery Campaigns, the source in which this measure is mentioned, is a classified pub-
lication under the Chinese system, whereas China’s Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia 
is openly published. Second, even if an adversary uses conventional weapons to attack 
China’s nuclear force, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns does not advocate a 
nuclear counterattack. It affirms China’s no-first-use stance but embraces options to 
lower China’s nuclear deterrence threshold.84
Nevertheless, even as described and caveated as it is in the Science of Second Artil-
lery Campaigns, lowering the nuclear threshold is problematic from a number of per-
spectives, not least because it could be highly escalatory. If China’s no-first-use policy 
is intended, in part, to diminish the uncertainties that might lead to nuclear escalation, 
much of the value of that policy could be lost in China’s intentional ambiguity on low-
ering the nuclear threshold. This disconnect suggests a significant area of ambiguity 
and tension in Chinese nuclear thinking, one that also runs through other measures 
that involve confusing and confounding adversary leaders.
Nuclear Counterattack Campaigns
In keeping with China’s no-first-use policy, the nuclear counterattack campaign is the 
only type of nuclear strike campaign discussed in Chinese military publications.85 The 
2006 Science of Military Campaigns defines such campaigns as
82 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 294.
83 The encyclopedia’s discussion of campaign deterrence measures is limited to (1) raising the weapon readiness 
level, (2) show of strength, (3) creating momentum with troops, (4) missile launch exercises, and (5) public opin-
ion and propaganda. See China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 80.
84 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 298.
85 As Yu Jixun explains, the nuclear counterattack campaign was first defined in The PLA Second Artillery Mili-
tary Terms, published in March 1984. The definition was subsequently refined in other publications, including 
the 1985 edition of «第二炮兵战役学» [Science of Second Artillery Campaigns]; «第二炮兵战役法» [Second 
Artillery Campaign Methods] and «第二炮兵战役教程» [Second Artillery Campaigns Teaching Materials], which 
were published in 1996; and «中国军事百科全书» [Chinese Military Encyclopedia], 1997. Source titles listed in 
Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 40–41.
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the series of nuclear missile strikes and related operational activities of a large 
Second Artillery nuclear campaign formation, strictly carried out under the direct 
command and control of the Supreme Command, in accordance with the intent of 
the Supreme Command, to achieve specially designated strategic goals.86
Chinese military publications state that the nuclear counterattack campaign could be 
carried out either independently or as part of a “joint nuclear counterattack campaign” 
[lianhe hefanji zhanyi] in coordination with the nuclear forces of the other services.87 
PLASAF (and since December 2015, the Rocket Force) has been expected to constitute 
the main force in such a joint campaign, although the deployment of Jin-class subma-
rines may give PLAN a larger role than it has had previously.88
Chinese military publications delineate the mission, characteristics, and guiding 
principles of nuclear counterattack campaigns. According to Campaign Theory Study 
Guide, the basic mission of a nuclear counterattack campaign is “to thwart the ene-
my’s strategic designs, shake the enemy’s will, paralyze the enemy’s command systems, 
retard the enemy’s operational activities, weaken the enemy’s war potential, and deter 
the escalation of nuclear warfare.”89 Of note, military publications indicate that nuclear 
targets would include a wide range of countervalue and military targets, such as enemy 
political and economic centers and important military bases, but not nuclear counter-
force targets (such as enemy ICBM silos). China’s thinking on targeting could change 
as its missiles become more accurate and as it contemplates the possibility of conflict 
with potential adversaries that do not have the robust nuclear capabilities the United 
States does, a topic discussed further in subsequent chapters.
Chinese military publications also highlight key characteristics of nuclear coun-
terattack campaigns that set them apart from other types of campaigns.90 Notably, the 
battlefield environment is said to be extremely harsh, at least partly because the no-first-
use policy assumes that a nuclear campaign would be executed only after China had 
suffered an enemy nuclear attack.91 Targets in China would likely include nuclear com-
86 The definition of the nuclear counterstrike campaign in Zhang Yuliang (2006), p. 617, is very similar to the 
definitions offered in 薜兴林 [Bi Xinglin, ed.], «战役理论学习指南» [Campaign Theory Study Guide], 国防大
学出版社 [Beijing: National Defense University Press], 2002, p. 384, and Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 297.
87 See Bi Xinglin, 2002, and Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 617.
88 According to Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, “because the nuclear forces of the Second Artillery are 
China’s main nuclear forces, the joint nuclear counterattack campaign usually takes the nuclear forces of the 
Second Artillery as the main component, with the nuclear forces of the navy’s nuclear submarines and the nuclear 
forces of the air force’s bomber units unifying the three dimensions of nuclear counterattack operational activi-
ties” (Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 297).
89 Bi Xinglin, 2002, pp. 384–385. This tracks very closely with the discussion of the mission of the nuclear 
counterattack campaign that appears in Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 298).
90 See, for example, Bi Xinglin, 2002, pp. 385–386.
91 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 298.
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mand centers, missile bases, and warhead storage facilities, creating hazardous condi-
tions under which the surviving Rocket Force elements would have to conduct nuclear 
counterattack campaign operations.92 Consequently, the requirements for protecting 
the missile force are very demanding.93 The huge destructive potential of nuclear weap-
ons necessitates highly centralized command and control and attendant communica-
tions and command systems that are “resistant to interference and destruction.”94
The guiding principles [指导思想] for Second Artillery nuclear counterattack cam-
paigns are “close protection and key point counterattacks” [yanmi fanghu, zhongdian 
fanji].95 “Close protection” concerns the survivability of the missile force and is therefore 
a vital prerequisite for successfully carrying out a nuclear counterattack campaign.96 
“Key-point counterattacks” involve conducting “nuclear firepower key-point strikes on 
the enemy’s crucial targets,” with the objectives being “to cause huge losses for the 
enemy, and to cause the enemy to be seriously shaken psychologically, to achieve the 
goal of weakening the enemy’s will to wage war.”97
Finally, PLA publications also discuss some of the main operational activities 
that would take place as part of a nuclear counterattack campaign. These include ini-
tial nuclear strikes, follow-on nuclear strikes, campaign firepower maneuver, battle 
damage assessment, “handling special situations,” and concluding the campaign.98 
Because the campaign could include follow-on nuclear attacks, China must hold some 
portion of its nuclear weapons in reserve after an initial nuclear exchange, so that it 
can deter further escalation or launch follow-on strikes if required. Chinese strategists 
indicate that the Second Artillery should be capable of “carrying out a number of waves 
of nuclear missile strikes after the initial nuclear strike.” Follow-on strikes could consist 
of repeat strikes against targets that were not destroyed by the initial nuclear strike or 
92 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 298–299.
93 Methods of protection listed in Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Yu Jixun, 2004) include improving 
early warning systems; ensuring appropriate dispersal of positions; hardening missile silos, storage facilities, and 
command centers; employing air defense, ground defense, and electronic warfare capabilities; and emphasizing 
concealment and camouflage to hide the activities of missile force units.
94 Little information is provided in most of these sources about what would happen in the event that missile 
force units were unable to communicate with higher headquarters or with the Supreme Command, but Science of 
Second Artillery Campaigns states that “When command is disrupted or when the situation is urgent, the Second 
Artillery campaign commanders and their command offices should, within their limited scope of authority, act 
on their own judgment, in light of the strategic intentions of headquarters” (Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 300). 
95 See Bi Xinglin, 2002, pp. 386–387.
96 According to Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 303), “close protection” is “the fun-
damental channel through which the Second Artillery increases survivability and the effective preservation of 
nuclear counterattack strength under nuclear conditions.” The purpose of “close protection” is “to avoid or to the 
greatest extent possible reduce the losses caused by an enemy nuclear raid or precision strike.”
97 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 304.
98 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 306–316.
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could be carried out “to maintain a huge amount of pressure and psychological fear 
against the enemy.”99
Future Evolution
Fundamental elements of Chinese thinking on the function, strategy, and opera-
tions of nuclear weapons have remained unchanged since China first tested a nuclear 
weapon in 1964 and affirmed its no-first-use policy. Going forward, China is unlikely 
to change the formal policies or principles associated with its nuclear forces and strat-
egy, given that the logic behind them still holds and that the state would pay a high 
political price for departing from these principles. Maintaining a limited but credible 
nuclear deterrent to discourage nuclear attack and prevent nuclear coercion remains 
the core of Chinese nuclear policy.
But as this chapter suggests, and as the subsequent chapters in this report address 
in more detail, many Chinese concepts are elastic and may be subject to significant 
reinterpretation. Even with modest reinterpretation, they may be compatible with 
important changes to force structure and operational practice—including some with 
implications for arms race and crisis stability and U.S. extended deterrence. Changes 
to China’s external security environment; shifts in other states’ nuclear policies; tech-
nological advances by the PLA and the Rocket Force; and the evolution of Chinese 
bureaucratic structures, procedures, and politics all have the capacity to elicit changes 
in Chinese strategic thought or practice.
While there will be those in the Chinese strategic community who have pushed—
and will likely continue to push—for discipline in maintaining the original intent 
behind the strategic concepts outlined earlier, virtually all elements of Chinese think-
ing are open to a degree of reinterpretation. The lean-and-effective standard of nuclear 
sufficiency, based as it was originally on an existential view of the power of nuclear 
weapons, may never have been quantified. Even without reinterpretation, this standard 
could support the continued expansion and diversification of China’s nuclear inven-
tory as the perceived threat evolves—and the perceived threat may itself be subject to 
widely divergent interpretation. As Chapter Three will address, China has undertaken 
an incremental but nonetheless sustained nuclear modernization program over the past 
two decades, and the pace of modernization appears to have accelerated in recent years. 
Thus, while China adheres to the lean-and-effective terminology, questions over what 
constitutes the boundaries of “lean” and “effective” begin to take on added relevancy.
Similarly, although the no-first-use policy will very likely remain the bedrock 
of Chinese nuclear policy going forward, it too could potentially be open to rein-
terpretation. There have been discussions at the elite level about whether attacks on 
99 Yu Jixun, 2004, pp. 306–307.
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Chinese nuclear forces and infrastructure would constitute a first strike—and thus 
trigger Chinese nuclear retaliation. Some Chinese nuclear strategists have also argued 
that nuclear weapons can help deter conventional strikes against important nonnuclear 
strategic targets in China. Nuclear threats may come into play in the event of extremely 
serious “threats to national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”100 Such internal 
discussions highlight uncertainties over the nuclear threshold should China find itself 
in a major conflict, with all the attendant chaos and uncertainty.
The evolution of Chinese nuclear practice could come about in several different 
ways. As suggested above, new challenges, considerations, or confidence could lead 
to a leadership-directed or top-down reevaluation or reinterpretation of policy. The 
development of new capabilities or technologies could also drive changes in practice. 
For example, the acquisition of technical or procedural capabilities important to some 
form of limited warfighting capability could lead Chinese planners to consider adjust-
ments to policy that would capitalize on such potential. Some new capabilities could 
come from China’s conventional missile forces, and some could come as a result of 
simple bureaucratic inertia in China’s research and development system. Finally, exter-
nal and internal drivers could work together if, for example, China felt challenged by 
the development of nuclear warfighting capabilities in India and therefore decided to 
accelerate some of its own programs.




China’s Nuclear Force Structure
China’s nuclear deterrent, once highly vulnerable to a disarming first strike, has been 
made far less so by the addition of road-mobile systems, new SSBNs, and qualitative 
improvements to the force. This chapter provides a brief overview of the historical 
and current evolution of Chinese nuclear forces, providing context for the subsequent 
discussion of how external and internal forces might either reinforce or deflect the 
current trajectory of these forces. It focuses on the current size and nature of Chinese 
nuclear forces and on programs that are thought to be currently in development. It also 
includes some brief historical background on the evolution of China’s nuclear deter-
rent, offers an overview of China’s current nuclear force structure, and highlights some 
systems that China may deploy in the future.
To date, improvements to Chinese nuclear forces have been broadly consistent 
both with a desire to maintain an assured retaliatory capability and with a no-first-
use doctrine, although recent developments will provide China with other possible 
employment strategies. China is enhancing the striking power and survivability of 
its theater and strategic missile forces and improving their ability to counter missile 
defense developments.1 For theater nuclear deterrence missions, China currently main-
tains DF-21 and DF-21A medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and two classes of 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the aging DF-3 and the newly revealed, 
and highly accurate, DF-26. China’s nuclear ICBM force consists of limited-range 
DF-4s, silo-based DF-5As and DF-5Bs, and road-mobile DF-31s and DF-31As. Beijing 
is also moving toward a sea-based nuclear deterrent capability based on the Jin-class 
(Type 094) SSBN and the JL-2 SLBM. Scholars and analysts estimate that, as of early 
2016, China’s nuclear stockpile includes roughly 260 nuclear warheads, of which about 
134 could be mounted on existing ICBMs and SLBMs.2
1 Michael S. Chase, Andrew Erickson, and Chris Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modern-
ization and its Implications for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 32, No. 1, 2009, pp. 67–114. 
We argued that the principal drivers of these developments are China’s assessment of its changing external secu-
rity environment, especially vis-à-vis the United States, and its growing concerns about the viability of its tradi-
tional deterrent posture, particularly in a missile defense environment.
2 For the warhead number, see Kristensen and Norris, 2016c, p. 205.
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Looking to the immediate future, China will almost certainly continue to develop 
its nuclear capabilities. The DF-5B, which made its debut during China’s August 2015 
victory parade, is the first Chinese missile said to be equipped with MIRVs. But others 
are likely to follow, and that could result in a rapid increase in the number of stra-
tegically deliverable warheads. China appears to be planning a follow-on SSBN and 
SLBM to enhance the sea-based component and appears to be conducting research on 
hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) to counter missile defenses.3 With a variety of new 
systems having matured and the MIRVing of DF-5s, the growth of China’s inven-
tory has accelerated, even as quality has improved, and growth (at least in strategically 
deliverable warheads) is likely to keep accelerating at least through 2025. Nevertheless, 
barring a more significant shift in military priorities and a willingness to confront the 
United States more directly, at potential political and economic cost, China will almost 
certainly not seek or achieve parity with the United States or Russia.
Historical Background
China successfully conducted its first nuclear weapon test on October 16, 1964, and 
established PLASAF to operate its nuclear ballistic missiles in 1966. That year, China’s 
DF-2 MRBM, which had a range of about 1,000 km and was developed from technol-
ogy from the Soviet Union, reached initial operational capability. China conducted its 
first thermonuclear test in 1967. But until the early 1970s, China’s nuclear force was 
still of questionable utility as a strategic deterrent. The DF-2 missile had several short-
comings, including its dependence on a nonstorable liquid propellant. A 1974 U.S. 
intelligence estimate described it as “an obsolescent and cumbersome missile system 
with slow reaction times.”4 U.S. analysts estimated that China had deployed only a 
small number of DF-2s, that production had ceased by 1971, and that the missile was 
retired from service in 1979.5
When China’s DF-3 IRBM became operational in May 1971, it reflected impor-
tant progress in China’s ballistic missile programs and bolstered the PRC’s limited 
strategic deterrent capabilities.6 With a longer range and a storable propellant, U.S. 
analysts noted that the DF-3 was “superior to the CSS-1 [DF-2] in range and reaction 
time,” but it still had poor accuracy. At the time, China was working on two new liq-
uid-fueled ICBMs—one with a range sufficient to reach Soviet targets east of the Urals 
3 See Zachary Keck, “China Confirms Hypersonic Missile Test,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2014.
4 See Director of Central Intelligence, China’s Strategic Attack Programs, National Intelligence Estimate 
13-8-74, June 13, 1974, p. 13.
5 John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1992, pp. 5–40.
6 Lewis and Hua, 1992.
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and some U.S. bases in Asia—and had “a large and ambitious program underway for 
the development and production of strategic missiles using solid propellants.”7 Beijing 
also showed interest in SSBNs and trained bomber crews to conduct nuclear missions, 
although its bombers were highly vulnerable to modern air defense systems. By mid-
1971, China had conducted 11 nuclear tests.
By the mid-1970s, China was capable of conducting nuclear strikes against tar-
gets along its periphery, including targets in the Soviet Union and U.S. bases in Asia.8 
China’s DF-4 limited-range ICBM achieved initial operational capability in late 1975. 
The two-stage, silo-based missile was the first China deployed that was capable of 
reaching Moscow. With a small nuclear force, however, Chinese leaders recognized that 
survivability was “crucial to the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent,” according to 
a 1974 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on China’s strategic weapons programs.9
In the early 1980s, China achieved several major milestones in developing its 
nuclear capabilities. May 1980 saw China’s first full-range flight tests of the DF-5 
ICBM into the Pacific Ocean. The following year, the DF-5 ICBM reached opera-
tional status, giving China a nuclear missile system capable of reaching targets in the 
continental United States.10 China conducted its first successful JL-1 SLBM flight test 
in October 1982, marking an important achievement in the development of solid- 
propellant ballistic missiles.11 The road-mobile solid-fueled DF-21 MRBM was first 
successfully flight-tested in May 1985, giving China a more responsive capability 
against regional targets. In addition, China began research and development on its 
second generation of strategic ballistic missiles, the JL-2 SLBM and the DF-31 road-
mobile ICBM.
Although China enjoyed positive relations and strategic cooperation with the 
United States in the 1980s, and Beijing saw the threat of Soviet attack as diminish-
ing, technological developments threatened to complicate China’s approach to nuclear 
deterrence. Most importantly, China’s concerns about U.S. plans to deploy a strategic 
missile defense system underscored Beijing’s anxiety that even a relatively limited mis-
sile defense capability could undermine its modest nuclear deterrent.12 Nonetheless, 
China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities remained limited throughout the 1990s.
7 Director of Central Intelligence, Communist China’s Weapons Program for Strategic Attack, National Intel-
ligence Estimate 13-8-71, October 28, 1971, p. 4.
8 Director of Central Intelligence, 1974, pp. 27–30.
9 Director of Central Intelligence, PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces, National Intelligence Estimate 13-76, 
November 11, 1976, p. 47. Note that Lewis and Xue state the DF-4 was not deployed until 1980.
10 Lewis and Hua, 1992.
11 Lewis and Xue, 1993.
12 See Brad Roberts, China and Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense 
Analysis, P-3826, September 2003, and Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global 
Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., China’s Growing 
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China’s Current Nuclear Force Structure
Since the 1990s, China’s nuclear posture has continued evolving.13 Today, China’s 
nuclear force consists of MRBMs and IRBMs for regional deterrence missions, silo-
based ICBMs, road-mobile ICBMs, and an emerging SSBN and SLBM capability.
Nuclear MRBMs and IRBMs
China’s nuclear-armed MRBMs and IRBMs now hold U.S. forces in Asia—and U.S. 
allies, should they facilitate such an attack—hostage in the event of nuclear attack 
against China. They also serve to deter nuclear attack by smaller powers, most promi-
nently India, and as a hedge against renewed tensions with Russia or a falling out with 
North Korea. China currently deploys DF-21 and DF-21A MRBMs and DF-3 and 
DF-26 IRBMs for regional nuclear deterrence missions.14 The DF-3, first deployed 
in 1971, is a single-stage liquid propellant IRBM with a maximum range of about 
3,000 km (1,900 mi). NASIC suggests that the DF-3 is transportable but has “limited 
mobility.”15 China still has about five to ten DF-3 launchers, according to the 2013 
NASIC report.16 Many observers expect that China’s 1970s vintage DF-3 IRBMs will 
likely be retired from service in the near future.17 China has been transitioning to 
a more survivable, road-mobile theater nuclear force for many years. This force cur-
rently consists of DF-21 and DF-21A MRBMs and the DF-26 IRBM. The DF-21 
and DF-21A are both two-stage solid propellant road-mobile missiles with maximum 
ranges of more than 1,750 km (more than 1,100 mi).18 According to the 2013 NASIC 
report on ballistic and cruise missile developments, China deploys fewer than 100 
launchers for these nuclear-armed MRBMs.19 In August 2015, China revealed a new 
road-mobile IRBM, the DF-26, with an estimated range of 3,000 to 4,000 km. Like 
the DF-21, both conventional and nuclear variants will be deployed.
Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.
13 Brad Roberts, “Strategic Deterrence Beyond Taiwan,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, 
eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2008.
14 NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, NASIC-1301-0985-09, 
2009, p. 14.
15 NASIC, 2013, p. 17.
16 NASIC, 2013, p. 17.
17 OSD, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009, Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, p. 24.
18 NASIC, 2009, p. 17.
19 NASIC, 2013, p. 17.
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Silo-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The silo-based DF-5 ICBM, a liquid-propellant, two-stage missile, served as the main-
stay of China’s intercontinental nuclear deterrence force for more than two decades 
after its initial deployment in 1981, and it remains an important component of that 
force today. China currently deploys about 20 of these missiles, which have a range of 
at least 13,000 km (more than 8,000 mi), sufficient to strike targets throughout the 
continental United States.20 A variant, marked DF-5B, participated in the August 2015 
victory parade, and the Chinese commentators announced that these carry MIRVs—
the first time that MIRVs have been deployed on Chinese missiles. The development 
has long been anticipated in U.S. government sources.21 The PRC also still fields some 
of its older and relatively limited-range, liquid-fueled DF-4 ICBMs, which are two-
stage liquid propellant missiles with a range of about 5,400 km (more than 3,400 mi). 
According to NASIC, China still has about ten to 15 launchers, but many observers 
anticipate that China will soon decommission this older system.22
Road-Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Small numbers of silo-based missiles (such as China’s DF-4s and DF-5s) are inherently 
vulnerable against greatly superior attacking forces, and China sought to mitigate vul-
nerability by developing and deploying mobile systems. After development programs 
that lasted many years, China has fielded two road-mobile ICBMs, the DF-31 and 
DF-31A. The DF-31 is a three-stage, solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM with a maxi-
mum range of more than 7,200 km (more than 4,500 mi). It is likely intended mainly 
to cover targets in Russia and Asia, but the missile’s range is sufficient to reach U.S. 
missile defense sites in Alaska, U.S. forces in the Pacific, and targets in parts of the 
western United States.23 The system, first flight tested in 1999, was deployed in 2006.24 
The DF-31A is a three-stage road-mobile ICBM with a maximum range of more than 
11,200 km (more than 7,000 mi). Deployed in 2007, its longer range allows it to 
reach targets throughout most of the continental United States. Hans Kristensen and 
Robert Norris estimate that, by 2016, China had deployed between 20 and 45 road-
mobile ICBM launchers, which is roughly consistent with the 2013 NASIC’s unclassi-
fied report on ballistic and cruise missile threats.25
20 NASIC, 2009, p. 21.
21 See, for example, OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China 2014, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014a, p. 7.
22 NASIC, 2013, p. 21.
23 Robert D. Walpole, “Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” statement for the record to the Senate 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, February 9, 2000.
24 NASIC, 2009, p. 24.
25 Kristensen and Norris estimate the total number of ICBMs at 50 to 75, and the same source lists an esti-
mated 30 silo-based ICBMs—yielding a range of between 20 and 45 road-mobile systems. NASIC, 2013, p. 21; 
Kristensen and Norris, 2016c, p. 206.
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Ballistic Missile Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Beijing’s long-standing pursuit of a sea-based deterrent is also aimed at enhancing the 
survivability of its nuclear force. Most observers agree that the only operational first-
generation Xia-class SSBN never conducted a deterrent patrol, but China is finally gain-
ing an operational submarine-based nuclear deterrent capability with the Type-094, or 
Jin-class, SSBN and the JL-2 SLBM.
Nuclear Warheads
In 2012, Hui Zhang, a researcher at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, estimated that China’s nuclear arsenal consists of about 170 
nuclear weapons.26 More recently, Kristensen and Norris, writing in the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, have estimated that China probably has about 260 nuclear war-
heads.27 These assessments are broadly consistent with publicly available information 
about Chinese fissile material production (see Chapter Eight) and with declassified 
U.S. intelligence reports.28 Significantly higher figures have occasionally been prof-
fered, but none based on credible evidence.29 Assessments by nongovernmental experts 
conclude that the warheads carried by China’s older missile systems are multimegaton 
warheads, whereas they judge that those deployed on its more modern road-mobile 
ICBMs have yields of several hundred kilotons.30
Evolution of China’s Nuclear Capability to Date
China’s nuclear forces have remained modest in size since their establishment in the 
1960s, but they have matured in terms of survivability and retaliatory capability, espe-
cially since the mid-1990s. In 1996, China deployed roughly 100 nuclear-capable mis-
sile systems—all were of limited, if any, mobility; all but the handful of DF-5s had 
limited range; and all but the JL-1 were liquid fueled (see Table 3.1). By 2016, China 
deployed more than 200 nuclear-capable missile systems, including roughly 100 that 
26 Hui Zhang, “China’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Intentions, Drivers, and Trends,” presented at the 
Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 53rd Annual Meeting, Orlando, Fla., July 15, 2012.
27 Kristensen and Norris, 2016c.
28 See, for example, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Proliferation Digest, March 1996.
29 Based largely on the scale of China’s military tunnel complex and on internet reports that have subsequently 
been discredited, Phillip A. Karber claims that the Chinese may have as many as 3,000 warheads. See Phillip 
A. Karber, “Arms Control Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall,” briefing, September 26, 2011, and 
William Wan, “Georgetown Students Shed Light on China’s Tunnel System for Nuclear Weapons,” Washington 
Post, November 29, 2011. For persuasive technical rebuttals that focus largely on the limits of China’s weapon-
grade fissile material and on dubious sources used in the Karber analysis, see Jeffrey Lewis, “Say It Ain’t So, Phil,” 
Foreign Policy, February 19, 2015, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Analysts Question Research on China’s Nuclear 
Arms,” webpage, December 2, 2011
30 See, for example, Shannon N. Kile, Philip Schell, and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,” in 
SIPRI Yearbook 2012, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2012, pp. 327–331.
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could reach parts of the United States from potential firing positions in China or the 
maritime domain.31 More important, China’s nuclear forces were far more capable 
and included road-mobile systems, modern (if still somewhat noisy) SSBNs, a limited 
number of MIRVed missiles, and a far larger number of solid-fueled systems.
Future Land- and Sea-Based Missile Systems
China’s Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia highlights a number of modernization 
goals. It indicates that China’s “strategic missile force building policy” [zhanlüe daodan 
budui jianshe fangzhen] is based on guidance from Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang 
Zemin, and Hu Jintao. According to the encyclopedia, the following are the specific 
guidelines for modernization:
• Use new era military strategic principles as guidance.
• Use information technology development as the core of construction.
• Focus on building quality.
• Improve overall combat capability (including survivability, rapid-response capa-
bility, command ability, penetration and defense abilities, attack capability, and 
support capabilities).
• Concentrate on strategic task requirements based on national and military condi-
tions (including economic affordability).32
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy highlights increasing the number of ICBMs, 
improving survivability, and enhancing the ability to penetrate enemy missile defenses 
as important means of strengthening China’s nuclear counterattack capability.33
As China continues to modernize its nuclear force structure in line with this 
general guidance, many analysts expect it to deploy more modern and survivable sys-
tems. In February 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Defense acknowledged the test of a 
new strategic missile variant, the DF-5C, and cited Western reports that it might carry 
as many as ten MIRVs.34 According to DoD, China is developing a new road-mobile 
ICBM, the DF-41, capable of carrying MIRVs.35 Although China has not officially 
31 The latter number of strategic delivery systems includes the JL-2 SLBM and DF-5 and DF-31 variants. The 
2016 DoD report on Chinese military power stipulates that “China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approx-
imately 75–100 [land-based] ICBMs,” a number which the report says includes the DF-4 (OSD, 2016, p. 58).
32 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 67.
33 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 233–234.
34 Ministry of National Defense, “China Says Its Trial Launch of DF-5C Missile Normal,” press release, Febru-
ary 6, 2017.
35 OSD, 2016, p. 25.
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≥5,500 1980 20 20 20 20 10 10 — — — —
DF-5A
(CSS-4 Mod 2)
≥13,000 1981 7 7 20 20 10 10 10 10 — —
DF-5B
(CSS-4 Mod 3)
≥13,000 2015 — — — — 10 30 10 30 20 60
DF-31
(CSS-10 Mod 1)
≥7,000 2006 — — 6 6 12 12 12 12 12 12
DF-31A
(CSS-10 Mod 2)
≥11,000 2007 — — — — 24 24 24 24 24 24
DF-41
CSS-X-20
≥12,000 — — — — — — 12 36 24 96
SLBMs
JL-1 ≥1,000 1986 12 12 12 12 — — — — — —
JL-2 ≥7,000 2015 — — — 48 48 60 60 60 60
JL-3 — — — — — — — ? ?
























Missiles Warheads Missiles Warheads Missiles Warheads Missiles Warheads Missiles Warheads
DF-21A
(CSS-5 Mod 1, 2)
2,150 1991 20 20 33 33 80 80 80 80 100 100
DF-26 3,500 2015 — — — — 8 8 20 20 30 30
HGVs
HGV-X Unknown — — — — — — — — 6 6
SOURCES: NASIC, 2009; NASIC, 2013; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1997, 2007, and 2016; OSD, 2016; Hans M. 
Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 4, July 1, 2015a, pp. 77–84.
NOTES: For theater missiles, the number of launchers is indicated. Some of these launchers may have associated reloads, so the actual number 
of missiles may be somewhat higher. The table includes only missiles and missile variants that are thought to be armed with nuclear warheads; it 
therefore excludes, for example, the DF-21C, which is armed with conventional warheads, and the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile. OSD, 2016, provides 
a larger total number of land-based ICBMs (75–100).
Table 3.1—Continued
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acknowledged the DF-41, the Chinese media reported widely on Western accounts 
of a second test launch of a DF-41 (armed in this case with two dummy warheads) in 
April 2016. The Chinese Defense Ministry, also citing Western reports, posted a mes-
sage on its website: “These tests are not aimed at any set country or target.”36 The 2016 
DoD report on Chinese military developments notes that
China insists the new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting 
of independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, are 
intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of contin-
ued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, 
and missile defense capabilities.37
China also reportedly plans to further strengthen the sea-based component of 
its nuclear deterrent with the development of the Type 096 SSBN and JL-3 SLBM.38 
In addition, China is developing HGVs. These systems can be boosted on a tradi-
tional missile and use aerodynamic lift in the upper atmosphere, extending their range. 
Most important for China, HGVs have the capability to maneuver and could therefore 
improve China’s ability to counter enemy missile defense systems.39 As of January 2017, 
China had conducted seven flight tests of an HGV that DoD has labeled the DF-ZF.
Conclusions
China’s nuclear forces have evolved rapidly in recent years, with gains to survivability, 
mobility, speed of preparation, and accuracy. The number of strategic weapons capable 
of reaching the United States has also grown, and the rate of growth has accelerated 
over the last 20 years as new systems have come online. Based on programs currently 
thought to be ongoing, at least some of which will include MIRVed warheads, growth 
is likely to continue increasing at least into the 2020s. Given the long lead times that 
many nuclear programs require, we are unlikely to see dramatic changes in the number 
36 “International Security: China Confirms Further Test of Long-Range Missile DF-41,” Sydney Morning 
Herald, April 22, 2016. The initial Western report on the test was carried in the Washington Free Beacon and 
quoted unnamed Pentagon officials (Bill Gertz, “China Flight Tests New Multiple-Warhead Missile: DF-41 
Launch Comes Amid Heightened Tensions over S. China Sea,” Washington Free Beacon, April 19, 2016).
37 OSD, 2016, p. 57.
38 For Chinese press reports on these systems, see, for example, ‹专家: 中国或加快潜艇建造新一代核潜艇
将具交强威慑› [“Specialist: China May Speed Construction of A New Generation of Nuclear Submarine to 
Strengthen Deterrence”], Renmin Wang, September 2, 2016, and ‹中国首次具备对美国有效的水下战略核威
慑› [“For the First Time, China Prepares an Undersea Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Effective Against the United 
States”], 环球网 [Huanqiu net], October 29, 2013.
39 OSD, 2016, p. 22; Lee Fuell, “Broad Trends in Chinese Air Force and Missile Modernization,” testimony 
before the U.S. -China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 30, 2014.
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and types of Chinese-deployed nuclear systems beyond those discussed above during 
the period considered. And China is not likely to reach parity with the United States 
and Russia over the next ten to 15 years. However, it is possible that changes in China’s 
external environment, its threat perceptions, or bureaucratic and technological factors 
could produce additional adjustments to Chinese nuclear programs, policy, or practice. 
Even if such changes would not be fully reflected in deployed forces in the next ten 
years, they could be within 15. We now turn to China’s perception of its external secu-




China’s View of the Global Security Environment
China’s view of its external security environment and the nuclear programs and strat-
egies pursued by neighboring states and potential adversaries have decisively shaped 
China’s nuclear doctrine and strategy. Beginning in 1964 with China’s first test of 
a nuclear weapon, Chinese leaders declared that its nuclear program was a reaction 
to “nuclear blackmail” by “hegemonic powers,” meaning the Soviet Union and the 
United States. In this chapter, as well as the following two chapters, we examine 
China’s views of its changing external security environment and how its threat percep-
tion might shape or drive continuity or change in its nuclear force structure, policy, 
or posture. This chapter examines China’s view of the global security environment, 
providing context for its assessment of nuclear issues. Chapter Five examines China’s 
evolving view of U.S. strategic forces and policy, the most important planning factors 
for China today. Finally, Chapter Six examines Chinese perspectives on other nuclear 
powers and the possibility that regional nested security dilemmas and the resulting 
development of second-tier nuclear forces could become more significant drivers for 
Chinese nuclear forces and planning in future years.
Overall Security Environment
Official Chinese government assessments of China’s security environment, as commu-
nicated through major policy documents, provide the basis on which Chinese strate-
gists fashion foreign and defense policy. Defense white papers and other authoritative 
assessments signal to analysts the consensus among China’s top policymakers about 
the trajectory of security trends around China’s periphery. These documents also offer 
an important analytical framework for understanding the priorities and concerns that 
might influence future changes to China’s foreign policy and defense posture.
Chinese strategic statements adopt a dualistic view of the external security envi-
ronment. On the one hand, Beijing sees its future as inextricably linked to the inter-
national community and perceives the overall security environment as peaceful and 
stable. Chinese leaders understand that China’s current growth model, combined with 
the acceleration of globalization, is intertwined with the international environment. 
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Thus, China’s success in accomplishing national revitalization relies on close and con-
tinuing interaction with global and regional powers, markets, and institutions. China’s 
2010 national defense white paper states succinctly, “[China’s] future and destiny has 
never been more closely connected with those of the international community.”1 In 
assessing the overall security environment, China’s 2015 defense white paper notes, 
“Peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide 
of the times.” Its 2013 defense white paper struck a similar tone, concluding that peace 
and development were the “underlying trends” in the strategic environment and noting 
that the “balance of international forces” was “shifting in favor of maintaining world 
peace.”2
On the other hand, Chinese policymakers see a range of increasingly severe threats 
to China and are increasingly willing to acknowledge such concerns in major policy 
documents. These threats include transnational terrorism, the diffusion of sophisti-
cated military and cyber technologies, and what Beijing regards as the strengthening 
of U.S.-led alliance relationships along China’s periphery that aim to threaten or oth-
erwise constrain Chinese national and territorial interests in the region.3 The tensions 
between these two views are reflected not only in official Chinese security assessments 
but also in semiauthoritative Chinese think-tank and university studies funded by 
the central government.4 While the Chinese government’s current position is that, on 
balance, China faces a favorable external security environment for continued growth 
and development, the propensity of Chinese forecasters to increasingly highlight the 
threats to China’s national interests illustrates a level of unease and concern about the 
future trajectory of China’s external security environment higher than at any time 
since at least the immediate post-Tiananmen period.
1 State Council Information Office, 2011.
2 State Council Information Office, 2015; State Council Information Office, 2013.
3 Recent authoritative publications, including China’s 2015 and 2013 defense white papers, its Blue Book on 
National Security, and Science of Military Strategy all conclude that containment, hegemonism, and “cold war” 
policies are on the rise, threatening China’s long-term economic and security development. These publications 
include State Council Information Office, 2015; State Council Information Office, 2013; ‹中国国家安全研究
报告2014› [“Annual Report on China’s National Security Studies 2014”], «国家安全蓝皮书» [Blue Book on 
National Security], Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014; and Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 170–171.
4 These studies include Zhang Youwen and Huang Renwei, eds., «中国国际地位报告» [China’s International 
Status 2013], Beijing: People’s Press, 2013; PRC National Defense University Center for Strategy, eds., «国际战
略形势与中国国家安全» [International Strategic Environment and Chinese National Security], Beijing: Eastern 
Press, 2016; 国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所 [State Oceanic Administration, Ocean Development Research 
Department], «中国海洋发展报告(2013)» [China’s Ocean Development Report (2013)], Beijing: State Oceanic 
Administration Press, 2014; and Li Xiangyang, ed., «亚太地区发展报告 (2015)» [Annual Report on the Develop-
ment of Asia-Pacific (2015)], Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2015.
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Low Likelihood of Major Power Conflict
An enduring feature of Chinese assessments of the external environment is a belief 
in the low probability of war among major powers. As the 2010 defense white paper 
states, “coordination and cooperation have become mainstream in relationships among 
the world’s major powers.”5 This view has roots in Deng Xiaoping’s seminal statement 
in 1985 that “peace and development are the main trends of the times” [heping yu 
fazhan shi dangjin shidai de zhuti] and reflects an understanding that the broad con-
tours of major power relations have changed since the height of the Cold War, lessen-
ing the imminence of armed conflicts among major powers and overturning Mao’s 
assessment of the likelihood of “early war, major war, and nuclear war” [zao da, da da, 
he zhanzheng].6
Jiang Zemin’s assessment in 2002 that the next 20 years represented a “period 
of strategic opportunity” [zhanlue jiyuqi] for China’s growth and development fur-
ther justifies and validates this assessment that the current international environment 
remains sufficiently peaceful to allow the continuation of reform-era foreign policies 
focused on promoting China’s stability and economic development.7 More recently, 
in a key foreign policy speech in November 2014, Xi Jinping reaffirmed that China 
remains in, and should seek to support and maintain, the “period of strategic opportu-
nity” outlined by Jiang Zemin.8
Threats Remain, Asia-Pacific Region Less “Stable”
The low probability of war among major powers is balanced by persistent Chinese 
concerns about multiple and growing threats to Chinese, Asian, and global stability. 
The 2013 defense white paper provides a comprehensive Chinese assessment of such 
concerns:
There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neointerventionism. 
Local turmoils occur frequently. Hot-spot issues keep cropping up. Traditional 
5 State Council Information Office, 2011.
6 See, for example, 宫力 [Gong Li], ‹邓小平对美政策思想与中美关系› [“Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on U.S. 
Policy and Sino-U.S. Relations”], «国际问题研究» [China International Studies], Vol. 6, 2004. See also Zhang 
Wankun Franklin, China’s Foreign Relations Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic Comparative Analysis, 
Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 1998.
7 Jiang Zemin, “Build a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics,” report at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
November 8, 2002.
8 耿聪 [Geng Cong], ‹习近平在中央外事工作会议发表重要讲话强调高举和平, 发展, 合作, 供应旗帜› 
[“In an Important Speech to the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Xi Jinping Emphasizes Holding 
Aloft the Banner of Peace, Development, Cooperation, and Win-Win”], People’s Daily, November 29, 2014, p. 1.
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and nontraditional security challenges interweave and interact. Competition is 
intensifying in the international military field.9
A 2016 report from the Chinese National Defense University goes further, arguing 
that the relationship between major powers appears to be moving from “cooperation 
being the primary” mode of interaction and “competition as secondary,” toward a situ-
ation where the two are reversed—with the world sliding toward a situation in which 
competition is becoming dominant.10
China’s 2013 defense white paper featured an unusually frank and overall nega-
tive assessment of the security situation in the Asia-Pacific. For the first time, Chinese 
strategists dropped an assessment that the security environment in the Asia-Pacific 
remained “stable.” The authors subsequently singled out the United States and Japan 
as contributing to instability, noting that “some country” has “strengthened its Asia-
Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region,” and “frequently 
makes the situation there tenser” [pinfan zhizao diqu jinzhang jushi].11 On Japan, the 
authors accuse the country of “making trouble” [zhizao shiduan] over the issue of the 
Senkaku Islands.12 This assessment is consistent with other recent Chinese studies on 
the Asia-Pacific environment, with several singling out Japan’s nationalization of the 
Senkaku Islands and increased patrol activities as key drivers of instability.13
Also prominent in these assessments is the notion that China’s territorial rights 
are increasingly being infringed on, with a recent defense white paper noting, “China 
has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity, and devel-
opment interests.”14 China’s 2015 defense white paper maintained the same theme, 
noting that China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are increas-
ingly being compromised and that Japanese actions and the U.S. rebalance are growing 
concerns for China.15 The fact that these assessments essentially mirror image regional 
perceptions that China is more often the initiator of challenges to the status quo—or 
at least responds disproportionately to the activities of others—does not mean that 
Beijing’s beliefs are not sincerely held.
9 State Council Information Office, 2013.
10 PRC National Defense University Center for Strategy, 2016.
11 State Council Information Office, 2013.
12 State Council Information Office, 2013.
13 See, for example, PRC National Defense University Center for Strategy, eds., «国际战略形势与中国国家安
全» [International Strategic Environment and Chinese National Security], Beijing: Eastern Press, 2012; “Annual 
Report on China’s National Security Studies,” 2014; State Oceanic Administration, Ocean Development 
Research Department, 2014.
14 State Council Information Office, 2013.
15 State Council Information Office, 2015.
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China’s Blue Book on National Security also strikes a pessimistic tone on recent 
trends around China’s periphery, noting the “Cold War thinking” of the United States 
and Japan in “reinforcing their policy of containment and constraint against China.”16 
The authors highlight the “increasingly grave disputes” over maritime sovereignty with 
neighboring states that are “likely to intensify in scale and complexity.”17 These assess-
ments highlight China’s frustration over what it regards as the increasingly antagonis-
tic behavior of other actors around China’s periphery, notably Japan and the United 
States, and of smaller states whose actions over territorial disputes China views as pro-
vocative, such as the Philippines and Vietnam—as well as the disconnect between 
Chinese views and those of many of its neighbors, most of whom view China as the 
primary culprit.
Chinese Views on Global Nuclear Environment
Chinese perceptions of the international security environment are closely tied to trends 
in the global nuclear environment. During the Cold War, Chinese analysts saw the 
nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as a symbol of 
the unstable and tense security environment that then characterized international rela-
tions. China’s generally positive but nevertheless mixed assessment of the global secu-
rity environment is thus also closely tied to a similar assessment of nuclear trends in the 
21st century. Beijing remains concerned about U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD); 
the nuclearization of space; the large nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia; 
and the developing nuclear capabilities of neighboring nuclear powers, including India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea.18 There is little, if any, apparent reflection about China’s 
own role in Pakistan’s nuclear program or the consequences of its inaction on North 
Korea’s.
The 2013 version of Science of Military Strategy notes that, while Chinese strate-
gists no longer view the current environment as being characterized by nuclear hege-
monism and power politics, China nonetheless faces a more “complex” nuclear envi-
ronment. The authors highlight four general trends:19
• the tendency of “major nuclear powers” (a clear reference to the United States) to 
treat China as its “main strategic opponent” [zhuyao zhanlve duishou]
• the growing actual or latent nuclear capabilities of China’s neighbors (India, Paki-
stan, and North Korea)
16 “Annual Report on China’s National Security Studies,” 2014, p. 1.
17 “Annual Report on China’s National Security Studies,” 2014, pp. 1–2.
18 Shou Xiaosong, 2013; China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012.
19 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 170–171.
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• the increasing sophistication of some major powers’ conventional military capa-
bilities, with the U.S. development of prompt global strike a particular concern, 
given the potential to target China’s nuclear weapons with conventional strikes
• outside pressure [waibu yali] for China to participate in arms limitations or reduc-
tions while it remains greatly inferior to the United States and Russia in nuclear 
capabilities.
The China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia provides another important assess-
ment of Chinese views on the nuclear environment. On the issue of “nuclear develop-
ment trends,” the authors view more countries adopting “dual deterrence strategies” 
combining nuclear and conventional capabilities. In this construct, the traditional 
nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based missile forces is replaced with a “four-in-
one” structure with space constituting a new strategic component.20 Furthermore, 
nuclear forces are becoming more “synthesized, multifunctional, miniaturized, and 
motorized.”21 And finally, the authors view innovations in the leadership and com-
mand structure as reducing “midlevel and segment components.”22
The authors are wary about trends in nuclear disarmament. They note that 
progress has been “slow and difficult and may even be reversed” because U.S. missile 
defenses have “widened the gap between the United States and other midlevel nuclear 
powers.”23 Missile defense systems, in their view, will “hinder” midlevel nuclear coun-
tries from participating in the process of nuclear disarmament, forcing them to “con-
sider enhancing their nuclear forces to counterbalance defense assets.”24 The authors 
also view the nuclear nonproliferation regime as “shaken” by the nuclear tests of India 
and Pakistan. Going forward, persuading India and Pakistan to join the NPT will be 
necessary for the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime.25
Conclusions
Chinese views of the global security environment suggest that, despite important ele-
ments of continuity in perspectives on the nature of the international system, chal-
lenges are increasing in number and severity. The U.S.-China relationship is, in this 
view, increasingly adversarial; Japan is showing worrisome signs of militarist revival; 
and a range of smaller states are challenging Chinese maritime rights. While the pros-
20 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 42–44; 127–128.
21 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 127–128.
22 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 127–128.
23 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 42–44.
24 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 42–44.
25 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 42–44.
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pects for general war may be low, Chinese strategic documents suggest a strong likeli-
hood that more-limited conflicts may occur. We can conclude from this that, even if 
Chinese economic growth rates decline in the coming years and decades, the demand 
signal for military resources is unlikely to diminish. Chinese leaders will have to bal-
ance military demands with a variety of societal needs. The rate of growth in military 
budgets may decline, but barring dramatic changes in the domestic or international 
situation, it is unlikely that growth in the military budget will lag significantly behind 
economic growth rates.
Within the larger environment of heightened risk, Chinese strategists see a number 
of specific nuclear challenges, including U.S. development of new offensive and defen-
sive systems, the growth of regional nuclear inventories, and increased pressure for 
China to participate in nuclear arms control negotiations before its forces have suffi-
ciently matured to guarantee its retaliatory capability. As noted in Chapter Two, Chi-
na’s historically limited view of minimum deterrence has meant that its nuclear forces 
have not received priority in PLA resource allocation. The transition from the Second 
Artillery Force to Rocket Force may signal a change in nuclear fortunes. Regardless, 
a credible nuclear deterrent is viewed as uniquely important to Chinese security. Any 
sense that U.S. or other countries’ capabilities could jeopardize China’s secure second-




Chinese Views of U.S. Nuclear Forces and Policy
Chinese strategic statements, as well as interviews with Chinese experts and policy-
makers, indicate that the United States and its nuclear forces are, overwhelmingly, the 
most important planning factor in the design and operation of Chinese nuclear forces.1 
In terms of nuclear capabilities, the United States is rivaled only by Russia, and of the 
two, only the United States is viewed as a potential adversary in plausible scenarios that 
could occur in the short- to medium-term future.2 Although they are clearly not the 
only drivers of Chinese nuclear development, U.S. nuclear forces and policy will have a 
larger impact on Chinese nuclear futures than those of any other single foreign power.
Disentangling China’s view of U.S. nuclear strategy from its view of U.S. national 
strategy more broadly is difficult. Chinese analysts tend to view strategic nuclear mat-
ters, as they view all military matters, in highly political terms. The view that the 
United States and China embrace competitive, as well as cooperative, positions on a 
range of strategic and broader political and economic issues bleeds into China’s con-
cerns about its nuclear position vis-à-vis the United States. But the reverse is also true. 
China’s deep suspicions of U.S. nuclear policy, fueled by fears over the implications 
of BMD and CPGS, feed into growing doubts about U.S. strategic intentions. To be 
sure, Chinese analysts have welcomed some U.S. adjustments to nuclear policy and 
programs over the past decade but nevertheless see considerable uncertainty about the 
implications of other programs for China’s retaliatory capability.
1 Chinese doctrinal texts note that the United States sees China as its principal threat but are circumspect in 
saying explicitly that China views the United States its principal threat. Rather, the emphasis is on U.S. systems 
and strategies that threaten Chinese nuclear posture, thus implying that China views the United States as the 
only country capable of threatening Chinese second-strike capabilities. Chinese academics, however, are more 
direct in their analysis that the United States constitutes China’s primary nuclear threat. As one academic puts 
it, “Overall, China’s nuclear forces are mainly directed at the United States” (Pei Shen, “China Has Undersea 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Against United States for the First Time,” Global Times Online [in Chinese], October 
30, 2013).
2 Chapter Six addresses the historical importance of Russia to Chinese nuclear development and Russia’s 
diminished but nevertheless significant role today.
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U.S. Nuclear Weapon Doctrine and Strategy
China’s perceptions about the U.S. nuclear threat date to the Cold War, when the 
United States adopted policies that China considered tantamount to “nuclear blackmail 
and hegemony.” Various U.S. officials threatened nuclear use during the Korean War 
and during the first and second Taiwan Crises (1954–1955 and 1958, respectively).3 In 
1965, shortly after China’s first nuclear test, Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out that if 
China genuinely wanted to put a stop to “nuclear blackmail from external powers,” it 
had to possess its own authentic nuclear deterrence force.4 This historical narrative of 
U.S. nuclear threat colors contemporary Chinese assessments of U.S. nuclear strategy.
Post–Cold War shifts in U.S. nuclear policy have heightened Chinese uncertain-
ties. The concept of a “new triad” based on nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, BMD, 
and revitalized defense infrastructure, revealed in purported leaks of the classified 
2002 U.S. NPR, raised the specter that the United States might develop strategies to 
neutralize a Chinese second-strike capability.5 Chinese doctrinal texts note that the 
Bush administration proposed the concept of “preemptive” nuclear strikes and that it 
reaffirmed the option to use nuclear weapons first if necessary.6
Chinese analysts viewed the 2010 NPR and 2013 Report on the Nuclear Employ-
ment Strategy of the United States more positively, seeing them as steps toward building 
greater confidence in U.S. intentions.7 Both documents stipulated that the “fundamen-
tal role” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, reaffirmed that the U.S. will 
not carry out or threaten a nuclear attack against nonnuclear-weapon states that are in 
compliance with their obligations under the NPT, and proposed efforts to reduce the 
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile in keeping with President Obama’s long-term goal of 
seeking a world without nuclear weapons. The 2013 report notes a lack of transparency 
3 Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the Korean 
War, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989; and Tong Zhao, “Nuclear Signaling and China’s Perception About 
Nuclear Threat: How China Handled Nuclear Threats in the Cold War,” paper presented at International Studies 
Association Annual Conference, March 2011.
4 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 7.
5 For more on the “new triad” see David S. McDonough, “The ‘New Triad’ of the Bush Administration,” Inter-
national Journal, Vol. 59. No. 3, 2004. Several Chinese participants in a track 2 dialogue called the new triad “the 
most dynamic and potentially threatening element in China’s nuclear security environment” (“Conference on 
U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” jointly organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
[CSIS], Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA], and the RAND Corporation, Beijing, June 20–21, 2006).
6 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 14.
7 DoD, Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2013, p. 3; 
DoD, 2010.
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in China’s conventional and nuclear weapon programs but points out that the United 
States “remains committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations.”8
Although the 2010 and 2013 reports were generally received positively in China, 
they did not fully ameliorate Chinese uncertainty over the direction of U.S. nuclear 
doctrine and the U.S. ability to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes against China.9 
Chinese strategists note with concern that the 2010 NPR reaffirmed that “there remains 
a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in 
deterring a conventional or [chemical or biological weapon] attack against the United 
States or its allies and partners.”10 Chinese scholars and nuclear strategists observe a 
lack of clarity over how and under what circumstances the United States will use its 
nuclear weapons itself constitutes a form of “nuclear coercion.” U.S. adversaries might, 
for example, face uncertainty about whether large-scale conventional attacks or attacks 
on critical U.S. assets may trigger nuclear retaliation. Fundamental questions remain 
over which scenarios might prompt U.S. military planners to employ nuclear weapons 
first during a conflict.11 They point out that U.S. nuclear submarines are equipped with 
SLBMs that can carry more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. These submarines provide 
the United States with the ability to attack hundreds of ground targets in the Asia-
Pacific with very little warning or reaction time.12
Chinese strategists also note that recent U.S. doctrine calls for reducing the role of 
nuclear weapons by exploring “what objectives and effects could be achieved through 
integrated nonnuclear-strike options, and to propose possible means to make these 
objectives and effects achievable.”13 As the 2013 Report on the Nuclear Employment 
Strategy of the United States notes, “Although they are not a substitute for nuclear weap-
ons, planning for nonnuclear strike options is a central part of reducing the role of 
8 DoD, 2013, p.  4. See also Lora Saalman, China and the US Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, February 2011.
9 For example, Chinese scholar Teng Jianqun notes that, on analyzing the 2010 NPR, the United States still 
has not changed its thinking on “global hegemony” (Lu Desheng: “Does ‘Spring of Nuclear Disarmament’ 
Come?—Interpretation of U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report by Teng Jianqun, Director of Arms Control 
Research Center of China Institute of International Studies” PLA Daily [in Chinese], April 8, 2010). Another 
prominent Chinese scholar on nuclear issues, Yin Chengde, acknowledged U.S. efforts toward reducing the 
amount of nuclear weapons in the 2010 NPR, but concluded that “no fundamental changes in the US strategy 
of nuclear hegemony had occurred,” which he sees as threatening China’s second-strike capability (Yin Chengde, 
“The New START Treaty and the Legend of a Nuclear-Free World,” «国际问题研究» [International Studies], 
July 13, 2010).
10 DoD, 2013, pp. viii, 16.
11 Noted Chinese scholar Li Bin also questions whether the U.S. will respond to a conventional attack on a U.S. 
aircraft carrier with a nuclear strike. See Li Bin, “Chinese Nuclear Policy Changes from ‘Limited Retaliation’ to 
‘Self-Defense,’” «军情洞察» [Military Affairs Percipience], June 22, 2009.
12 Li Bin and Nie Hongyi, 2008. For a discussion on U.S. number of nuclear-armed submarines and warheads, 
see Woolf, 2013, p. 16.
13 DoD, 2013, p. 5.
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nuclear weapons.”14 Chinese strategists fear that the United States may seek to replace 
some of the traditional missions of nuclear weapons with advanced conventional forces 
and missile defenses. Teng Jianqun, director of the Arms Control Research Center at 
the Chinese Institute of International Studies and a retired PLA officer, summarized 
Chinese thinking on this point:
Although [the U.S. NPR] said that the United States will not use nuclear weapons 
first against nonnuclear countries . . . the United States nevertheless has achieved 
absolute advantages in conventional weapons, has prevented missile defense sys-
tems from being restricted, and reserves options for using strategic bombers and 
long range ballistic missiles in conventional roles—the so-called “prompt global 
strike capability.” [This] further reflects the confidence that the United States has 
to protect American interests even without relying on nuclear deterrence. Such a 
posture helps the United States take the moral high ground, suppress those coun-
tries intending to acquire nuclear weapons, and force them to accept the limita-
tions by the NPT.15
Teng’s focus on BMD and conventional missile technology highlights a grow-
ing concern among Chinese policymakers that such advances could render China’s 
second-strike capabilities ineffective.
Ballistic Missile Defense
It is hard to overstate the importance of U.S. BMD as a driver of Chinese threat per-
ceptions in the strategic arena.16 An evaluation of the nuclear strategic environment by 
the Academy of Military Sciences, Chinese military strategists offered the following 
assessment of the impact of U.S. BMD systems on Chinese nuclear strategy:
The Asia-Pacific anti-missile system of the United States will threaten the effec-
tiveness of China’s limited nuclear deterrents and produce detrimental effects on 
China’s task of safeguarding her sovereignty, security, and unity. The imbalance 
of strategic power is caused by anti-missile defenses, and may in turn give rise to 
the danger of an escalating arms race. The continuing development of the missile 
defense systems may extend the arms race to outer space.17
14 DoD, 2013, pp. viii, 16.
15 Lu Desheng, 2010.
16 Christopher P. Twomey and Michael S. Chase, “Chinese Attitudes Toward Missile Defense Technology and 
Capabilities,” in Catherine M. Kelleher and Peter J. Dombrowski, eds., Missile Defense: The Fourth Wave and 
Beyond, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015.
17 ‹解读中国 ‘战略评估报告’ 八大核心问题› [“Chen Zhou Analyzes Eight Core Issues in China’s ‘Strategic 
Evaluation 2013’”], 中国广播网 [China National Radio Online], June 26, 2014.
Chinese Views of U.S. Nuclear Forces and Policy    61
Beijing has always been attentive to the larger strategic context and mean-
ing of missile defenses. The U.S. two-tiered Sentinel system, proposed and seri-
ously considered in 1967, was justified primarily against a Chinese nuclear threat.18 
Chinese criteria in judging the impact of deployed military systems include how the 
specific offense-defense configuration could affect strategic stability, the impact on 
major-power relations and regional security, and the implications for global arms con-
trol processes and direction. Hence, missile defense has seldom been treated merely 
as a military issue. Chinese strategists argue that U.S. missile defenses will have long-
term negative effects on arms control and nonproliferation efforts, as well as on broader 
international relations and strategic trust between the United States and China. The 
U.S. pursuit of a BMD system further reinforces the Chinese perception that Wash-
ington is seeking absolute security at the expense of others.19
The Chinese authors of Strategic Evaluation 2013 argue that U.S. missile defenses 
will hinder the international arms control process and could touch off a resurgence 
of the arms race, especially in outer space.20 Second-tier nuclear weapon states, in the 
authors’ view, will be less interested in joining multilateral nuclear disarmament nego-
tiations if they believe missile defenses will jeopardize their own ability to conduct 
nuclear counterattacks and will instead focus on improving the penetration capabili-
ties of their own systems—in part through technological improvements (e.g., the use 
of penetration aids) but also by increasing the number of deployed systems. The China 
Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia similarly notes,
The US missile defense deployment system has widened the gap between the 
United States and other midlevel nuclear powers. This will hinder midlevel nuclear 
countries from participating in the process of nuclear disarmament, forcing them 
to consider enhancing their nuclear forces to balance this defense system.21
More pointedly, Chinese strategists have also expressed concerns about what U.S. 
missile defenses might suggest about Washington’s strategic intentions toward Beijing 
and the extent to which U.S. missile defenses could undermine the credibility and 
effectiveness of China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Chinese experts and officials 
at track 2 dialogues have articulated concerns that the United States would tailor its 
18 Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense, Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institu-
tion, 2010.
19 This prompted retired Chinese general Peng Guangqian to claim that the United States is “is aimed at estab-
lishing its global absolute supremacy, affecting its global absolute control, and guaranteeing its global absolute 
security.” See Kang Yongsheng, “The U.S. Military’s Strategic Consideration Behind the Building of the Asia-
Pacific Missile Defense System,” «中国青年报» [China Youth Daily], June 28, 2013.
20 “Chen Zhou Analyzes . . . ,” 2014.
21 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, p. 25.
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nuclear forces to negate China’s second-strike capability.22 Separately, Chinese scholar 
Li Bin has underscored the potential impact of a capable BMD system on China’s 
second-strike capability:
Chinese nuclear deterrence depends directly on American perceptions about the 
Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability. The deployment of NMD [national mis-
sile defense] would change these perceptions and therefore significantly under-
mine the Chinese deterrent. Without the backup of NMD, the Americans would 
always worry about a Chinese retaliation with the few Chinese nuclear weapons 
that might survive a U.S. first nuclear strike against China . . . . If the Americans 
tended to believe that a first nuclear strike plus a NMD system would be able to 
disarm the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability, the U.S. could become incau-
tious in risking nuclear exchanges with China in a crisis.23
As Li’s statement indicates, it is the combination of a small, if recently much improved, 
retaliatory capability with adversary missile defenses that gives Chinese planners most 
pause about the present state of China’s nuclear force structure. Li indicates that Chi-
na’s response to improvements in U.S. missile defense capabilities could include some 
combination of the following:24
• establishing the capability to overwhelm missile defenses by building more ICBMs 
or by MIRVing Chinese ICBMs to multiply the number of warheads
• equipping Chinese missiles with the ability to release decoys or chaff to fool sen-
sors
• lowering the observability of warheads by employing stealth technologies
• developing maneuverable reentry vehicles
• increasing the ability of Chinese ICBMs to survive a first strike by deploying 
more mobile missiles and/or SSBNs
• building missile defense to protect Chinese ICBMs
• raising the alert level of Chinese nuclear forces.
In addition to concerns about the U.S. deployment of ground-based interceptor 
systems as part of the NMD program, Chinese strategists also view the U.S. develop-
ment of theater missile defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia as problematic. Concerns 
about TMD were articulated in Chinese government policy documents as early as 
2004, when the authors of the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns predicted that cer-
tain countries will use “great strengths” in promoting TMD systems, with the help of 
22 “Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” 2006.
23 Li Bin, 2001.
24 Li Bin, 2001, p. 5.
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“allies’ cooperation as support.”25 The authors concluded that such systems would serve 
to “lower our missile penetration probabilities” and produce “grave impacts on our 
missile firepower strikes.”26 The TMD threat will, one scholar has argued, force China 
to “improve its capabilities of survival and penetration.”27
On August 23, 2012, the Wall Street Journal reported that the United States was 
planning a major expansion of missile defenses in Asia.28 According to U.S. officials, 
the move was designed to contain threats from North Korea. The planned buildup was 
part of a defensive array that could cover large swaths of Asia. Under the expansion, a 
new forward-based X-band (FBX) radar was deployed in southern Japan, complement-
ing a similar system already deployed in northern Japan. Separately, a Pave Paws radar 
site was completed by Raytheon in Taiwan in March 2013 for the use of the Taiwan 
military. These deployments complement U.S. Navy plans to expand its fleet of BMD-
capable warships from 26 to 36 by 2018, with more than 60 percent deployed to Asia.29 
The United States is also deploying mobile U.S. missile defense interceptor missiles, 
discussed further below.
China sees the U.S. decision to deploy TMD systems in the context of the broader 
U.S. political strategy in East Asia and its policy toward China, in particular the U.S. 
“rebalance” to Asia. China sees TMD as yet another deliberate step that the United 
States has taken to strengthen the U.S.-Japan military alliance, increase intelligence 
sharing, and promote research and development cooperation.30 The decision to deploy 
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, announced 
formally in July 2016, suggests an expanding degree of regional anti–ballistic missile 
cooperation and exacerbates Chinese fears of being surrounded by a set of alliances 
aimed at containing Beijing.31 Other concerns are more directly related to Chinese 
security and nuclear deterrent capability.
25 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 63. 
26 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 63.
27 “China Warns of Response to U.S. Missile Defense,” Global Security Newswire, July 19, 2012; Te-ping Chen 
and Alastair Gale, “China Warns on Proposed New Missile Defense System for Seoul,” Wall Street Journal, May 
29, 2014. One scholar questioned the deployment of the X-band radar so close to the Chinese mainland and con-
cludes that the logical target of continued TMD developments is not North Korea, but China (Li Bin, “China 
and the New U.S. Missile Defense in East Asia,” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, September 6, 2012).
28 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Plans New Asia Missile Defenses,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 
2012.
29 Entous and Barnes, 2012; Malcolm Moore, “Pentagon Plans New Missile Defences in Asia,” Daily Telegraph, 
August 23, 2012.
30 ‹美日导弹防御合作马不停蹄, 两国提升情报分享› [“U.S., Japan Cooperation on Missile Defense Unre-
lenting, Two Countries Upgrade Intelligence Gathering”], «环球时报» [Global Times], September 9, 2006.
31 “South Korea and U.S. Agree to Deploy Missile Defense System,” New York Times, July 7, 2016; “South 
Korea, U.S. to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense, Drawing China Rebuke,” Reuters, July 8, 2016.
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Of greatest concern to China is the possible integration of TMD with U.S. NMD. 
Wu Riqiang, professor at Renmin University, suggests that FBX could track Chinese 
missiles on trajectories to the United States.32 Depending on the effective range of 
the FBX (which he estimates might be between 1,200 and 2,000 km, depending on 
the size of the target), systems in Japan might track Chinese SLBMs launched from 
the South China Sea or possibly ICBMs launched from central or southern China.33 
While U.S. ground-based interceptors located in Alaska or California could not use 
forward-based radar for targeting solutions, the radars could, Wu argues, compromise 
China’s retaliatory capability in several other ways. First, they might give the United 
States more warning time and, hence, more battle space. Second, longer radar track-
ing time might better enable the United States to discriminate decoys from warheads, 
since more information will tend to improve discrimination. And third, Wu argues, if 
the FBX could see the warhead and decoy separation, it might identify the decoys and 
actual warheads at that time.34
Some Chinese concerns are rooted in technological uncertainty, as in the case 
of the FBX ranges noted above. U.S. programmatic uncertainty and questions about 
Washington’s future course are also issues. Chinese strategists note that, at present, 
U.S. interceptors deployed in Asia are, at best, capable of intercepting MRBMs, but 
not IRBMs or ICBMs, given the higher trajectories of the latter two categories of sys-
tems. However, the United States and Japan have jointly developed and begun live-fire 
testing of a new Aegis-launched missile (the SM-3 Block IIA) capable of intercept-
ing IRBMs.35 In March 2013, the United States canceled its program to develop a 
follow-on to the Block IIA, the SM-3 Block IIB, which was slated to provide sea- and 
land-based defense against ICBMs. Whether deployed in Asia or off the U.S. coast, 
the SM-3 IIB might have provided a layered defense against incoming ICBMs and 
SLBMs. That layered defense, in conjunction with improved X-band radar capabili-
ties, could have plausibly enabled a shoot-look-shoot capability and produced a far 
more effective missile defense against China.36 Despite the system’s cancellation, Chi-
nese planners believe they must plan against the possibility that development of the 
SM-3 IIB, or something like it, could restart.
In light of trends in BMD development, few Chinese scholars and policymakers 
see a path out of the Sino-American nuclear security dilemma. Prominent nuclear aca-
32 Wu Riqiang, Why China Should Be Concerned with U.S. Missile Defense? How to Address It? Atlanta: Georgia 
Institute of Technology, Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation, undated.
33 Of note here, the FBX recently deployed to southern Japan would be better positioned to track trajectories 
from central China than would the preexisting systems in Aomori Prefecture.
34 Wu Riqiang, undated.
35 U.S. Missile Defense Agency, “U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development Project Conducts Successful Flight Test 
of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA,” Fort Belvoir, Va.: U.S. Department of Defense, December 8, 2015.
36 Wu Riqiang, undated.
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demics, such as Li Bin, while hinting of countermeasures, such as dummy warheads 
and deception, as a low-cost alternative to an arms race, ultimately conclude that the 
inherent uncertainty brought about by nuclear weapons technology forces policymak-
ers to prepare for worst-case scenarios:
Theoretically, the U.S. missile defense would undermine the development of Chi-
na’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Therefore, China is bound to take measures to 
maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. From an economic perspec-
tive, an arms race in offensive nuclear weapons and missile interceptors would be 
disadvantageous to both countries. China could presumably employ such low-
cost countermeasures as dummy warheads, which could alleviate strategic weapon 
competition. However, because the technology is uncertain, decisionmakers may 
not be able to clearly foresee the long-term relationship between mutual devel-
opment [of weapons systems] and restraint. So, facing the development of U.S. 
missile defenses, China has to adopt alternative measures. Thus, China will face 
uncertainties on its path toward the development of strategic missiles.37
Conventional Prompt Global Strike
U.S. plans for CPGS call for the capability to strike targets anywhere in the world in 
as little as an hour. A number of different technologies have been explored, including 
an HGV that could be deployed on modified Peacekeeper missiles. Other systems have 
been considered and rejected, including conventional warheads mounted on Trident II 
SLBMs. Whatever system is ultimately chosen, if any, will represent a niche capability 
that will be deployed only in small numbers.38
Chinese analysts view CPGS, along with BMD, as part of a larger U.S. effort to 
achieve “absolute security” [juedui anquan]—the pursuit by U.S. military planners of 
numerical and technical superiority over all potential adversaries and of the ability to 
neutralize any countermeasures or retaliation.39 Of the four items listed in the 2013 
Science of Strategy as elements of “the nuclear security environment faced by China,” 
37 Li Bin and Nie Hongyi, 2008, p. 4.
38 Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 24, 2016.
39 As one analyst notes, the Obama administration seeks to continue to maintain a “leading-edge in nuclear 
technology and to consolidate and expand the conventional military strength so as to maintain and strengthen 
its ‘absolute security’” (王志军 [Wang Zhijun], ‹论美国 ‘绝对安全’ 神学政治与奥巴马 ‘无核世界思想’› [“On 
the United States’ Political Theology of ‘Absolute Security’ and Obama’s ‘Nuclear-Free World’”], «国际论坛» 
[International Forum], Vol. 1, 2010). Other analysts use the term global control [quanqiu kongzhi] to describe U.S. 
policy in this regard (Ning Wen, Jing Bo, and Tang Li Wen, ‹美国快速全球打击计划深讨与启示› [“Illuminat-
ing and Discussing U.S. Prompt Global Strike Plan”], «装备指挥技术学院学报» [Journal of Academy of Equip-
ment], Vol. 3, 2011).
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CGPS was listed third, reflecting a degree of concern about CPGS that may be difficult 
for U.S. analysts to appreciate given its expected “niche” role only in U.S. defense plan-
ning.40 Chinese articles on CPGS reveal both an acute interest in its technical capa-
bilities and a deep fear of the potential repercussions of an operational U.S. capability. 
Chinese analysts tend to view CPGS as a threat to China’s nuclear weapon systems and 
strategy and to its command and control centers and space assets. They are particularly 
concerned that such systems could be employed to disable Chinese nuclear weapons 
without crossing a “nuclear threshold,” thus rendering any nuclear counterstrike by 
China as an escalatory and destabilizing move.41
Some Western arms control experts have expressed concern about the escalatory 
potential of CPGS, such as the difficulty that those on the receiving end of such an 
attack might have distinguishing CPGS from a nuclear attack if, for example, ICBMs 
equipped with conventional warheads were employed. Adjustments have been made to 
CPGS programs and the use of ICBMs excluded from consideration partly as a result 
of this logic.42 However, some concerns are harder to mitigate. China’s Rocket Force is 
charged with overseeing China’s conventional and nuclear missiles, and Chinese plan-
ners worry that a CPGS attack might target command and control centers responsible 
for both nuclear and conventional arsenals, thus compromising China’s nuclear retalia-
tory capability.43
Chinese analysts tend to lump all CPGS weapons that U.S. planners have ever 
considered into the category of potential future threats, regardless of whether there 
were ever associated programs. Indeed, many Chinese discussions of CPGS appear to 
refer to all long-range precision strike. Given past U.S. consideration of space-based 
weapons, this logic also explains why Chinese analysts place CPGS (along with missile 
defense) into a narrative of U.S. pursuit of “space weaponization.” As one such analyst 
notes:
United States’ PGS unsettles crisis stability in outer space and will have a severe 
impact on strategic stability. Advancing the practice of weaponizing outer space 
not only causes a direct threat to its peaceful use, but also damages the national 
sovereignty [of other states] and personal privacy. The U.S. obstruction of negotia-
40 The text reads: “Innovations in conventional military capabilities among the major powers are becoming 
more sophisticated, namely the United States’ development of prompt global strike, which, once operational, has 
the capacity to target China’s nuclear weapons with conventional strikes” (Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 170–171).
41 One article written by three academics affiliated with the Armament Command Technology Party School 
points out that CPGS will “challenge [China’s] nuclear strategy because the U.S. can use conventional missiles to 
strike our nuclear installations” (Ning Wen, Jing Bo, and Tang Li Wen, 2011).
42 See Woolf, 2016. See also David E. Mosher, Lowell H. Schwartz, David R. Howell, and Lynn E. Davis, 
Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and U.S.-Russian Relations, Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1666-NSRD, 2003, p. 5.
43 Saalman, 2014, p. 7.
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tions on the preventing space weaponization has led to frustrations in the interna-
tional arms control [community].44
Perhaps more reasonably, interviews with Chinese strategists also suggest that 
their concern extends to the ISR capabilities associated with CPGS. These might, 
regardless of the attack systems employed with them, compromise the security of their 
mobile missile force.45
Several Chinese articles point to the “strategic ambiguity” [战略模糊性] introduced 
by CPGS. They highlight the fact that CPGS blurs the distinction between conven-
tional strategic and tactical missiles and thereby complicates escalation problems. If, for 
example, the United States employed CPGS systems to achieve strategic ends, adver-
saries would be forced to adopt escalatory countermeasures to offset whatever strategic 
advantages CPGS attacks might confer on the adversary.46 These articles also note that 
strategic ambiguity about CPGS employment could be intentional on the part of the 
United States, buttressing deterrent or coercive leverage by leaving potential target 
countries, such as China, Iran, and North Korea, guessing as to how or if the United 
States would deploy such assets.47
Conclusion
The United States and its strategic forces and strategy are overwhelmingly the most 
important planning factors for Chinese nuclear strategists today. Although other 
regional states are likely to become more important in the future than they are now, 
considerations related to U.S. strategic forces will likely remain primary. Overall, 
Chinese experts and strategists believe that the qualitative improvements to the 
Chinese nuclear inventory in recent years have enhanced the survivability of China’s 
nuclear forces and made the country’s deterrent capability more robust. However, 
Chinese strategists remain deeply concerned about the possibility that new U.S. doc-
trines, technologies, and priorities could jeopardize the future effectiveness of this 
44 Xu Nengwu, “The Threats and Challenges to Outer Space Security Posed by the Adjustment of the U.S. Stra-
tegic Deterrent System,” National Defense Science & Technology, Vol. 34, No. 2, April 2013.
45 Interviews, Beijing, May 2014.
46 As one analyst put it, “CPGS destroys traditional notions of what constitutes tactical, strategic, and nuclear 
systems and their use. Thus, traditional notions of nuclear deterrence and nuclear balance might give way to a new 
round of arms completion” (Wei Zilin et al., “Current Situation and Development of U.S. Outer Space Prompt 
Global Strike System,” «飞航导弹» [Aerodynamic Missile Journal], Vol. 2, 2012). Other analysts note that CPGS 
has “similar strategic effect” as nuclear weapons, thus upsetting the nuclear balance and giving the United States 
a strategic edge (Li Dapeng and Liu Shunsheng, “Military-Strategic Balance in the 21st Century and the Impact 
Factors,” National Defense Science and Technology, Vol. 34, No. 2, April 2013, p. 1).
47 “U.S. ‘Prompt Global Strike’ Threatens China, Russia,” Asia Times (in Chinese), February 4, 2010.
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deterrent. They appear convinced that a portfolio of further improvements to Chinese 
nuclear forces will likely be required to ensure they remain capable of implementing 
their deterrent and retaliatory functions.
China is prone to view BMD and CPGS as parts of a larger U.S. strategy designed 
to upset traditional notions of nuclear strategic balance and achieve “absolute security,” 
a perspective that highlights broader concerns over the larger direction of American 
conventional and nuclear strategy. U.S. forces and actions are not the only drivers 
of Chinese nuclear planning, but development in the United States, particularly the 
future development of BMD and CPGS, will have a profound influence on the future 
shape of Chinese nuclear forces. Bureaucratic, technological, and inertial forces may, 
together with developments in China’s nuclear relationships with other powers, also 
push China toward a higher quality, more versatile, and larger nuclear force structure, 
but the most powerful push would likely come from U.S. actions or developments that 
appear to jeopardize China’s assured retaliatory capability.
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CHAPTER SIX
Nested Security Dilemmas and China’s View of Other 
(Non-U.S.) Nuclear Powers
Although deterring U.S. nuclear attack or coercion remains the primary consideration 
in Chinese nuclear strategy, nuclear developments in other states—particularly in 
India, Pakistan, Russia, North Korea, and Japan—increasingly inform Chinese per-
ceptions of its evolving security environment. Given growing regional nuclear arsenals 
and the new salience of nuclear issues in regional security, these countries are likely 
to take on even greater significance to Chinese nuclear planning in the future. This 
chapter addresses Chinese views of developments in each of the countries just listed, 
highlighting in particular the evolving importance, for different reasons, of India and 
Russia. Before moving on to discuss China’s perspective on individual countries, how-
ever, we briefly discuss the more general problem of multilateral nuclear dynamics in 
the Asia-Pacific region.
Nested Security Dilemmas
China is embedded in a complex set of regional security competitions within which the 
actions of even ostensibly friendly states can pose indirect but potentially serious prob-
lems for China (Figure 6.1). The actions of these states may, for example, cause other 
countries that are viewed as potential adversaries to buttress their military capabilities 
in ways that are antithetical to China. For example, Chinese strategists do not view 
Pakistan as a direct security challenge, but Pakistani military capabilities are a major 
driver of Indian security policy. The modernization of Indian forces can, in turn, pose 
challenges to Chinese planners. Although these dynamics may apply to conventional, 
as well as nuclear, security, they may be particularly complex and acute on the nuclear 
side, given the number of countries’ interests that can be simultaneously affected by 
delivery systems of very substantial range.
At the system level, although the United States and China cooperate in a number 
of important arenas, they are also engaged in security competition or “hedging.” At 
the regional level, China also views India and Japan as potential adversaries, although 
again, it also cooperates with these states in many areas. Complicating this picture, the 
















Balancing or hedging relations
Security enhancing relations
United States, India, and Japan are also all involved in some degree of security com-
petition with other regional states. In East Asia, the United States, Japan, and South 
Korea are deeply concerned about North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities. Con-
cerns about North Korea have largely motivated U.S. NMD and U.S.-Japan and U.S.–
Republic of Korea cooperation on TMD—issues of obvious concern to China. South 
Korea, for its part, remains deeply suspicious of Tokyo, and security developments 
in Japan influence South Korean security decisionmaking. In some cases, the results 
can affect Chinese security interests. The recent push to revise the civilian nuclear 
agreement between Washington and Seoul and permit certain types of reprocessing in 
South Korea was justified in large measure by similar allowances for Japan.
In the South Asian context, we have already noted the important role Pakistan 
plays in shaping Indian security policy and the consequent implications for Chinese 
security. Chinese strategists do not regard Russia as a potential military adversary but, 
incongruously, are concerned about discussions of “China threats” in Russia. And Chi-
nese analysts see Russian nuclear policy as working to shape international strategic 
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trends and thinking. Russia keys on local, European, and U.S. threats in considering 
its own strategy and force structure, but its actions have at least indirect consequences 
for Beijing.
Given the growing nuclear arsenals of several states around China’s periphery and 
the increasing complexity of interactions between regional states, Asia’s nested security 
dilemmas are likely to significantly influence Chinese nuclear thinking in the coming 
decade. As a driver of insecurity and competition, causality within nested security 
dilemmas can run in various directions. One of the main features of this situation is 
the potential for any given nuclear development to affect the security interests of states 
not originally targeted or even seriously considered by the original actor. In the conclu-
sion of this chapter, we address further the implications for the United States. In the 
following sections of this chapter, we address nuclear developments in several countries 
(Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Japan) and their direct and indirect impact 
on Chinese nuclear thinking.
Russia as Contributor to Global Nuclear Atmospherics
China’s views about Russia’s nuclear forces and capabilities have changed significantly 
since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Russian nuclear capabilities and 
strategy were key considerations in shaping China’s nuclear doctrine and force struc-
ture. Although Russia is no longer viewed as a significant threat and is therefore a less 
important planning factor today, PLA leaders closely monitor nuclear developments 
in Russia. PRC military publications and press articles note post–Cold War changes 
in Russian strategy that indicate an expanded role for nuclear weapons and the relax-
ation of previous restraints on their use. In addition, Chinese publications trace several 
Russian force modernization efforts as Moscow has reassessed its relationship with the 
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the turn of 
the century.
Despite this close observation and some trepidation about Russian tactical nuclear 
weapons in the Far East, PRC planners and policymakers do not view Russia as a secu-
rity competitor. Rather, Chinese efforts to maintain awareness of Russian developments 
focus on Russia’s role as a major nuclear power. Monitoring developments in Russia 
is thus essential to understanding the role nuclear weapons play in the continuously 
evolving and increasingly competitive international security environment. According 
to Chinese strategists, Russia’s nuclear force developments—much like China’s—are 
seen largely as a response to the United States and to U.S. allies’ efforts to maintain a 
hegemonic international position.
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Soviet Union as a Primary Cold War Threat
During the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 marked a shift in the 
thinking of China’s political and military leaders, convincing them that the Soviet 
Union presented a greater threat than the United States did. The Soviets’ use of nuclear 
signaling in 1969, including mock attacks on PRC nuclear facilities, demonstrated a 
significant level of coercive intent.1 Consequently, China’s military strategic guidelines 
in the early 1970s to mid-1980s designated the Soviet Union as “the main target of 
defensive operations.”2 In the face of an overwhelming disparity of nuclear capability, 
China’s nuclear posture was centered on maintaining the ability to conduct a second 
strike following a disarming first strike by the Soviets. This requirement likely shaped 
China’s force structure and, specifically, development of the DF-4 and DF-5 missiles, 
which were designed to be capable of targeting Moscow.3 Beginning in 1971, Second 
Artillery’s DF-4s were moved to Qinghai and other sites in Northwest China to range 
Soviet targets more effectively.4
The underlying theme in PRC nuclear force development was China’s recognition 
of Soviet nuclear superiority. Beijing understood that addressing this discrepancy in a 
symmetrical fashion would be unproductive and prohibitively costly. Hence, China’s 
nuclear strategy emphasized attacking countervalue targets and did not attempt to 
develop significant counterforce capabilities. But the strategy did require that a por-
tion of China’s missile force be capable of surviving a Soviet first strike and then pen-
etrating its missile defenses. In part because of the skepticism of Chinese leaders about 
the utility of nuclear weapons beyond nuclear deterrence, Beijing pursued a three-part 
approach: developing a small force capable of threatening the Soviet Union with signif-
icant damage; building a defensive posture emphasizing survivability; and mitigating 
the effects of nuclear attack through civil defense, redundancy, and hardening. There 
was effectively no high-level support for building large, technically capable nuclear 
forces.5
1 Lewis, 2007, pp. 15, 67; and Michael S. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and 
the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969, Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010. During the conflict, China’s 
nuclear bases were under order to prepare defenses as Soviet aircraft conducted mock attacks on PRC nuclear 
facilities. Despite Mao’s order that “nuclear bases should be prepared for the enemy bombardment,” Second Artil-
lery was not ordered to a higher state of alert, and most Chinese preparations in response to the Soviet threat 
centered on survival using hardening and dispersal. These efforts were a portion of a broader “war preparation” 
campaign undertaken in 1969 that sought to make Chinese defense industry and economic sectors redundant 
and survivable.
2 David Michael Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic 
Guidelines,’” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring 
the Contours of China’s Military, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 93.
3 Lewis and Xue, 1988, p. 66.
4 Lewis and Xue, 1988, p. 213.
5 For instance, Zhang Aiping, at one time China’s defense minister, argued that “it is unnecessary for us to 
achieve tremendous accuracy . . . . I don’t think there is too much difference between the results, provided China’s 
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The PRC’s early nuclear force development, the perceptions on which these efforts 
were based, and the resulting plans for confronting the Soviet Union raise several 
important points for understanding the Rocket Force’s current modernization efforts. 
While we should not assume a linear projection based on this history, the historical 
record may nevertheless shed light on Chinese thinking when facing an existential 
threat from an enemy with vastly more nuclear weapons at its disposal.
China’s leaders appeared to question whether the Soviets would initiate a nuclear 
strike on China, particularly in the 1969 border conflict. There is disagreement about 
whether China placed its strategic forces on alert in what is widely regarded as the most 
serious foreign policy crisis that China had yet faced as a nuclear power.6 Although 
China’s leaders called for advanced preparations against Soviet nuclear strikes, a report 
from senior military officials to the CMC ultimately concluded that a Soviet nuclear 
attack was unlikely.7 This conclusion is significant because it indicates that, in a major 
crisis with potentially devastating consequences, the use of nuclear weapons and the 
idea of conflict escalation were not central to the PRC’s approach to planning for or 
managing the crisis.
Beijing’s adoption of a nuclear force of modest size and capability was closely 
related to China’s views on the limited efficacy of nuclear weapons. This view of 
nuclear weapons was, in turn, partly shaped by China’s experiences with the Soviet 
Union. China’s initial emphasis on avoiding nuclear coercion began with U.S. nuclear 
threats during the 1950s but was later applied to relations with the Soviet Union as the 
relationship with Moscow deteriorated. As a result, China’s leaders were satisfied with 
much lower overall numbers to satisfy the requirement for basic survivable second-
strike capability. The Soviet collapse in 1990 reinforced Beijing’s emphasis on avoiding 
the economic and political mismanagement that led to collapse and strengthened its 
determination to avoid costly nuclear arms races. This does not suggest that Chinese 
leaders will not further enhance their nuclear forces should their effectiveness be in 
doubt, but it does suggest that there might be limits on the speed and degree of change.
A New Context: China’s Views of Russia’s Nuclear Forces in the “New Era”
China’s perspective changed fundamentally with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War, but Russia still plays an essential role in PRC nuclear think-
ing. Both sides present the Sino-Russian relationship as a strategic partnership. Fu 
Ying, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, 
ICBM misses its predetermined target, the Kremlin, and instead hits the Bolshoi Theater” (Lewis, and Xue, 1988, 
p. 214). This anecdote reflects the central concern for China’s leaders in its approach to a vastly superior nuclear 
power: the ability to destroy urban areas or soft military targets in a retaliatory strike.
6 Lewis, 2007, p. 15; Gerson, 2010, p. iv.
7 Lewis, 2007, p. 79.
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has written that the two are “close, but not allies.”8 Chinese strategists and planners 
do not identify Russian nuclear forces as a direct threat to China but do note the con-
tinued Russian deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Far East. More broadly, 
they see Russian nuclear developments as shaping the global atmospherics of nuclear 
security issues. Chinese decisionmakers view the overall direction of Russian nuclear 
developments as troubling. Moscow has taken a progressive series of steps that increases 
the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy and lowers the threshold for their use, 
setting an example others might follow.
As early as 2006, Chinese analysts noted that Russian military spending was rising 
and that Moscow had “stopped disarmament, strengthened its nuclear and anti-crisis 
capabilities, and announced that it will not abandon the nuclear first-strike option.”9 
Needless to say, they have closely tracked the development of Russian nuclear forces 
and thinking since that time.10 One Chinese publication discussed at length a 2002 
Russian strategic concept to use “nuclear deterrence to support strategic mobility.”11 
The concept emphasized preemptive strikes to simultaneously win two local military 
contests and suggested that, when significant Russian security interests were under 
threat, Russia would retain the right to use nuclear weapons in concert with con-
ventional arms. Overall, these changes highlighted Russia’s willingness to use nuclear 
weapons first to retaliate against large-scale conventional attacks.12
Chinese analysts have noted that these developments contribute to a more com-
plex and challenging global nuclear environment. While Chinese strategists see these 
changes as destabilizing, they generally believe these modifications to policy came 
in response to U.S. and NATO military challenges. They are viewed as a logical, if 
unfortunate, reaction to the improved U.S. conventional precision strike capability and 
NATO encroachment into Russia’s near abroad. Chinese strategists cast Russia’s public 
statements that it reserved the right to strike first with nuclear weapons as being focused 
on “preventing the U.S. and NATO from diminishing its [Russia’s] strategic space.”13 
Most Chinese scholars maintain that Moscow and Beijing are united in viewing Wash-
ington as their “primary nuclear deterrence target” and that the “United States remains 
8 Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are Close, but not Allies,” Foreign Affairs, January/
February 2016.
9 Ren Xiangqun, “World Military Security Becoming More Complex by the Day,” Liaowang [Outlook], Octo-
ber 2, 2006.
10 See, for example, 凌胜银，陈旺 [Ling Shengyin and Chen Wang], ‹俄罗斯国防建设浅析› [“Analysis of 
Russian National Defense Building”], Siberian Times, February 1, 2013. This source addresses Russia’s movement 
away from its nominal no-first-use policy in some detail. 
11 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 56.
12 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 56.
13 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 58.
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the greatest factor strengthening Sino-Russian strategic relations.”14 Moscow’s strategy 
is seen as “joining with China to constrain the United States.”15
Nevertheless, at least one Chinese analyst, Zhao Tong, places Russian nuclear 
modernization and Moscow’s emphasis on nuclear weapons in the more value-neutral 
context of a U.S.-Russian “nuclear security dilemma” and highlights potential negative 
implications for Chinese security. He notes, for example, that renewed nuclear compe-
tition between the United States and Russia could undermine the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty or result in its abrogation. In that case, “the United States and 
Russia might put great effort into developing ground-based [IRBMs], and that could 
directly worsen China’s security environment around its periphery.”16 Notably, Zhao is 
U.S.-educated and is employed at the Qinghua-Carnegie office in Beijing, so his views 
are probably not typical. That said, he writes widely on nuclear issues, and some of his 
articles (including the one quoted above) are posted on Chinese websites, such as that 
of the Chinese Academy of Social Science.
More broadly, Chinese strategists and planners continue to view Russia’s nuclear 
capabilities as a benchmark by which to gauge Rocket Force modernization. For sev-
eral decades, many in the U.S. and Russian arms control communities sought to 
reduce the MIRVing of missiles, an objective that would have been greatly advanced 
by START II, which would have banned MIRVs on ICBMs. (The treaty never went 
into effect.) Under New START, MIRVs are allowed, and all Russian ICBMs deployed 
(and planned) since 2010, as well as many of Russia’s older missiles, are MIRVed. Three 
researchers at Chinese aerospace institutions concluded from trends in Russia, as well 
as from the MIRVed missiles France and Britain maintain, that, “nowadays, all the 
intercontinental strategic missiles being developed and which will be developed in the 
future by all major nuclear powers employ the multiple independently targetable war-
heads technology.”17 China has also shown great interest in Russian nuclear concepts. 
According to the China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, Russia’s nuclear forces are 
built on a “three-in-one” concept consisting of air-, land-, and sea-based systems, gener-
ally equivalent to the U.S. triad.18 PLA strategists contend that this three-in-one system 
14 Lora Saalman, Gu Guoliang, Zou Yunhua, Wu Riqiang, and Jian Zhang, “China’s and Russia’s Nuclear 
Relations,” Beijing: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 7, 2013.
15 Author analysis of Chinese media reports. Also see «国家安全公民手册» [Public Handbook on National 
Security], 时事出版社 [Beijing: Shishi Press], 2003.
16 赵通 [Zhao Tong], ‹美饿军备竞赛 ‘硝烟再起’› [“U.S.-Russian Arms Race: Gun Smoke Rising Again”], 
«中国社会科学报» [Chinese Social Sciences Today], July 17, 2015.
17 范瑞祥 张兵 张曙辉 [Fan Ruixiang, Zhang Bing, and Zhang Shuhui], ‹国外战略导弹多弹头分导技术及
其发展› [“Technology and Trends of Foreign Missile MIRVs”], «导弹与航天运载技术» [Missiles and Space 
Vehicles], May 2013, as cited in Zhao Tong and David Logan, “What if China Develops MIRVs?” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, March 24, 2015.
18 China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 127–128. 
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will eventually become a four-in-one system that relies heavily on space-based capa-
bilities to support integration of conventional precision and nuclear strike capabilities.
Chinese publications generally note that recent Russian nuclear force modern-
ization follows a sustained period of stagnation and uncertainty in Russia’s national 
defense policy.19 Russian President Vladimir Putin injected new life into Russia’s 
modernization efforts in 2000 with new land- and sea-based nuclear capabilities (see 
Table 6.1). According to one Chinese publication, nearly all of Russia’s Strategic Rocket 
Forces will possess new equipment by the end of this decade, up from 30 percent in 
2012.20 The same publication states that Russia’s nuclear forces will be equipped with 
19 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 55–56. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy details a period in the early 1990s 
in which Russia was reevaluating its relationship with the United States and NATO. During this time, Russian 
defense capabilities atrophied significantly. The policy eventually stated stipulates that Russia’s future intent was 
to not match numbers and capabilities of weapons but rather seek a “realistic deterrent.”
20 张海明 [Zhang Haiming], ‹俄罗斯武装力量改革进入新阶段› [“Russian Military Equipment Reform 


















Silo 1980 20 6 120
RS-20V Silo 1988 46 10 460
RS-12M (Topol) Mobile or silo 1988 90 1 90
RS-12M2 (Topol-M) Silo 1997 60 1 60
RS-12M1 (Topol-M) Mobile 2006 18 1 18
RS-24 (Yars) Mobile or silo 2010 73 4 292
RS-26 (Yars-M) Mobile (2016) — 3 —
Barguzin Rail ? — 4 —
RS-28 (Sarmat) 2020 — 10 —
ICBM subtotal 307 1,040
SLBMs (all types) 176 768
Strategic bombers 70 798
Strategic subtotal 2,606
Nonstrategic and defensive 
weapons (ABM/SAM)
1,950
Total warheads overall 4,556
SOURCE: Kristensen and Norris, 2016a.
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more than 400 land- and sea-based ICBMs. These will include new ICBMs to replace 
the RS-24 “Yars” and RS-12 “Topol,” as well as the Bulova SLBMs deployed on three 
Russian SSBNs. Other relevant modernization efforts include the continued deploy-
ment of early warning radars and an array of space-based platforms.
The absence of language in Russian government statements depicting China as a 
potential strategic threat reinforces Beijing’s generally benign view of Russia. Russia’s 
2000 and 2010 military doctrine documents are silent on China.21 Politically, Beijing 
and Moscow have continued to consolidate their relationship. Their most important 
bilateral strategic agreement—the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly 
Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation—
serves as a commitment not to use or threaten the use of force against each other. In 
the agreement, China and Russia stipulate that they will not target nuclear weapons 
against each other and that neither will use nuclear weapons first against the other.22 
Thus, while Russia has not maintained a no-first-use policy, it has essentially made this 
commitment to China.
Nevertheless, despite the apparent lack of mutual threat perception at the official 
level, Chinese analysts do note an asymmetry of views between the two countries at 
the unofficial level. Some Russian commentary describes China as a threat. An article 
on the China National Radio website summarizes an article by three Russians think-
tank researchers, concluding that:
If Chinese missile strength continues to increase on a large scale, China will first 
gain the ability to conduct a lethal strike against India, and later gain the same 
ability against Russia. If Russian strategic nuclear strength remains primarily silo-
based, and if Strategic Rocket Forces elements deployed to bases close to China are 
not highly mobile, the latent threat to Russia posed by continued improvement to 
Chinese nuclear forces will be even greater.23
China also evinces some concern about Russian tactical nuclear weapons and missile 
defense. Russia’s continued deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Far East 
highlights a continued lack of balance between U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear 
capabilities. It also suggests that Russia is more prone to hedge its bets with regard to 
China than vice versa. Chinese scholars have noted Russia’s growing reliance on tacti-
21 Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010; Russian Federa-
tion, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 2014.
22 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation, July 16, 2001.
23 ‹俄称中国核武仅次美俄 可对印饿致命核打击› [“Russia Labels Chinese Nuclear Strength Second Only 
to Those of the U.S. and Russia; Could Deliver Lethal Strike to India or Russia”], 中国广播网 [China National 
Radio], July 24, 2012.
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cal nuclear weapons—an asset category China does not possess.24 Recent track 2 dia-
logues highlight Beijing’s unease with Russia’s movement of military power to the Rus-
sian Far East and the Asia-Pacific, including deployment of nuclear-capable Su-27SM 
and Su-35 fighter aircraft. Chinese media also reports that the large-scale redeploy-
ment of tactical nuclear weapons represents Russia’s “assassin’s mace” for dealing with 
future nuclear arms competition in East Asia.25
China’s concern with Russian missile defense capabilities has been evident since 
the 1970s. The DF-5 was designed and flight tested to improve its survivability against 
the missile defense systems deployed near Moscow.26 In principle, missile defense pres-
ents numerous challenges for Chinese military and political leaders as they consider 
the viability and deterrent value of PLA nuclear forces. However, there has been little 
discussion of Russia’s missile defense capabilities in Chinese publications and none 
identifying these developments as threatening to China. This relative silence stands in 
marked contrast to the vocal Chinese objections to the U.S development and deploy-
ment of missile defenses. Recent Chinese publications have highlighted Russia’s move-
ment of a Voronezh early warning radar, capable of detecting Chinese missile launches, 
to western Russia.
In the Russian case, nested security dilemmas that begin in Western Europe have 
had a limited direct affect on China to date but are nevertheless felt through their 
impact on global nuclear trends and atmospherics. The indirect effects on Chinese 
security may, in the future, be significant.
South Asia’s Increasing Nuclear Prominence
Perhaps nowhere are nested security dilemmas likely to loom larger than in South 
Asia—specifically, in the complex interactions between Pakistan, India, China, and 
the United States. China has enjoyed close strategic ties with Pakistan since the early 
1960s, with both sharing deep suspicions of the Soviet Union and India, which they 
regarded as a Soviet client state.27 The end of the Cold War and evolving economic and 
political interests partially altered Beijing’s calculations about its interests with regard 
to India. Economic reforms, first in China and later in India, created incentives for 
24 Medeiros, 2007, p. xiv.
25 郭力 [Guo Li], ‹中国，如何不陷入‘东亚核竞赛’泥沼› [“How Can China Avoid Falling into the Quagmire 
of Nuclear Arms Competition in East Asia?”], «南方周末» [Southern Weekly], November 30, 2006.
26 Lewis and Xue, 1988, p. 66.
27 For many years, starting in the mid-1970s and lasting through most of the 1990s (and possibly longer), China 
provided assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programs. Beginning in the 1980s and taking firmer hold during the 
1990s, Beijing gradually embraced nonproliferation norms and created institutions to limit the export of sensi-
tive materials. Director of Central Intelligence, Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfer, 
Special National Intelligence Estimate 13/32-83, January 20, 1983; Medeiros, 2007.
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deeper economic intercourse, and the two share a number of interests with regard to 
the larger world order and the place of developing states within it.28
Yet mutual suspicions and unresolved border disputes continue to dog the 
relationship between China and India. India is not currently a significant driver of 
China’s nuclear force structure or policy but is assuming added importance in Beijing’s 
strategic thinking, and that trend is likely to deepen.29 New Delhi is enlarging and 
modernizing its nuclear forces. Pakistan’s apparent willingness to use nuclear weapons 
in the event of conventional conflict with India places pressure on India’s no-first-use 
policy. Any movement of Indian nuclear doctrine toward limited warfighting—even 
if designed primarily to address Pakistan’s nuclear challenge—could push China in 
the same direction. And the emerging strategic relationship between the United States 
and India has raised questions in China about the New Delhi’s future direction and 
intentions.
A 2016 SIPRI report estimates that India, Pakistan, and China each added 
roughly ten warheads during 2015, an annual rate of increase that appears to have held 
steady since 2012.30 If true, India, with an economy less than one-quarter of China’s, is 
matching the latter’s rate of production—an enormous effort for India. For Pakistan, 
which has a total gross domestic product (GDP) that is less than 12 percent the size of 
India’s, the figure represents a much greater level of effort. In terms of the power bal-
ance between China and India, roughly equal production also suggests a narrowing of 
the relative (although not absolute) gap between the nuclear arsenals of the two coun-
tries. As of early 2016, SIPRI estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of between 110 
and 130 warheads, that India had produced between 110 and 120 warheads (and the 
weapon-grade plutonium for a total of 135 to 180 warheads), and that China main-
tained an estimated inventory 260 warheads.31 Kristensen and Norris estimate that 
India has weapon-grade plutonium for a total of 135 to 180 warheads and that, by 
2025, Pakistan could realistically have between 220 and 250 warheads, “making it the 
world’s fifth largest nuclear weapons state.”32
28 George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Stephen Philip Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 2001.
29 Saalman, 2012, pp.  38–43; Xiaoping Yang, “China’s Perception of India as a Nuclear Weapons Power,” 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” June 30, 2016.
30 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen,“Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2016,” fact sheet, Stockholm: 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2016; “Pakistan, India, China Beefed Up Nuclear Arms 
Arsenal in 2012: Study,” International News, June 3, 2013.
31 Kile and Kristensen, 2016.
32 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Vol. 71, No. 5, September 1, 2015b, p. 77; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 
2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 6, November 1, 2015c.
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Nuclear policy and doctrine have been subjects of active debate in India, a debate 
that engages a wide range of officials, academics, and pundits. In part, the liveliness of 
the nuclear discussion and the diversity of viewpoints are functions of India’s vibrant 
political system but are also partly driven by the nuclear circumstances the state is 
confronting. India faces two main security competitors, Pakistan and China. Both 
countries have nuclear arms but are dramatically different in terms of the nature and 
scope of the challenges they present and in in their relationships with India. Mutual 
security concerns and grievances between Beijing and New Delhi derive from territo-
rial disputes and the border war of 1962 but are mitigated by political cooperation and 
growing economic links. Indian tensions with Pakistan run far deeper, the product of 
shared history; a violent separation; sectarian, ethnic, and religious differences; territo-
rial disputes; and a series of wars and smaller clashes since independence.
Within 18 months of its 1998 nuclear tests, India had outlined its nuclear strat-
egy, which was based on a “credible minimum deterrent,” the adoption of a no-first-use 
policy, and the use of assured retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage on any state 
that struck India first. Implicit in this strategy was the assurance that India would not 
pursue tactical nuclear weapons or a nuclear warfighting strategy. However, Pakistan, 
much weaker in conventional weaponry than its Indian rival, has not adopted a no-
first-use policy and has instead employed the implicit threat of nuclear escalation to 
deter conventional attack.33 Pakistani officials have outlined redlines that might trigger 
Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of a large part of its 
conventional forces or the loss of large parts of its territory.34 It has deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons to operational units and has reportedly integrated conventional and 
nuclear fire plans for contingency use.35
In India, Pakistan’s posture has raised doubts about New Delhi’s no-first-use 
policy and its strategy of massive retaliation. While the threat of retaliation might 
deter Pakistani first use during a conflict, it would also provide little flexibility. It also 
might not be credible in the context of battlefield employment of nuclear weapons and 
would do little to manage escalation in the event that nuclear weapons were actually 
employed. Unless a better and more credible answer can be found, Pakistan’s threat of 
rapid escalation could negate Indian conventional superiority.36 During the 2014 elec-
33 For more detail on the nuclear strategies of India and Pakistan, see Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the 
Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014, Chs. 3 
and 4.
34 Michael Krepon, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability,” in Michael Krepon and Julia 
Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 
2013.
35 Krepon, 2013.
36 All these issues, and the Indian discussion of them, are discussed in Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, 
“India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance,” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, May 19, 2016. 
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tion campaign, the Bhartiya Janta Party declared that it would revisit nuclear strategy, 
demonstrating that reservations about the no-first-use policy are not just academic but 
also reach into important political circles.37 Before the election campaign ended, Bhar-
tiya Janta Party leader Narendra Modi stipulated that India would not abandon the 
no-first-use policy, and there have been no moves to revise policy or doctrine since he 
became prime minister in May 2014. But as far back as 2010, Indian National Security 
Advisor Shivshankar Menon qualified “no first use” as “no first use against non-nuclear 
weapon states.”38 According to one Chinese analyst, China sees this “as basically a 
retraction of India’s no-first-use policy.”39
At the same time, Hans Kristensen has argued that, even without formal policy 
change, India already appears to be developing capabilities that may go beyond those 
strictly required by its announced minimum credible deterrent policy.40 According to 
India’s Defense Research and Development Organization, India is actively develop-
ing MIRVs, a quick-launch capability, and highly accurate missiles—all capabilities 
that would be useful for a nuclear warfighting or counterforce strategy but that are 
not absolutely necessary for a policy of assured retaliation.41 The Defense Research 
and Development Organization will deploy the new Agni-5 missile in canisters within 
which warheads and missiles must be mated before loading, effectively preventing 
the peacetime separation of components that was heretofore a core element of India’s 
efforts to demonstrate the credibility of its no-first-use policy.42
Within the Sino-Indian relationship, attention to military and security issues 
continues to be highly asymmetrical, with Indian strategists giving far more attention 
to China than Chinese strategists do to India.43 In part, this is a function of the more 
top-down nature of discussion, especially in authoritative sources, on security issues in 
China. Authoritative Chinese commentary follows official formulations, in this case 
placing the discussion largely within the narrative of Chinese-Indian win-win diplo-
macy and the “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity” signed 
37 P. R. Chari, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change,” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, June 4, 2014.
38 Shivshankar Menon “Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on ‘The Role of Force in Strategic 
Affairs,’” Government of India Ministry of External Affairs website, October 21, 2010.
39 Xiaoping Yang, 2016.
40 Hans M. Kristensen, “India’s Missile Modernization Beyond Minimum Deterrence,” FAS Strategic Security 
Blog, October 3, 2013.
41 Kristensen, 2013.
42 “India Test-Fires Canister-Launched Agni 5 Missile,” HIS Jane’s 360, February 1, 2015.
43 Tien-sze Fang, Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations, New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2014; Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and Policies Toward India,” in Francine R. 
Frankel and Harry Harding, eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. See also John W. Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Mutual Threat Per-
ceptions,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2002, pp. 109–134; Saalman, 2012, pp. 38–43.
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in 2005. In keeping with the Chinese tendency to emphasize nuclear policy rather 
than capabilities and India’s articulation and maintenance of a no-first-use policy, the 
discussion of Indian nuclear and missile programs in China has been muted.44 To the 
extent that less-authoritative writings have addressed the issue of Indian capabilities, 
they are often dismissive in tone.45
There are some indicators, albeit subtle ones, of change in authoritative Chi-
nese statements on India, as well as increased Chinese discussion of India in track 1.5 
nuclear discussions. In the 2013 version of Science of Military Strategy, the nuclear secu-
rity situation facing China is described as increasingly complex.46 In that discussion, 
the development of nuclear programs in countries on China’s periphery is listed imme-
diately after changes to U.S. strategic forces and strategy. The development of Indian 
nuclear forces is described as “particularly rapid.”47 Harder to evaluate, but of poten-
tially greater significance, may be the suggestion in China’s 2013 defense white paper 
that “China’s armed forces . . . make overall and coordinated plans to promote military 
preparedness in all strategic directions.”48 This “all azimuths” formulation may carry 
significant, if implicit, implications for China’s thinking regarding India and Russia.
At the popular level, China’s understanding of India has been influenced by the 
commercialization of Chinese media and the proliferation of outlets. Much of the cov-
erage is derivative, consisting of Chinese reporting on foreign news stories. Neverthe-
less, this coverage exposes readers to new perspectives—and, specifically, to the sense 
of strategic rivalry felt on the Indian side. One recent report cites a SIPRI expert who 
speculated that India’s nuclear-weapon programs are aimed primarily at China, rather 
than Pakistan.49 Another report knits together observations from Indian, Canadian, 
U.S., Russian, and Japanese sources to suggest India might consider using nuclear mis-
siles to strike the Three Gorges Dam.50 And in December 2015, the Chinese-language 
Global Times summarized a report from Yahoo News on a secret “nuclear city” in 
44 Interview, Beijing, May 19, 2014. Having tested nuclear devices in 1998, the Indian government established a 
National Security Advisory Board. On August 17, 1999, the board drafted a report on nuclear doctrine that estab-
lished a no-first-use policy and a policy of “credible minimum nuclear deterrence.” See Arms Control Association, 
“India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” webpage, July 1, 1999; and “The National Security Advisory Doctrine,” India 
News, October 1, 1999.
45 李智 [Li Zhi], ed., ‹印度将追加 ‘维克兰特’ 号建造费 或圆航母国产梦› [“India Will Increaase Funding 
for ‘Vikrant’ Construction, May Achieve the Dream of Domestically Produced Aircraft Carrier”], China Net-
work, July 17, 2014.
46 Shou Xiaosong, 2013. 
47 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 171.
48 State Council Information Office, 2013; emphasis added.
49 ‹瑞典智库: 印度核武器针对中国而非巴基斯坦› [“Swedish Think Tank: Indian Nuclear Weapons Are 
Against China, not Pakistan”], Huanqiu Net, September 28, 2009.
50 ‹中国防空火力密布三峡 防印度核武› [“China’s Air Defense Firepower Densely Deployed Around Three 
Gorges Against Indian Nuclear Weapons”], 中国时刻 [China Time Network], August 6, 2013.
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southern India designed to supply enriched uranium for use in hydrogen bombs. The 
article cited several Indian and Western officials who discussed India’s motives for the 
hydrogen program primarily in terms of deterring China.51
Chinese academics and military commentators have made similar points. In the 
past, Chinese analysts generally described Indian rhetoric on the “China threat” as 
an instrumental justification for Indian military programs. More recently, however, 
some leading India experts in China warn that the discussion of the China threat in 
India has a long history and is a real motivator and planning factor. Fudan University’s 
Zhang Jiegen has argued that, “Although Sino-Indian relations have made enormous 
progress in recent years, Indians still view China as a strategic competitor. . . . And this 
is even more the case in nuclear strategy.”52 Others view Indian nuclear motivations as 
mixed, partly driven by insecurity vis-à-vis China but also by a desire for great-power 
status.53 Rear Admiral (retired) Yin Zhuo, a popular military commentator, stated that 
India’s emphasis on developing its military nuclear power could affect the strategic bal-
ance in Asia, particularly if India aligned with the United States.54
Both Chinese media and the expert community closely followed India’s April 19, 
2012, test firing of the Agni-5 ICBM, dubbed by Indian media as the “China killer.” 
Two analysts with the Nanjing Army Command Institute concluded that the Agni-5 
test was an “important milestone” in India’s development of a land-based nuclear 
deterrent and illustrated India’s desire for a “seat at the table” with the United States, 
Russia, and China. They also saw the test as an effort to “counterbalance” China’s 
nuclear forces.55 An article from the China Academy of Military Sciences suggested the 
test was proof that India was “making up for deficiencies in Indian long-range ballistic 
missile development” and was a “first step” in realizing a “real combat capability and 
deterrent.”56 Technical analyses in Chinese defense journals concluded that the mis-
51 ‹美媒: 印度秘密建造 ‘核城市’ 追赶中国核武伐› [“U.S. Media: India Builds a Secret ‘Nuclear City’ to 
Close China’s Nuclear Advantage”], «环球时报» [Global Times], December 18, 2015.
52 章节根 [Zhang Jiegen], «印度核战略对中国安全环境及南亚政策的影响» [Impact of Indian Nuclear Strat-
egy on China’s Strategy Environment and its Policies Toward South Asia], 复旦大学国际问题研究院 [Shanghai: 
Institute of International Studies, Fudan University], April 2011. See also Ming Zhang, China’s Changing Nuclear 
Posture, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999.
53 Xiaoping Yang, 2016.
54 ‹专家: 印度核力量将打破亚太平衡 配合美日遏华› [“Expert: India’s Nuclear Strength Could Destroy the 
Asia-Pacific Balance and Facilitate the U.S. Containment of China”], Xinhua, February 18, 2014.
55 Wang Tao and Liu Yonghong, ‹从 ‘烈火5’ 试射透视印度 ‘导弹强国’ 思想› [“A Perspective on the Thinking 
of Becoming a ‘Strong Missile Power’ from India’s Test of the Agni-V Missile”], «国防科技» [National Defense 
Science & Technology], Vol. 5, 2012.
56 军事科学院 [Academy of Military Sciences], ‹烈火走向实战尚需时日› [“Agni Not Yet Combat Capabile”], 
Jiefangjun Bao, September 22, 2013.
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sile achieved initial success in hitting its target, thereby illustrating India’s “new and 
improved” strategic nuclear deterrent.57
The rapid development of Indian nuclear forces and the evolving Chinese report-
ing on India-related security issues raise three important questions. First, will China 
accept Indian parity in the nuclear realm? Historically, Beijing has accepted demon-
strable U.S. and Russian nuclear superiority, and China’s standards for nuclear suffi-
ciency do not differentiate potential opponents. Yet a number of considerations never-
theless make the question salient. China’s 1964 test came when the United States and 
Russia already had an effectively unassailable lead in nuclear weapons. India’s 1998 
test, on the other hand, came some 34 years after China’s first test. Research on cogni-
tion suggests that individuals are far more reluctant to surrender assets (such as advan-
tages) already in hand than they are to forgo gaining something they currently lack, 
and such logic could produce a differentiated Chinese view of its positions vis-à-vis the 
United States and Russia on the one hand and India on the other.58
China’s historically dismissive attitude toward Indian power and capabilities 
could deepen Chinese reluctance to surrender current nuclear advantages. Chinese 
writings tend to place India on a different plane from not only the United States and 
Russia but also China. Although Chinese sources categorize both China and India 
as emerging powers, they are quick to highlight India’s shortcomings. U.S. academic 
Susan Shirk states flatly that China “simply does not take India seriously.”59 Chinese 
specialists see India is seen as having a host of structural economic disadvantages, many 
caused by what Chinese observers see as its weak or immature democratic structures. 
And although Chinese strategists note Indian military advances, they often describe 
its technology, such as that embedded in its newly launched SSBN, as primitive or 
derivative.60
Perhaps as a consequence, when India has demonstrated technical prowess that 
may rival or exceed China’s, the advances have come as a shock to the Chinese sci-
entific community, prompting a determination to match or better India.61 Examples 
Chinese interlocutors have cited include the deployment of seven satellites by a single 
57 Fang Youpei, Chen Liling, Wang Liping, and Cai Yamei, ‹印度烈火弹道导弹突防能力分析› [“Penetra-
tion Ability Analysis of Indian Agni Ballistic Missile”], «航天电子对抗» [Aerospace Electronic Warfare], Vol. 29, 
No. 1, 2013.
58 For a discussion of prospect theory application in political science, see Rose McDermott, “Prospect Theory in 
Political Science: Gains and Losses From the First Decade,” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2004.
59 Shirk, 2004.
60 See, for example “Expert: India’s Nuclear Strength Could Destroy . . . ,” 2014. On India’s nuclear capabilities 
more generally, see 罗琪 [Luo Qi], ‹印度核力量难敌中国:中国对印度有”三大优势› [“Indian Nuclear Capa-
bilities Face Difficulties Challenging China: China’s ‘Three Large Advantages’ vs. India”], «世界新闻报» [News 
of the World], July 20, 2010.
61 Interview with Chinese strategist, Beijing, May 2014.
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booster and the employment of advanced gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.62 
The entry of India’s Mars Orbiter Mission into Mars orbit in September 2014 prompted 
a half-page spread in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily on India’s “Great Power 
Dream.” The article acknowledged India’s technological progress but also singled India 
out for responsibility in the continuing India-Pakistan nuclear arms competition. It 
suggested that many Indians have been unable to move beyond the 1962 war and 
argued that India’s technological development is excessively weighted toward military 
achievement.63 
Asked point blank whether or not China would accept Indian nuclear parity, 
some of the Chinese experts we interviewed expressed doubt that it would. Moreover, 
some analysts also believe that India may in fact be pursuing that goal.64 In December 
2016 and January 2017, India conducted back-to-back tests of the Agni-4 and Agni-5 
missile systems, with the domestic Indian media proclaiming India’s ability to strike 
targets throughout China. In the most direct official response to Indian strategic tests 
to date, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying noted the tests and suggested 
that they ran contrary to UN Security Council regulations “on whether India can 
develop ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.”65 China’s Global Times 
ran an article urging India to “cool its missile fever” and suggested that, if Western 
countries turned a blind eye toward India’s nuclear development, China would not 
“stick rigidly” to “nuclear rules.” “Pakistan should,” it continued, “have those privileges 
in nuclear development that India has.”66 One Indian analyst speculates that China’s 
response was, in part, informed by a fear that the United States was setting India up as 
a nuclear rival and abetting an Indian desire for strategic parity.67
A second question is whether Chinese doctrine will be influenced by Indian 
nuclear developments, especially if the latter abandons its no-first-use doctrine or, more 
62 On Indian satellite deployment, see William Graham, “Indian PSLV Successfully Lofts Multiple Satellites,” 
NASA Spaceflight website, February 25, 2013.
63 严 瑜 [Yan Yu], ‹科技催胀印度 ‘大国梦’› [“Science and Technology Inflate India’s ‘Great Power Dream’”], 
«人民日报海外版» [People’s Daily Overseas Edition], September 27, 2014. When India launched the orbiter in 
December 2013, Chinese commentary initially focused on the limitations of India’s space program and the inad-
visability of interplanetary travel while India’s satellite program for earth observation remains weak.
64 The Chinese Academy of Military Science’s Du Wenlong, for example, argues that India is using the Agni-5 
to achieve strategic parity and that it is seeking to transform itself from a regional military power to a major global 
military power.; see ‹专家: 印度欲借烈火5导弹谋求与中国战略平等对话› [“Specialist: India Wants to Use 
the Agni-5 Missile to Seek Strategic Parity Dialogue with China”], China National Radio, September 18, 2013.
65 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on December 27, 2016. The ref-
erence is apparently to UN Security Resolution 1172 (adopted in June 1998), which called on both India and 
Pakistan to cease the development of nuclear and nuclear-capable missile capabilities. It was approved under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter and is therefore nonbinding.
66 “India Needs to Cool Its Missile Fever,” Global Times, January 4, 2017. The same content appeared in the 
Chinese-language version of the newspaper.
67 “Why India’s Nuclear Missile Tests Are Giving Sleepless Nights to China,” DailyO, January 11, 2017.
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likely, develops nuclear warfighting capabilities without officially changing doctrinal 
labels. Given the current trajectory of Indian research and development, it appears that 
Indian leaders would have to make an active political decision to halt the progression 
toward such capabilities. Should India deploy a broad range of warfighting capabili-
ties, Chinese military planners might fear that China could potentially face an Indian 
foe capable of using nuclear weapons to win battlefield victories. Just as Pakistan’s 
commitment to the battlefield use of nuclear weapons pressures India to find a flexible 
response, India’s development of warfighting capabilities could encourage China to 
embark down a similar path.
A third question is what impact the budding Indian strategic relationships with 
the United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan might have on the Chinese view of 
India’s nuclear and missile programs. The U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade 
Initiative, launched in 2012, is designed to mitigate bureaucratic hurdles in defense-
industrial cooperation. The initiative was further developed in 2015 with the ten-year 
Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship.68 If Chinese views on Indian 
nuclear issues are shaped in part by how analysts assess the purported low quality of 
Indian military systems, the new framework for technology transfer may prompt a 
degree of reconsideration about the potential challenge from India. At the same time, 
the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (signed in 
2015) and other signs of broader U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation may raise doubts 
about India’s broader international direction.69 As Chinese researcher Yang Xiaoping 
wrote, “All these [U.S.-India] initiatives support India’s greater power aspirations and 
also make India more technically capable.”70
Although China has long belittled Indian military capabilities and underesti-
mated New Delhi’s suspicion of China, that is now changing. To some extent, this 
change is being driven by the commercialization of the media and access to a far wider 
range of information, but it also reflects a new appreciation of India in authoritative 
sources. Indian nuclear capabilities are improving rapidly, and both the relative numer-
ical and technological gaps are narrowing. India is currently pursuing technological 
capabilities that may go beyond those strictly required for a minimum credible nuclear 
deterrent and may eventually give it some limited nuclear warfighting capabilities. 
And New Delhi’s budding strategic relationship with Washington suggests an evolv-
ing Indian political calculus. All these developments have caught China’s attention and 
could prompt it to redouble its efforts and rethink its requirements.
68 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-India Defense Framework,” June 3, 2015.
69 Nirmala Ganapathy, “India and the US ‘Vision’ for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Seen as ‘Counter’ to 
China,” The Straits Times, January 26, 2015. 
70 Xiaoping Yang, 2016.
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China’s North Korea Problem
Beijing’s relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is com-
plex and growing more so over time. China and North Korea have long maintained 
ostensibly close relations, with a bond forged in blood after the Chinese People’s Volun-
teer Army took up arms alongside the Korean People’s Army in 1950. According to the 
Sino-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, should 
North Korea come under attack, China must “render military and other assistance 
by all means at its disposal.”71 Decades after the Korean War, China is North Korea’s 
most important trading partner and a critical source of economic and food aid.72 Bei-
jing may have little affinity for Pyongyang but fears disorder in North Korea and the 
possibility of increased refugee flows into China. It has, therefore, routinely come to 
Pyongyang’s defense in the international political arena, often using its clout in such 
organizations as the UN to prevent or minimize sanctions against North Korea.73
Yet while China’s leaders have historically been tolerant of North Korean misbe-
havior, Beijing is growing increasingly wary of its neighbor to the northeast. In recent 
years, Chinese academics and intellectuals have been allowed to comment on and 
criticize the DPRK openly.74 Mandarin-language social media services, such as Sina 
Weibo, have permitted comments openly critical of North Korea and Kim Jong-un to 
be posted unfiltered.75 Despite China’s past reluctance on sanctions, it has neverthe-
less approved increasingly stringent UN sanctions in June 2009, January 2013, and 
March 2016. Following North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in September 2016, the Chi-
71 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, July 11, 1961.
72 Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, R40095, April 2, 2014. Despite North Korea’s relative economic unimportance to 
China, trade with China makes up roughly 60 percent of total North Korean trade. Moreover, North Korea’s 
massive trade deficit with China, coupled with Pyongyang’s inability to finance it through borrowing, has led 
some experts to argue that this trade deficit is essentially an indirect subsidy. See Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian 
E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, R41259, January 15, 2014, and Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang 
Tests Beijing’s Patience,” Comparative Connections, July 2009.
73 This international political support has traditionally spanned both security and human rights issues. See, for 
example, Malcolm Moore, “China Rejects UN Criticism on North Korea,” Telegraph, February 18, 2014.
74 One example of critical commentary by a major Chinese foreign relations expert is Shen Dingli, “Lips and 
Teeth,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2013a. It is worth noting, however, that commentators have not received 
carte blanche to advocate extreme positions. When Deng Yuwen, editor at a major Communist Party journal, 
wrote a Financial Times piece calling for China to abandon North Korea as an ally entirely, he soon found him-
self out of work (Jane Perlez, “Chinese Editor Suspended for Article on North Korea,” New York Times, April 1, 
2013).
75 Kerry Allen, “China’s Patience with ‘Kim the Fat’ Wears Thin After H-Bomb Test,” BBC News, January 8, 
2016.
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nese Foreign Ministry declared that it “resolutely opposes” Pyongyang’s actions.76 And 
in contrast to China’s apparently lax enforcement of the past, the Liaoning Provincial 
government announced shortly after the September 2016 test that it was investigating 
a Chinese conglomerate for “serious economic crimes” related to possible violations of 
sanctions.77
Despite some change in attitude and rhetoric, there may be limits in how far 
Beijing is willing to go to dissuade Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear and missile 
programs.78 In Beijing’s view, North Korea remains a valuable strategic buffer against 
the United States and South Korea. More important, the Chinese prioritize stability on 
the Korean Peninsula above all other values there—including denuclearization—and 
fear that, if pushed too hard, North Korea could become unstable.79 Even after numer-
ous North Korean nuclear tests, Beijing continues to apportion responsibility to South 
Korea and the United States, as well as North Korea, and continues to emphasize the 
need for restraint. In March 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters: “The 
Korean peninsula is right on China’s doorstep. We have a redline, that is, we will not 
allow war or instability on the Korean peninsula.”80
Although North Korea has nuclear weapons and shares a border with northeast 
China, Beijing appears to sense no direct threat to its own security from that quarter, 
despite the North’s growing nuclear and nuclear capability (see Table 6.2). Indeed, 
two recent Chinese defense white papers list security threats as diverse as strengthened 
American alliances in the Asia-Pacific region; Japanese territorial claims; the “three 
forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; Taiwanese independence; and natural 
disasters—without even mentioning North Korea and its nuclear capabilities.81 Simi-
larly, the 2013 Science of Military Strategy provides only cursory comments on North 
Korea, none of which suggest a direct threat from it: “Entering the 21st century, the 
76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‹2016年9月9日外交部发言人华春莹主持例
行记者会议› [“Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hua Chunying Holds Press Conference on September 9, 2016”], 
September 9, 2016.
77 Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “China Announces Inquiry into Company Trading with North Korea,” New 
York Times, September 20, 2016. 
78 Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad, “China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?” Parameters, Vol. 44, 
No. 1, Spring 2014.
79 Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Director of Asia-Pacific, United States Institute of Peace, “Testimony Before 
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Hearing on China’s Relations with North Korea,” 
June 5, 2014; Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “China’s North Korea Policy: Backtracking from Sunnylands?” 
38 North website, July 2, 2013.
80 Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard, “China Draws ‘Red Line’ on North Korea, Says Won’t Allow War on 
Peninsula,” Reuters, March 8, 2014.
81 State Council Information Office, 2015; State Council Information Office, 2013.
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North Korean nuclear issue has continued to ferment, and the likelihood that the 
problem will resolve completely within the short term is very small.”82
Instead, China’s concerns about the DPRK’s nuclear program stem almost entirely 
from other regional actors’ responses to North Korea’s development of the weapons. 
Chinese leaders have long been concerned that aggressive U.S. responses to nuclear 
provocation could cause greater instability on the Korean peninsula. This fear was on 
full display during the ongoing nuclear crisis in 2003, when China took unprecedented 
diplomatic action to establish the Six-Party Talks, a move that many analysts believe 
was driven by Beijing’s fear of what the United States might do if Pyongyang’s nuclear 
posturing continued unchecked.83 More recently, China has exerted pressure on North 
Korea to back off from nuclear and ballistic missile tests in the wake of American B-2 
and B-52 “show of force” flights over South Korea that Beijing feared could spark a 
larger crisis.84
Beijing also fears that the United States and its regional allies are exploiting the 
North Korean nuclear issue to advance their own interests. China has made no secret 
of its concerns about TMD, and there is some debate within China about whether the 
United States is deploying THAAD and other systems in response to nuclear and mis-
82 Shou Xiaosong, 2013, p. 171.
83 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length, Carlisle, Pa.: Stra-
tegic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2004, pp. 12–13.
84 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2013.
Table 6.2










No Dong <50 800
IRBM <50 >2,000
TD-2 Unknown >3,400
SLBM At least 1 Unknown
KN08 At least 6 >3,400
SOURCE: OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015, January 
2016b, p. 19.
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sile developments in North Korea or is simply using these developments as an excuse.85 
While China does acknowledge that the United States, Japan, and South Korea have 
legitimate concerns about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, mainstream Chi-
nese military analysts frequently argue that the United States and its allies are simply 
using North Korea’s behavior as an excuse to install missile defense systems aimed 
at China.86 In February 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi indicated, “China 
is deeply concerned that the United States may deploy the THAAD missile defense 
system to Korea, and China resolutely opposes any country borrowing the nuclear 
problem on the peninsula to damage China’s rightful national interests.”87
Regardless of the extent to which they believe U.S. explanations about TMD, 
some Chinese analysts nevertheless stipulate that North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
programs are doing significant harm to China’s international position—leading Japan 
to remilitarize, South Korea to enter the U.S. orbit more fully, and U.S. allies to join 
with the United States in deploying missile defenses.88 More broadly, developments 
in North Korea contribute to the Chinese view that the international nuclear security 
environment is growing more complex and challenging for Beijing, even though there 
is presently no direct sense of threat from Pyongyang.
China’s View of Japan
In recent years, concern has increased in China over Japan’s direction. Chinese strate-
gists see Japanese foreign policy as becoming “more extreme on such issues as its recog-
nition of history, its constitutional amendment policy and various territorial disputes 
with neighboring countries.”89 China’s 2013 defense white paper explicitly singled out 
Japan as “making trouble” over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, while the 2015 white 
paper claims, “Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhaul-
ing its military and security policies.”90 Chinese analysts note that Japan sees China as 
85 For more on Chinese uneasiness over missile defense programs, see the “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Nuclear 
Posture” section earlier in this chapter.
86 Chen Zhou, “Anti-Ballistic Missile Program: Does No Good to World Peace and Security,” China-US Focus, 
August 24, 2012.
87 ‹中国极力反对的美国’萨德系统’究竟是什么?› [“Why Does China Strenuously Oppose the U.S. THAAD 
System?”], 环球网 [Global News Net], July 8, 2016.
88 Chen Yue, “Commentary: Why Does U.S. Add Fuel to Fire in Korea Peninsula?” China Military Online, May 
17, 2013; “Why Does China Strenuously Oppose . . . ?” 2016. 
89 Zhang Yaohua, “Japan in 2012: Intensifying Right-Leaning Politics,” in The CIIS Blue Book on International 
Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2013, p. 75.
90 State Council Information Office, 2013; State Council Information Office, 2015.
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its main potential security threat.91 With Chinese military activities in the East China 
Sea (including transits of Japan’s Miyako Strait) on the rise and with Japan increasing 
defense spending in an effort to remain militarily competitive, suspicion and recrimi-
nation continue to characterize the relationship in 2017—despite diplomatic efforts to 
mitigate tensions.92
On the nuclear side, Chinese analysts view Japanese missile defense efforts as 
destabilizing and aimed at not only North Korea but also China. China is also cautious 
of Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities and is worried that barriers preventing Japan from 
seeking nuclear weapons may be eroding.
Japanese Missile Defense
Japan has been building a BMD system since 2003. It currently deploys a two-tiered 
system: Aegis ship-launched SM-3 missiles for midcourse interception and ground-
based Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air missiles for terminal inter-
ception. Japan has fielded six Aegis BMD ships, PAC-3 units for six Air Defense Mis-
sile Groups, four FPS-5 fixed air-defense radars, and seven upgraded FPS-3 radars.93 It 
is building the first of two additional Aegis-equipped BMD ships and is deploying its 
new FPS-7 radar.94 Japan is also considering two additional elements to its current mis-
sile defense system: a THAAD system and ground-based SM-3 interceptors.95
Japan is also the closest U.S. regional partner in missile defense.96 Japan has been 
working with the United States toward a Northeast Asia TBM defense system. This will 
involve real-time sharing of intelligence, as well as joint training and other activities. 
To facilitate cooperation, the United States has forward deployed a number of assets: 
Aegis BMD ships to Yokosuka naval base since 2006, PAC-3 units to Kadena Air Base 
since 2006, a Joint Tactical Ground Station at Misawa Air Base since 2007, and two 
91 According to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, countries that Japan has traditionally viewed as potential 
adversaries in the post–Cold War era (ranked in order of threat) were North Korea, China, and Russia. Recently, 
the text writes, Japan is focused more on growing Chinese power and military capabilities. Shou Xiaosong, 2013, 
p. 63.
92 For example, the release of the 2016 Defense of Japan white paper, for example, saw spokesmen for both sides 
criticizing both the military activities and rhetoric of the other side (‹国防部新闻发言人吴谦就日本发表2016年
版‘防卫白皮书’发表谈话› [“Chinese MoD Spokesman Wu Qian Discusses Japan’s Release of its 2016 Defense 
White Paper”], Xinhua, August 2, 2016).
93 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2016; Ministry of Defense, Japan’s BMD 
Update, Tokyo: March 19, 2014c.
94 Ministry of Defense, Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2016 Budget, Tokyo, 2016.
95 Julian Ryall, Gabriel Dominguez, and Neil Gibson, “Japan Considers Adding THAAD to Its Air Defence 
Capabilities,” IHS Jane’s 360, August 12, 2016; “Defense Ministry to Study New Missile Defense Systems,” Japan 
Times, June 21, 2014.
96 U.S. efforts to work with South Korea on missile defense has encountered a number of obstacles (Karen Mon-
tague, A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Programs, Arlington, Va.: George C. Marshall Institute, March 
2014).
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AN/TYP-2 radar systems. Since 2006, Japan and the United States have been jointly 
developing an advanced BMD interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA). As of December 
2015, the interceptor had undergone two live-fire tests.97 It will have improved maneu-
verability, intercept capability, range, and reliability in target detection.98 In addition to 
serving in Japan, it will also be the centerpiece of European missile defense.
Chinese experts track Japanese and U.S.-Japanese missile defense efforts closely.99 
They see these efforts as targeting China, as well as North Korea, and have several con-
cerns. First, these experts fear that future advances in Japanese (and U.S.) sea-based 
missile defense system could undercut China’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Chinese 
experts believe future SM-3 variants could, if deployed near China’s shores or close to 
the United States, have some capability to intercept Chinese ICBMs. If applied to U.S. 
homeland defense, this could provide the United States with the space necessary for 
a shoot-look-shoot doctrine, which would greatly increase the effectiveness of missile 
defenses. Japan’s intelligence sharing with the United States, as well as U.S. radars and 
other assets positioned in Japan, would also increase the effectiveness of U.S. homeland 
missile defense by improving the tracking of Chinese missile trajectories.100
Second, there is concern that missile defense efforts could contribute to the devel-
opment of technologies (such as command, control, communications, computers, 
and ISR systems) that would be useful in developing offensive ballistic missile forces, 
should Japan decide to pursue a long-range strike capability. Japan has shown interest 
in long-range strike. Japanese officials reportedly wanted to include discussions of Japa-
nese strike options in the negotiations over the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation.101 (The U.S. side demurred.) And in August 2014, a new Air Tactics 
Development Wing was established within the Air Defense Command and was tasked 
97 U.S. Missile Defense Agency, 2015.
98 Ministry of Defense, “Efficient Deterrence and Response,” in Defense of Japan 2014, Tokyo, 2014b, Pt. III, 
Ch. 1, Sec. 1; Ministry of Defense, 2014c. See also “Strategic Capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA Interceptors,” 
Mostly Missile Defense blog, June 30, 2016.
99 See, for example, 雷宇曜 姜文志 刘敬蜀 张声 [Lei Yuyao, Jiang Wenzhi, Liu Jiangshu, and Zhang Sheng], 
‹日本防空反导导弹系统探析› [“Analysis of Japan’s Air Defense Missile Defense System”], «飞航导弹» 
[Aerodynamic Missile Journal], Vol. 1, 2014; 李梅 [Li Mei], ‹美国西太平洋地区导弹防御系统建设情况分析› 
[“Assessment of the Construction of U.S. Missile Defense System in the Western Pacific Region”], National 
Defense, No.  6, 2013; 孟杰 张弓胤 [Meng Jie and Zhang Gongyin], ‹日本海上自卫队反导作战能力分析› 
[“Analysis of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Anti-Ballistic Missile Warfighting Capability”], «飞航导
弹» [Aerodynamic Missile Journal], No. 2, 2013; 兰子诺 [Lan Zinuo], ‹近年日美导弹防御合作新动向› [“New 
Directions in U.S.-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation”], «国际资料信息» [International Data Information], 
Vol. 8, 2011.
100 Twomey and Chase, 2015; Wu Riqiang, “China’s Anxiety About U.S. Missile Defence: A Solution,” Survival, 
Vol. 55, No. 5, October–November 2013.
101 “日本の’敵基地攻撃能力’保有、米国と水面下のせめぎ合い” [“Behind the Scenes Disagreement with U.S. 
over Japan’s Development of Capabilities to Strike Enemy Bases”], Reuters, September 10, 2014. 
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(in part) with studying the strike problem.102 If Japan decided to manufacture nuclear 
weapons, such capabilities could evolve into delivery systems.103
Third, Chinese strategists see U.S.-Japanese missile defense cooperation as 
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Closer cooperation with the United States may 
encourage Japan to take a higher profile in regional crises over North Korea or Taiwan, 
and bolder Japanese action could, they believe, exacerbate existing tensions.104 One 
expert raised the possibility that Aegis BMD ships could provide Tokyo with greater 
ability to deploy assets forward and intervene in affairs abroad.105 Another noted that a 
stronger U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. nuclear extended deterrence could provide Japan 
with more leeway to engage in lower-level conventional conflict because Japan might 
reason that the U.S. nuclear deterrent would prevent adversaries from engaging in 
large-scale conventional retaliation.106
Finally, Chinese analysts worry that Japanese development of missile defense 
could lead to proliferation and a regional arms race. Some, for example, have observed 
that North Korea may respond to Japanese and U.S. TMD by expanding the size and 
sophistication of its missile force to penetrate defenses.107
Japanese Latent Nuclear Capabilities
Along with concerns over Japanese missile defense, China has also been increasingly 
vocal in its criticism of Japan’s latent nuclear weapon capability. China is well aware 
that Japan is technically capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons and delivery vehi-
cles and also has sufficient nuclear materials. As of early 2016, Japan had 47.9 tons of 
separated reactor-grade plutonium, of which 10.8 tons were held domestically and the 
rest abroad.108 Several hundred kilograms of this material are being shipped to the 
102 The Air Tactics Development Wing brought existing research and instructional groups under one umbrella 
and also examines options for defeating electronic warfare and modern air defenses (“空自が研究センター新設” 
[“JASDF Research Center Established”], Sankei Shimbun online, August 1, 2014; “空自に今夏’航空戦準術団’
敵基地攻撃能力を研究” [“JASDF (to Establish) Air Tactics Development Wing to Study Offensive Potential 
Against Enemy Airbases This Summer”], Sankei Shimbun online, January 3, 2014).
103 吴心伯 [Wu Xinbo], ‹日本与东北亚战区导弹防御› [“Japan and TMD in Northeast Asia”], «国际问题研
究» [China International Studies], Vol. 5, 2003, p. 47.
104 Wu Xinbo, 2003, p. 47.
105 Dai Yanli and Cheng Min, ‹日本 ‘宙斯盾’ 反导弹系统的发展, 动因与影响›[“Japan’s Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense System’s Development, Drivers, and Influence”], «外国军事学术» [Foreign Military Studies], Vol. 7, 
2007.
106 Li Bin and Yun He, “Credible Limitations: U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in Northeast 
Asia,” in Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, eds., Disarming Doubt, Australia: Lowry Institute, 2012.
107 Dai Yanli and Cheng Min, 2007, p. 47.
108 Office of Atomic Energy Policy (Japan), “The Status Report of Plutonium Management in Japan—2015,” 
July 27, 2016.
94    China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
United States for disposal.109 But Japan continues to work toward opening a repro-
cessing facility at Rokkasho that could separate roughly 8 tons of plutonium a year—
enough material for more than 2,000 nuclear warheads.110 A China Central Television 
(CCTV) report suggests that, should Japan decide on nuclear weapons, Japan would 
immediately become the world’s third-largest nuclear power.111 And while there is no 
indication that the Chinese government believes that Japan is currently manufacturing 
nuclear weapons, there is concern that Japan may be keeping more nuclear material 
than necessary for domestic energy use.
In recent years, Chinese analysts have repeatedly suggested that Japan is continu-
ously using small steps to chip away barriers preventing its nuclearization.112 Chinese 
articles cite a number of Japanese developments confirming this trend, including the 
following:
• moves to reinterpret Japan’s constitution, modification of its Atomic Energy Basic 
Law to allow nuclear energy to be used for “national security”113
• passage of a State Secrets Law that restricts information related to national 
defense114
• greater accumulation of nuclear material115
• continued construction of the Rokkasho nuclear reprocessing plant.116
109 “Japan to Send Weapons Grade Plutonium Back to U.S. This Weekend, Greenpeace Says,” Reuters, March 
18, 2016. 
110 “Japan Producing Huge, Lightly Guarded Stockpile of Plutonium,” NBC News, April 27, 2014. 
111 See ‹日本核武迷局› [“Japan’s ‘Nuclear Weapon’ Puzzle”], video, CCTV Channel 13, March 6, 2014. The 
same report noted that Japan has advanced computer modeling and simulation capabilities that can “test” nuclear 
weapons without physically detonating a device.
112 ‹‘核武梦’ 将给日本带来灾难› [“‘Nuclear Weapons Dream’ Will Bring Japan Disaster”], «解放军报», PLA 
Daily, February 28, 2014, p. 7.
113 ‹重启核电站, 日本欲何为?› [“Restarting Nuclear Reactors, What Is Japan Trying to Do?”], Xinhua, March 
20, 2013; ‹韩媒: 日本修改原子能法意在牵制中国› [“South Korean Media: Japan Amends Atomic Energy 
Basic Law to Counter China”], «参考消息网» [Cankao Xiaoxi], June 24, 2012.
114 ‹日本执政党强行表决通过保密法案› [“Japan’s Governing Party Forced Through State Secrets Law”], 
Xinhua, December 7, 2013.
115 伍钧, 孙向丽 [Wu Jun and Sun Xiangli], ‹日本累计核材料令东亚安全蒙忧› [“Japan’s Accumulation of 
Nuclear Material Causes Concerns for East Asian Security”], Xinhua, February 21, 2014.
116 Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing facility, which could commence operations in 2016, has “an annual through-
put of 800 tons of spent fuel containing one percent plutonium.” The significant amount of plutonium repro-
cessed by the facility makes it difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor diversions of 
nuclear material from the facility. See Alan J. Kuperman, David Sokolow, and Edwin S. Lyman, “Can the IAEA 
Safeguard Fuel-Cycle Facilities?” Austin: University of Texas, Nuclear Proliferation Prevent Project Working 
Paper 2, 2014, p. 22.
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From China’s perspective, Japanese participation in TMD is an immediate prob-
lem, closely tied to the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent and to issues of nuclear 
sufficiency. Chinese analysts do not appear to believe that deployed missile defense 
capabilities already in place compromise China’s retaliatory capability. But it would 
not be unreasonable to presume, given the language of many Chinese statements, that 
possible future developments in Japanese TMD may already be a planning factor in 
China. Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities fall into a separate category and are, like con-
siderations related to North Korea, an issue that affects the nature of the international 
global environment, rather than an immediate issue for Chinese planners.
Conclusion
China is embedded in a set of complex and nested nuclear security dilemmas. Beijing’s 
nuclear calculations are still primarily based on an estimate of the potential threat 
from the United States. At the same time, several other regional countries are assum-
ing greater prominence in Chinese nuclear thinking. The number of countries subject 
to China’s nuclear security assessment has increased, complicating the task of fashion-
ing a nuclear posture that supports Chinese strategic deterrence while not simultane-
ously setting off or exacerbating potentially costly regional arms races. China’s future 
nuclear doctrine will partly depend on how well Beijing understands the dilemmas and 
dynamics attendant to nuclear politics in this environment, and the balance it strikes 
between competing motivations and impulses.
For all parties engaged, Asia’s nested security dilemmas mean that the actions of 
even states that do not pose a direct threat may be problematic. North Korean nuclear 
developments pose security challenges for Beijing because the reactions of the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea may affect China’s retaliatory capability. Washington 
may confront similar dilemmas. Potential nuclear rivalry between China and India 
could prompt Pakistan to increase its own nuclear efforts—and Pakistan’s nuclear 
efforts could, in turn, increase the probability of loose nukes. Such efforts could also 
further impoverish the state, raising the specter of state failure.
Fortunately, although security dilemmas and insecurities exist, there is little sign 
of a truly multilateral arms race at present. Pakistan and India appear engaged in a 
nuclear arms race, and there is an action-reaction cycle apparent in U.S.-China stra-
tegic relations, but multilateral dynamics are more prospective than present. All the 
nuclear states of Asia will, however, have to make efforts to ensure that this remains the 
case. A multilateral arms race would impinge on both U.S. and Chinese interests, com-




Internal Drivers: Political Leadership and Bureaucracy
The preceding chapters have addressed China’s current nuclear trajectory and the 
external considerations that may shape its future direction. Assuming that the Chinese 
state behaves according to the rational-actor model (discussed further later), its leaders’ 
perceptions of the external environment will play a decisive role in shaping strategic 
direction. However, as a number of students of international relations have observed, 
domestic factors may also be important in shaping outcomes; depending on the coun-
try and its circumstances, these can potentially trump external drivers.1 In this chapter, 
we consider three models of national decisionmaking and how they might influence 
China’s nuclear direction. First, we briefly evaluate the evolution of China’s political 
governance in the context of the rational-actor model. Second, we evaluate the role of 
bureaucratic politics and the evolving status and influence of different bureaucratic 
actors (with primary attention to China’s military services). Third, we assess the pos-
sible effects of organizational processes and the influence of standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs) and bureaucratic inertia on the China’s nuclear force development and 
1 The literature on the domestic sources of foreign and security policy includes works on the roles of regime 
type, economic interests and structures, culture, and bureaucratic influences. Most of these are associated with 
one or two specific aspects of state behavior. For example, regime type has been largely discussed in terms of the 
state’s propensity for war or, alternatively, its military competence. Economic factors and the role of industry 
have largely been discussed in terms of how they factor into arms racing or, alternatively, the types of weapons 
in procurement. The literature on bureaucratic factors is most closely associated with the topics covered in this 
report, including both military force structure and doctrine. The literature on the domestic sources of behavior 
is too large to cite in any comprehensive way, but representative works covering the areas listed above include 
Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
Summer 1983; Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, New York: Norton, 
2000; James R. Kurth, “The Political Economy of Weapons Procurement: The Follow-on Imperative,” American 
Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 2, March 1, 1972; Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977; Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strat-
egy in Chinese History, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996; Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French 
and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997; Twomey, 2010; 
and Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1971.
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policy.2 These three lenses by no means exhaust the full range of policymaking models 
that could potentially affect nuclear options but do represent important perspectives.
China’s Political Leadership and the Rational-Actor Model
To what extent has Chinese behavior in the nuclear realm been consistent with the 
rational-actor model, in which states behave as logical, unitary actors in response to 
external threats, pressures, and opportunities?3 While we cannot definitively answer 
this question, we can point toward characteristics of the state that should or should not 
push behavior in this direction and offer some observations about real-world outcomes. 
A variety of factors associated with post-1949 China should work in favor of behavior 
consistent with the rational-actor model. But while important elements of continuity 
characterize decisionmaking, leadership patterns have evolved rapidly since the mid-
1980s, and these changes are likely to affect the susceptibility of the state’s nuclear 
policymaking to greater influence from bureaucratic actors with narrower interests.
China emerged from Japanese occupation and civil war with a tightly fused polit-
ical and military leadership. All senior statesmen had spent decades within both the 
political and military hierarchies of the Communist Party. The structure of the party-
led state was such that the military was tightly subordinated to political authority— 
a subordination symbolized by regular military professions of loyalty to the party and 
by the PLA’s political commissar system, which placed political officers in positions of 
nominally equal importance to commanders. The members of the CMC, a party organ 
chaired by the Communist Party chairman (and, later, by the general secretary, when 
the position of chairman was abolished), directed most important aspects of military 
policy. For the first several decades after 1949, there was little interservice competition 
within a military that was dominated, in both name and reality, by army (or ground 
forces) commanders. Perhaps most important, Mao Zedong emerged from the civil 
2 These models borrow language from and are broadly consistent with Allison, 1971, although we employ them 
simply to outline broad changes and their potential influence on future developments, rather than attempting 
any detail assessment of past or future decisions. Allison proposes three models of government decisionmaking: 
Model I, the rational-actor model, assumes that a government can be treated as a unitary actor rationally pursu-
ing its goals. Model II, the organizational process model, drops the unitary actor assumption by examining how 
organizations within a government subdivide problems, with each organization having power over part of the 
solution. Model III, the governmental politics model, also discards the unitary actor assumption by examining 
how the leaders of different organizations within a government compete and negotiate to make decisions. We 
have changed the order of presentation and address the issues associated with Allison’s Model II first because the 
balance of bureaucratic power between the services will not only affect interservice bargaining but also influence 
how much of an effect bureaucratic processes will have on Chinese nuclear force structure and policy.
3 The language and ideas associated with the rational-actor model have been employed primarily to examine 
the assumptions associated with realist theories and to assess them alongside alternative views that see domestic 
factors and actors as important. Realists assume the state will behave as a unified actor in reacting to external 
threats and opportunities. See Allison, 1971.
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war as the near universally recognized father of the new state. While his administra-
tive leadership was challenged in the aftermath of the disastrous Great Leap Forward, 
he was, for most of the period between 1949 and his death in 1976, capable of setting 
foreign and security policy direction.
To be sure, some of the observations listed above may also challenge the rational-
actor model interpretation of Chinese leadership. Nearly total army dominance of the 
military eliminated the potentially pernicious effects of interservice rivalry but also sys-
tematically privileged continental thinking in military policy. The political leadership 
was both unified and well endowed with military experience, but much of that experi-
ence was in revolutionary and guerrilla war, leading to a dismissiveness of conventional 
and, to some extent, nuclear capabilities on the part of many Chinese leaders.4 Mao, 
for his part, was almost universally acknowledged as the leader of the revolution and 
given a uniquely privileged political position following that event. But there were, nev-
ertheless, periodic political struggles that were bitter and often lethal to the losers.5 In 
these struggles, Mao Zedong was willing to subordinate military policy to perceived 
domestic political requirements.6
Nevertheless, Chinese political leaders had the confidence and means to direct 
military policy, and Mao viewed political and military imperatives as unified in ways 
that would, in his own mind, produce desired outcomes in both realms. The rational-
actor model does not necessarily predict “rationality” in a single objective sense but 
simply means that the state reacts as a unified, logical actor. Certainly, the first genera-
tion of Chinese leaders after the PRC’s founding had clear views both on the unique 
attributes of nuclear weapons that made possessing them essential and on the limita-
tions of their utility beyond a certain small number. These views were translated into 
policies that limited the scale of China’s nuclear force building.
Chinese political leaders kept very immediate control of nuclear policy through 
a National Defense Industry Special Commission [国防工业专门委员会], often referred 
to as the Central Special Commission [中央专门委员会].7 The Central Special Commis-
4 This dismissiveness of conventional capabilities was not universal, even in the PRC’s early days. Peng Dehuai, 
who commanded Chinese forces in Korea, advocated for the development of larger armored and air forces and 
greater professionalization within the military, but he was purged in 1959. On the views shaping Mao’s military 
thought, see Prashant Kumar Singh, “Rereading Mao’s Military Thought,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 37, No. 5, Sep-
tember–October 2013; see also Twomey, 2010.
5 Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 
provides a detailed, three-volume study of the politics leading up to the Cultural Revolution.
6 For this reason, Thomas W. Robinson views the period of Maoist domination as one in which foreign affairs 
were ruled largely by political considerations (Thomas W. Robinson, “Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to 
the 1990s,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
7 The Central Special Commission moniker was short for still another unofficial name for the group, the Chi-
nese Communist Party’s Central Specialist Commission of Fifteen [中共中央15人专门委员会].
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sion, created in 1962 and consisting of 15 members from the political, military, and 
scientific communities (and headed by Premier Zhou Enlai), was tasked with coor-
dinating nuclear weapon development.8 There is at least circumstantial evidence that 
senior leaders have, on at least two occasions, vetoed the deployment of capabilities that 
were within China’s technological means. The two cases involved the nondeployment 
of the neutron bomb and the belated deployment of MIRVs. Despite having success-
fully tested an enhanced radiation warhead in 1988 and having had the capability to 
deploy neutron weapons since then, China has not done so.9 The reasons for political 
veto remain somewhat unclear and are probably numerous: limited strategic utility, 
inconsistency with declaratory policy, and a general normative factor viewing such 
weapons in negative terms.10 In the case of MIRVs, a 1999 Central Intelligence Agency 
report estimated that China had been capable of deploying multiple reentry vehicles for 
20 years (thus as early as 1979).11 The same report stated that MIRV capability could 
be fielded in “a few years.” However, only in 2015 did unclassified estimates assess 
that China had actually deployed MIRVs (on a variant of its heavy, DF-5 missile)— 
representing a delay of between 15 and 35 years.12 The main point in both cases is that 
scientific and military impetus, while perhaps accounting for some aspects of nuclear 
policy, may not always drive acquisition and deployment in the absence of political 
support.13
While elements of continuity in Chinese security policymaking persist, many of 
the conditions and institutions have changed in significant ways. Following his acces-
sion to power in 1978, Deng Xiaoping established regulations and procedures that 
would limit one-man rule and encourage adherence to collective leadership under the 
Politburo Standing Committee, currently comprising seven top leaders. Central to 
this move was the introduction of strict retirement ages for different positions within 
the party, military, and civilian bureaucracy. Even top leaders in the Politburo Stand-
8 Lewis and Xue, 1988; Sun Xiangli, 2013, p. 12.
9 Jonathan Ray, Red China’s “Capitalist Bomb”: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program, Washington D.C.: 
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Uni-
versity, January 2015.
10 In 1988, Liu Huaqiu, a senior specialist with China’s Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for 
National Defense, wrote that the weapon contradicted China’s no-first-use doctrine, did not suit China’s geogra-
phy, was too costly, required too much plutonium and tritium for mass production, and was not as cost effective 
as precision guided munitions (Ray, 2015, p. 27).
11 National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States Through 2015,” Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1999.
12 OSD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2015, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2015, p. 9.
13 For more on this point, see Michael S. Chase, Stephanie Lieggi, Andrew S. Erickson, and Brian Lafferty, 
“China’s Nuclear Weapons Program and the Chinese Research, Development, and Acquisition System,” SITC 
Policy Briefs, Vol. 12, 2014.
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ing Committee are not considered for reappointment after the age of 68.14 Age limits 
have not only reduced the average age of senior political and government officials but 
also imposed an additional constraint on the general secretary’s ability to place allies 
in key positions of authority, since regular retirements take many tested candidates out 
of circulation.
There has also been a trend toward the “regularization,” or bureaucratization, of 
government, with the composition, roles, and functions of different actors being better 
defined and, to an extent, respected in policymaking. These phenomena have extended 
into the military realm. Where once the members of the CMC were appointed and 
replaced at the whim of the party chairman, both the number of members and the 
composition are now relatively stable, with key military organizations being regularly 
represented.15 And while the ground forces are still the most prominent and influential 
military element, the other services (PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF) have gained in 
rank and bureaucratic standing. Finally, since the “third generation” of Chinese lead-
ers associated with Jiang Zemin assumed power in 1989, civilian leaders have come 
to office with far less military experience and knowledge than their predecessors and 
have, therefore, been more dependent on advisors and the military itself for informa-
tion and expertise.
All this might suggest a system with more scope for bureaucracies to influence 
policy. To be sure, critical elements of political control remain in place, and we may 
still expect the state to behave much as the rational-actor model might predict. The 
CMC, headed by the party general secretary, still dominates military policy, providing 
both a strong mechanism for top-down control and integration of service priorities and 
approaches. Military tendencies toward greater overt independence have been beaten 
back by the party, which demands and receives regular assurances from the military 
of fealty to the party. Xi Jinping has centralized power to an extent not seen since 
Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.16 Xi secured the control of the military faster and more 
completely than either Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao. Xi’s anticorruption campaign, while 
serving its stated goal of reducing the role of graft, also gives him a powerful tool to use 
selectively against political opponents.17
14 William A. Joseph, Politics in China: An Introduction, 2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
p. 213.
15 The CMC currently has ten members. Its membership now includes, on a recurring basis, the heads of the 
four general departments (general staff, political, armaments, logistics), the heads of the air force, navy, and 
second artillery, two military vice chairmen and the chairman (Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party gen-
eral secretary).
16 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip,” Foreign Affairs, Novem-
ber/December 2014.
17 Andrew Wedeman, Baogang Guo, and Eri Saikawa, “Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt and the Politics of Corruption,” 
China Currents, Vol. 13, No. 2, October 15, 2014.
102    China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
Nevertheless, Xi operates in a system that is far different from the one Mao domi-
nated. He remains constrained by rules, age limits, custom, and stronger bureaucratic 
institutions. The military, part of that bureaucracy, pays homage to the party, but is far 
more focused on professional matters and warfighting than it was during the Maoist 
era.18 Against this backdrop, narrower dynamics in the nuclear realm play out. In 
the nuclear realm, the Central Special Commission, which brings together technical 
specialists and senior political leaders, still exists, but according to Chinese civilian 
experts engaged in nuclear research, its functions are more circumscribed. The day-
to-day supervision of top leaders has declined since the 1960s and 1970s, and the role 
of the military in nuclear policymaking has grown.19 Given the evolving political and 
administrative landscape in China, it is likely these bureaucratic factors will exert sig-
nificant influence over nuclear outcomes in the years to come.20
Bureaucratic Politics and the Military Services
Most organizational theorists identify parochial interests, including manpower, bud-
gets, independence, and prestige, as important drivers of bureaucratic behavior—and 
acknowledge that bureaucracies can have a decisive influence on national direction. 
Organizations push policies that will benefit themselves. They will sometimes indepen-
dently decide policy (when regarded as within their areas of professional competence) 
or influence it through political interactions or bargaining.21 This section considers 
the military services as actors in nuclear force structure and planning, their relative 
status and influence, and the interactions between the services. The elevation of the 
Second Artillery from branch to service (with its name change to PLA Rocket Force) 
will strengthen nuclear advocacy within the PLA, although the full contours of change 
are not yet entirely clear. What is clear is that the recent reforms consolidate changes 
that were already under way. Below, we address the evolution of the Second Artillery, 
PLAN, PLAAF, and the potential impact of the new Rocket Force, in that order.
18 Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” Armed Forces and Society, 
Vol. 31, No. 2, 2005.
19 Interviews with Chinese experts, Beijing, May 16–17, 2014.
20 Lampton highlights the challenges of civilian control as it pertain to the Chinese system (David M. Lampton, 
Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California 
Press, 2014; see, especially, Ch. 6, “Soldiers and Civilians”).
21 On the impact of bureaucratic politics, especially the competition for manpower, resources, and prestige, see 
Allison, 1971; Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in 
Perspective,” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1981; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, 
and Germany Between the World Wars, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984; and Jack Snyder, The Ideology 
of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984.
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A note on terminology and organization is in order. We use the term Second 
Artillery when discussing missile force developments prior to 2016 and the term Rocket 
Force when discussing events since 2016 and when assessing projected future develop-
ments or impact. We divide the discussion of PLASAF and Rocket Force into two sec-
tions (with the Rocket Force discussed at the end of this section), in part to keep the 
chronology and temporal narrative of the various service summaries more consistent 
and, more important, because the ultimate shape of the Rocket Force (which is cur-
rently uncertain) will affect the nuclear positions of all the services.
PLA Second Artillery Force
On December 31, 2015, Chinese Premier and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping 
announced the name change for the Chinese missile force and its elevation from a 
branch [兵种] to a service [军中]. These changes followed logically from the increas-
ing status that PLASAF had been enjoying up to that point. China’s 2008 defense 
white paper described PLASAF as “a strategic force under the direct command and 
control of the CMC” that is “mainly responsible for deterring other countries from 
using nuclear weapons against China and for conducting nuclear counterattacks and 
precision strikes with conventional missiles.”22 PLASAF was officially established in 
July 1966 after ten years of missile and nuclear warhead development and the train-
ing of missile battalions.23 PLASAF units made their first public appearance during 
the National Day parade in October 1984 to commemorate the 35th anniversary of 
the PRC’s founding. In 1986, reports and images surfaced of the newly built PLASAF 
headquarters in Xishan, northwest of Beijing. In the early 1990s, PLASAF established 
a conventional missile program and began fielding conventional missiles.24
Although PLASAF was officially a branch of the PLA and, therefore, “one-half 
notch lower in bureaucratic rank” than a service, it had already gained many attributes 
of a service prior to 2015.25 In official discussion of PLA elements, it was listed together 
with the services, last in the sequence behind the PLA Army, PLAN, and PLAAF. Like 
the services, PLASAF’s conventional battlefield missiles would operate under cam-
22 State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2008, January 21, 2009.
23 This section predominately from Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artil-
lery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CF-
182-NSRD, 2002. More pre-1990s PLASAF history is available in Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, 
“Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” in James C. Mulvenon, and David Finkelstein, eds., 
China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Arts of the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army, Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2005.
24 Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artil-
lery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012.
25 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, 2002, p. 520. See also Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, 2005, p. 167.
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paign commanders in the event of a conflict.26 Unlike the conventional missile forces, 
however, PLASAF’s nuclear missile forces bypass this structure and are instead directly 
controlled by the CMC. Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes note that, “[b]y necessity, it is 
therefore a very stove-piped institution, perhaps the most vertically integrated of all 
units with the People’s Liberation Army.”27
They go on to explain that:
The central command and control center for all Chinese forces, including SAC 
[PLASAF], is located in Xishan, in the hills west of Beijing, where strategic opera-
tional orders originate. Direct communication with China’s six launch bases would 
be passed through the SAC headquarters and its communications regiment. . . . At 
a political level, ultimate authority to use nuclear weapons is “subject to the unified 
command of the Central Military Commission. Only the commission’s chairman 
. . . has the power to issue an order to use such weapons after top leaders reach a 
consensus on the issue.”28 However, it is likely that such a decision would require a 
consensus decision with the Central Military Commission and other senior mili-
tary elders. In wartime, a “skip echelon” system would be in effect, with the central 
command communicating directly with launch bases.29
The CMC also directs changes to the Second Artillery’s readiness level, from 
“third class,” or normal conditions; to “second class,” a warning and preparatory status; 
and, finally, to “first class,” at which full preparations are completed and units await a 
launch order.30
Traditionally, the PLA has been an army-dominated institution, with the other 
services playing supporting roles. However, over the years PLASAF gained greater 
institutional standing within the PLA. This may reflect the increasing importance of 
missile forces, given PLASAF’s more-sophisticated systems and platforms, both con-
ventional and nuclear, and their relevance for potential future contingencies. As Chase, 
Erickson, and Yeaw noted, “China appears to be on the verge of reconciling the previ-
ously significant divergence between the Second Artillery’s once largely aspirational 
doctrine and its actual capabilities.”31
The Second Artillery’s rise is also a function of the elevation of the PLA’s technical 
services more generally. Since 2004, the PLASAF commander has, like the PLAN and 
26 Wortzel, 2007, pp. 9–10.
27 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, 2002, p. 521. Note on PLA doctrine from Wortzel, 2007, p. 20.
28 Corroborated by analysis of the use of the term “supreme commander” [统帅部] to describe the CMC chair-
man as PLASAF’s command authority in Wortzel, 2007, pp. 24–26.
29 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, 2002, p. 546.
30 Wortzel, 2007, p. 20.
31 Chase, Erickson, and Yeaw, 2009, p. 74.
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PLAAF commanders, been a member of the CMC.32 The 2004 white paper noted that 
the PLA is emphasizing modernization of PLASAF and the other technical services:
While continuing to attach importance to the building of the army, the PLA gives 
priority to the building of the navy, air force and Second Artillery Force to seek 
balanced development of the combat force structure, in order to strengthen the 
capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and 
conducting strategic counterstrikes.33
The 2006 white paper stated that, “[t]hrough restructuring, the proportion of the 
navy, air force and Second Artillery Force [personnel] in the PLA has been raised by 
3.8 percent, while that of the army has been lowered by 1.5 percent.”34 Recent white 
papers have emphasized the success of PLASAF’s modernization programs and that its 
“capabilities of strategic deterrence, nuclear counterattack, and conventional precision 
strike are being steadily elevated.”35
An examination of promotion time lines for the commanders of PLASAF, PLAN, 
and PLAAF shows that PLASAF promotions lagged until recently, when they normal-
ized with the other technical services.36 Li Xuge (1985–1992) was only a major gen-
eral [shaojiang] when he became the PLASAF commander, waited three years to be 
promoted to lieutenant general [zhongjiang], and was never made a full general. Yang 
Guoliang (1992–2003), served as PLASAF commander for eight months before his 
promotion to zhongjiang and then waited nearly an additional five and a half years 
before becoming the first full general [shangjiang] to serve as PLASAF commander. 
In contrast, PLAN and PLAAF commanders were promoted to full general during or 
shortly after holding the commander post. From 1985–2015, all PLAAF commanders 
held the rank of zhongjiang or higher before assuming their positions. Recent PLASAF 
commanders have reached the rank of full general sooner and in line with their PLAN 
and PLAAF counterparts. Wei Fenghe, who was appointed commander in October 
2012 and who now commands the Rocket Force, was promoted to full general less 
than a month after assuming command.
Over its 50-year history, a distinctive PLASAF identity and culture gradually 
emerged. The 76 biographies of top PLASAF’s leaders found in the China Strategic Mis-
32 James Mulvenon, “The King Is Dead! Long Live the King! The CMC Leadership Transition from Jiang to 
Hu,” China Leadership Monitor, Vol. 13, January 30, 2005, p. 6.
33 State Council Information Office, “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” in China’s 
National Defense in 2004, Beijing, December 2004b.
34 State Council Information Office, 2006.
35 “Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army,” in State Council Information Office, 2011; State Council 
Information Office, 2013.
36 Sources for this analysis include China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 2012, pp. 878–880, and biogra-
phies in Chinese online encyclopedia and other websites, such as Baidu.
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sile Force Encyclopedia show that, although PLASAF leaders’ paths to the role of com-
mander have varied considerably over time, there has been a growing trend of career-
length service in PLASAF or its antecedent organizations. Jing Zhiyuan (2003–2012) 
was likely the first commander to spend his entire career in artillery and PLASAF 
roles, although he entered the PLA in 1963, three years before PLASAF was founded. 
Wei Fenghe (2012–present) appears to be the first to spend his entire career only in 
PLASAF, except for a two-year stint as a deputy chief of the General Staff Department 
from 2010 to 2012.37 The deputy chief slots have historically been dominated by PLA 
Army officers, so Wei’s time as department’s first deputy chief from PLASAF is also 
noteworthy. Wei Fenghe is also likely the first commander with leadership experience 
in PLASAF at the brigade level. In 1994, he commanded an unidentified missile bri-
gade and received a second grade merit for successfully completing an experiment on 
large-missile launching.38 The last four PLASAF commanders had experience in com-
mand of PLASAF bases.
Another important commonality among the recent PLASAF (and now PLA 
Rocket Force) commanders is crossover experience in both nuclear and conventional 
roles, which reflects the force’s “dual deterrence and dual operations” mission [双重
威慑,双重作战].39 Li Xuge (1985–1992) appears to be the first PLASAF commander to 
explore potential conventional roles for PLASAF. He led research on conditions on 
the role of PLASAF in conventional missiles and local conflicts and also established 
the first conventional missile training squadron.40 Jing Zhiyuan (2003–2012) is likely 
the first commander to have had direct command experience with both conventional 
and nuclear forces, given PLASAF’s introduction of conventional missiles in the early 
1990s and reports that Jing played a role in China’s response to the Taiwan Strait crisis 
in 1996.41 Wei Fenghe (2012–present) also has experience with both nuclear and con-
ventional forces; he was the chief of staff at 54 Base (Luoyang, Henan Province), which 
comprises brigades that field nuclear road-mobile missiles and ICBMs, before becom-
ing commander of 53 Base (Kunming, Yunnan Province) in December 2002.42
37 General sources for Wei Fenghe’s biography include Mark A. Stokes and L. C. Russell Hsiao, “Leadership 
Transitions in the Second Artillery Force at the 18th Party Congress: Implications for Roles and Missions,” Asia-
Eye Blog, May 7, 2012; ‹魏凤和简历› [“Wei Fenghe’s CV”], Sohu, March 15, 2013; ‹魏凤和› [“Wei Fenghe”], 
Baidu, 2014.
38 ‹魏凤和› [“Wei Fenghe”], «中文百科在线» [Chinese Online Encyclopedia], 2012.
39 Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 270.
40 ‹李旭阁同志生平 (1927–2012)› [“Comrade Li Xuge’s Biography (1927–2012)”], 新浪博客 [Sina Blog], 
October 14, 2012.
41 Shi Jiangtao, “Hu Flexes His Military Muscle,” South China Morning Post, September 26, 2004.
42 Michael S. Chase and Daniel Yoon, “Like Arrows on the Bent Bow: Nuclear and Conventional Capabili-
ties of China’s Second Artillery Force,” paper prepared for the PLA as Organization conference, Washington, 
D.C., June 13–14, 2012, pp. 51–55; OSD, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, p. 29.
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Finally, PLASAF commanders also hold senior roles within the party apparatus. 
Jing Zhiyuan (2003–2012) became the first Second Artillery officer to serve on the 
CMC in September 2004.43 Wei Fenghe (2012–present) is a current member of the 
CMC. All four of the most recent commanders have been members of the Central 
Committee.
PLA Navy and Nuclear Issues
The PLA Rocket Force may ultimately gain control of China’s SSBNs (or the SLBMs 
stored in them), a possibility we explore later, in the subsection on the Rocket Force. 
Unless and until that happens, PLAN controls these assets. The development of 
China’s blue water navy is well beyond the scope of this essay, but certainly signals a 
major change in PLAN’s institutional role within the PLA and a great enhancement of 
China’s capabilities more generally.44 China’s 2015 defense white paper’s highlights the 
importance of maritime power:
The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability, and sustainable 
development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be 
abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and 
oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China 
to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its 
national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic sea lines of commu-
nication and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime coopera-
tion, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.45
This shift to a maritime focus is likely to have a range of implications for PLAN’s 
strategic nuclear forces. First, the overall increase in PLAN’s role will empower naval 
strategic thinkers. Second, increased naval forces will be better able to protect Chinese 
SSBNs from attack. Third, PLAN is likely to have a larger voice in security policy in 
general.
Although PLAN plays a secondary role to the Second Artillery in nuclear affairs—
and may play an even more circumscribed role with the creation of the Rocket Force—
43 Adapted from Chase and Yoon, 2012, pp. 37–38; ‹靖志远› [“Jing Zhiyuan”], Baidu, 2014; ‹靖志远活动
报道集› [“Report on Jing Zhiyuan’s Activities”], People’s Daily Online, 2009. See also Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, 
2005, p. 216.
44 See, for instance, Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd 
ed., Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2010, and Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping 
Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, China Strategic Per-
spectives 9, 2015.
45 State Council Information Office, 2015.
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it has possessed strategic capabilities for 40 years.46 For most of this period, PLAN 
operated only the Xia-class (Type 92) SSBN, which was neither reliable nor safe. Thus, 
China’s navy has not been forced to address nuclear strategy with the same degree of 
immediacy that the Second Artillery has. However, PLAN now increasingly engages 
on strategic nuclear issues. China’s 2010 defense white paper highlights China’s devel-
opment of a sea-based deterrent, noting that PLAN is enhancing its “strategic deter-
rence and counterattack” capabilities.47 Beijing’s long-standing pursuit of a sea-based 
deterrent is aimed, in part, at enhancing the survivability of its nuclear force more 
generally. Although most observers assess that the first-generation Xia-class SSBN has 
never conducted a deterrent patrol, China’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent finally 
is taking shape with the Type-094, or Jin-class, SSBN and the JL-2 SLBM.
The 2016 DoD report on Chinese military and security developments indicates 
that China has delivered four Jin-class SSBNs to PLAN, and “up to five may enter service 
before China begins developing and fielding its next-generation SSBN, the Type 096, 
over the coming decade.”48 Each submarine carries 12 of the new JL-2 SLBM, and each 
JL-2 is equipped with a single nuclear warhead of several hundred kilotons.49 U.S. offi-
cials reportedly confirmed in December 2015 that a Jin-class SSBN had undertaken 
China’s first-ever deterrence patrol.50 When Chinese SSBNs are able to conduct regu-
lar deterrence patrols, China will effectively gain its “first credible, sea-based nuclear 
deterrent.”51 This will represent a critical development for Chinese strategic power, and 
the “incorporat[ion of] very different platforms . . . will greatly influence the operations 
of its future fleet.”52 From a strategic standpoint, submarines will likely be viewed as 
indispensable, not only because they are relatively survivable but also because they can 
(unlike all of China’s land-based missiles) launch on trajectories that will not take mis-
siles near U.S. strategic missile defenses positioned at Fort Greely, Alaska.53
46 徐双喜, 钱晓虎 [Xu Shuangxi and Qian Xiaohu], ‹铸就共和国水下核盾: 海军某潜艇基地官兵驾 ‘蓝鲸’ 
40余年从横大洋创造数十项纪录› [“Forging the Underwater Shield of the Republic—Officers and Troops of a 
Certain Navy Submarine Base Set Tens of Records During More than 40 Years of Piloting ‘Blue Whales’ Across 
the Length and Breadth of the Vast Ocean”], «解放军报» [PLA Daily], October 28, 2013; ‹英雄核潜艇,大洋
深处砺剑锋›[“Heroic Nuclear Submarines, Sharpening Swords in Depth of Vast Oceans”], «解放军报» [PLA 
Daily], October 29, 2013.
47 State Council Information Office, 2011. That language is repeated in State Council Information Office, 2015.
48 OSD, 2016, p. 26. See also Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions 
for the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., 2015, p 19.
49 See Zhou Wa, “China Seeks to Calm US Fears over Missile,” China Daily, January 16, 2014; and Keck, 2014.
50 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China Advances Sea- and Land-Based Nuclear Deterrent Capabilities,” IHS Jane’s 
360, December 15, 2015.
51 OSD, 2016, p. 26.
52 ONI, 2015, p. 5.
53 Ground-based interceptors associated with NMD are at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
California. Assuming they can maneuver and transit to firing positions within range of targets in the United 
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These developments will present the PLA leadership, and especially PLAN’s, with 
a range of decisions over the coming months and years. The routine separation of war-
heads from launch vehicles that characterizes PLA’s land-based nuclear force posture 
reassures Chinese and foreign leaders alike that Chinese nuclear forces cannot be used 
without authorization from central leaders. In the submarine-based force, similar sepa-
ration will not be viable, so new procedures to address concerns related to unauthor-
ized use will be required. Further, if the warheads are routinely mated with missiles for 
deterrence patrols, it is also possible that the ownership and storage of the warheads, 
which are reportedly maintained in central storage facilities held by the Rocket Force, 
may be transferred to PLAN for handling ease and security.54 Similarly, decisions about 
the routine readiness will be required. Will China maintain continuous SSBN patrols 
as the French and British do? Although ONI seems to assume that to be the case, there 
is limited evidence from Chinese sources.55
PLAN leadership has become more professional and technologically savvy. To 
date, those with expertise in nuclear weapons have not figured heavily in PLAN’s lead-
ership, although the circumstances that have limited their rise may now be changing. 
According to two separate studies of PLAN leadership, conducted by ONI and the 
Center for Naval Analyses, PLAN is dominated by surface warfare officers. Thumbnail 
sketches of PLAN’s top 19 leaders by ONI and of the top 91 leaders by the Center for 
Naval Analyses do not suggest any of these individuals has a significant background 
in SSBNs or nuclear strategic affairs more generally.56 This is not surprising, given that 
there was only a single SSBN in the inventory for most of PLAN’s nuclear history and 
that this boat rarely put to sea. This situation limited the career prospects for officers 
with nuclear weapon backgrounds. However, a few top PLAN leaders, including Vice 
Admiral Liu Yi (PLAN deputy commander since 2011) and Rear Admiral Yuan Yubai 
(North Sea Fleet commander), do have backgrounds on nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines (SSNs). Admiral Sun Jianguo, assigned to the PLA General Staff Department 
as its deputy commander, had similar experience, culminating in command of what 
several Chinese sources refer to as the world-record–setting longest submarine cruise 
of 90 days.57
States without being detected and destroyed, SSBNs can fire on trajectories that do not take the missiles near 
either site.
54 For the best source on current practice of warhead storage, see Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead 
Storage and Handling System,” Arlington, Va.: Project 2049 Institute, March 12, 2010.
55 ONI, 2015, pp. 17, 19.
56 Jeffrey Becker, David Liebenberg, and Peter Mackenzie, Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy, 
Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2013, p. 123; ONI, 2015.
57 See, for example, ‹孙建国任军参谋 部副谋长 曾被称’小巴顿’›[“Sun Jianguo Appointed Vice Chief of Staff, 
Once Called ‘Little Patton’”], «澎湃新闻» [The Paper], February 4, 2016.
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In the short term, this paucity of PLAN leaders with significant experience in 
the strategic force will tend to retard strategic thought development within the navy 
(at least relative to the PLA Rocket Force). That said, the broader role of former SSN 
commanders should lead to attention to nuclear power plants that will benefit both 
future SSN and SSBN models. As operational commanders gain experience in the 
Jin class and get promoted, this should gradually change. And if the United States 
continues to develop missile defenses, as it is likely to do, the Chinese SSBN fleet will 
almost certainly receive greater attention, further enhancing the role and stature of its 
commanders. More broadly, the development of a blue water navy will likely produce 
a leadership more comfortable with strategic issues and facilitate the development of 
strategic naval capabilities.58
PLA Air Force
PLAAF does not currently have a strategic nuclear role, but air-delivered weapons 
were employed in several of China’s early nuclear tests. The growing role of PLAN in 
nuclear delivery, assuming it does not lose that role to the PLA Rocket Force, could 
encourage PLAAF to reacquire a nuclear role for itself. PLAAF is currently seeking 
to recast itself as a “strategic air force,” and although it has not defined such a force 
as necessarily nuclear capable, nuclear armament would be consistent with the desire 
for a larger, independent strategic role.59 Certainly, a heavy bomber would be desirable 
from PLAAF’s perspective, and a nuclear mission would help justify such an acquisi-
tion, but PLAAF does not require a heavy bomber to gain a nuclear role. China has 
already extended its reach by fielding long-range air-launched cruise missiles (DH-10s) 
that can be launched from H-6 medium bombers. A miniaturized warhead able to fit 
on a cruise missile represents another path to a nuclear air force, although that would 
require a policy change on the part of the PLA, which has not heretofore embraced 
tactical nuclear weapons. None of these potential developments has been publicly dis-
cussed by Chinese strategists, and there is no indication that such developments are 
either imminent nor even likely in the longer term. Nevertheless, the development of 
PLAN’s nuclear force and the manifest desire of PLAAF officers to develop a larger, 
independent role for the air force do highlight the possibility.
The Creation of the PLA Rocket Force
The reforms of December 2015, which changed the name of the Second Artillery to the 
PLA Rocket Force and elevated its status from branch to service, will have a significant 
impact on the bureaucratic politics of nuclear weapons in China. Xi Jinping’s military 
58 David Liebenberg and Jeffrey Becker, “Recent Personnel Shifts Hint at Major Changes on the Horizon for 
PLA Navy Leadership,” China Brief, Vol. 14, No. 3, February 7, 2014.
59 Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, “China’s Search for a Strategic Air Force,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2016.
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reforms have unfolded in stages, and the ultimate shape of the new Rocket Force is not 
entirely clear. Depending on the degree of reorganization during subsequent rounds of 
reform, the creation of the Rocket Force could fundamentally transform the bureau-
cratic landscape.
In announcing the bureaucratic promotion and changing the organization’s 
name, Xi Jinping said: “The Rocket Force is our country’s core strategic deterrent 
force; it is the strategic support for our country’s major power status; and it is an impor-
tant foundation for safeguarding our nation’s security.”60 Other Chinese observers who 
have sought to explain the change note that the elevation brings the organization’s 
status in line with its current state of material development, which has produced a large 
force with a range of capabilities critical to the PLA’s overall function.61 The change in 
formal status, and the political endorsement of the missile forces that has gone with it, 
will presumably make the Rocket Force a more capable advocate for nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems, for support systems that may still be lacking (such as space-based 
early warning systems), and for more-flexible interpretation of policy and doctrine.
A second change that was also announced on December 31, 2015, was the cre-
ation of the Strategic Support Force, which will also likely boost the prospects for 
the development of early warning capability. The Strategic Support Force will, among 
other things, assume most or possibly all PLA space functions, which have been oper-
ated up to the present directly by the PLA General Armaments Department.62 For 
years, the Second Artillery had argued for a separate space component within the PLA, 
while PLAAF had sought to roll space into PLAAF under the rubric of an air and space 
force.63 Hence, the creation of the Strategic Support Force represents an important 
bureaucratic victory for missile force officers. Both the commander and deputy com-
mander of the new force were originally officers from Second Artillery Force.64 Given 
that many other key personnel will come from the ranks of former Second Artillery 
60 “Meeting to Establish . . . ,” 2016.
61 ‹专家: 二炮为何升格为第四大军种火箭军?›[“Specialist: Why Was the Second Artillery Elevated as the 
Fourth Major Military Service to the Rocket Force?”], 环球网 [GlobalNet], January 9, 2016.
62 ‹我国成立战略支援部队 体制上领先美军› [“China Establishes Strategic Support Force, Takes Lead over 
the United States in [Military] Structure”], «腾讯新闻» [Tengxun Xinwen], January 1, 2016.
63 For views on the proper use and organization of space forces with clear PLASAF leadership imprimatur, see
杨学军 [Yang Xuejun], «优势来自空间－论空间战场与空间战争» [Advantage Comes from Space: The Space 
Battlefield and Space Operations], Beijing: 国防工业出版社 出版时间 [National Defense Industry Press], 2006. 
For a competing set of views with clear PLAAF imprimatur, see «空天一体作战学» [Study of Integrated Air-
Space Operations], Beijing: 解放军出版社 [PLA Publishing House], 2006.
64 岳怀让 [Yue Huairang], ‹战略支援部队: 高津任司令员, 刘福连任政治委员› [“Strategic Support Force: 
Gao Jin Appointed Commander, Liu Fulian Appointed Political Commissioner”], «澎湃新闻» [Pengpai 
Xinwen, The Paper], January 1, 2016; ‹两少将任战略支援部队首任副司令 生平简历公开› [“Brief Biographies 
of the Two Major Generals Appointed as Deputy Commanders of the Strategic Support Force”], «大公報» 
[TaKungPao], January 6, 2016.
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officers—a function of relative similarity in educational requirements—the Strategic 
Support Force is likely to have strong ties to the missile forces for years to come.
It is unlikely that Xi Jinping’s military reforms are complete, and it is unclear what 
future developments might hold. Some Chinese commentators have suggested that the 
PLA Rocket Force may ultimately be given responsibility for all Chinese strategic strike 
elements, including SSBNs and (future) strategic bombers, as well as ground-based 
missile forces.65 These developments would, as one Chinese analyst noted, produce the 
world’s first military service that controls all three elements of a nuclear triad. Without 
doubt, it would have momentous consequences from the standpoint of bureaucratic 
politics, creating a unified advocate for both nuclear and conventional strike. Other 
possible organizational reforms might see the PLA Rocket Force gain control of BMD 
or counterspace functions, both of which employ modified ballistic missiles as kinetic 
kill vehicles, or possibly of the space functions most closely associated with nuclear 
deterrence—specifically, early warning satellites. Given that Xi Jinping affirmed the 
concept of “combined nuclear and conventional” [核常兼备] in announcing the new 
Rocket Force, one change that will probably not occur is the hiving off of conventional 
ballistic missiles or their migration to another service.66
Bureaucratic Politics—Summary
There is certainly no guarantee that the new PLA rocket force will gain a monopoly 
over all Chinese nuclear elements. Whether or not it does, advocacy for a robust nuclear 
posture is likely to grow stronger in the years ahead. Most obviously, the Rocket Force 
will be a more influential actor, even without making additional organizational gains. 
With the deployment of a substantial fleet of Jin-class submarines, PLAN’s interests 
in China’s nuclear deterrent and deterrent posture have also increased, and PLAAF 
will almost certainly push for long-range bombers that could one day supply deliv-
ery for nuclear weapons. This bureaucratic landscape, combined with an international 
nuclear environment that Chinese strategists characterize as increasingly complex and 
challenging, is fertile ground for the further growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities. 
What kinds of capabilities are developed may be partly determined by organizational 
processes.
Organizational Process as a Potential Driver of Chinese Nuclear Force 
Structure
While Chinese political leaders determine budget totals and influence major procure-
ment decisions, force posture choices largely emerge from the routine functioning of 
65 “Specialist: Why Was the Second Artillery Elevated . . . ,” 2016.
66 “Meeting to Establish . . . ,” 2016.
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the Chinese bureaucracy’s organizational units. Examining the role that the routine 
functioning of these organizational units can have in force structure and force posture 
decisions highlights an alternative driver: organizational process.67
As noted earlier, Chinese leaders can and do intervene in force structure decisions. 
However, when Chinese leaders do not intervene in force structure decisions, organi-
zational processes can play a larger role in shaping decisions. Organizations tend to 
behave according to SOPs, which means that organizational processes tend to produce 
a limited menu of options. In the case of force structure decisions, this often manifests 
itself in preferences for continued incremental improvements to a service’s primary 
weapon system. Without the intervention of civilian leaders, a military service’s organi-
zational goals and procedures, as well as its research and design labs, tend to determine 
force posture. In this way, any single force posture decision can reflect the activity and 
interests of a cluster of research and development organizations, rather than a single 
conscious decision by leaders to acquire a capability. Over time, if this dynamic is not 
checked, it can create an emergent force structure, rather than one molded by a single 
rational actor pursuing an objective.68
To explore how organizational processes could drive nuclear force structure deci-
sions, we examine the SOPs, perceptions, and priorities of the PLA Rocket Force, 
PLAN, and PLAAF and how those might shape the options proposed to national 
leaders. In doing so, we consider how these organizational processes could affect three 
key aspects of China’s minimum deterrent policy: inventory, quality, and posture. 
China has historically fielded a small inventory of nuclear-capable delivery systems and 
nuclear warheads. In terms of quality, Chinese systems were, for many years, character-
ized by poor accuracies and long launch times.69 In the case of posture, China’s nuclear 
forces have historically been kept on low alert, with a priority on tight control over 
nuclear warheads at the expense of survivability. A single central storage location holds 
the majority of Chinese warheads, although a small number of warheads are routinely 
moved between the central storage location and smaller warhead storage facilities asso-
ciated with each of the Second Artillery’s six bases.70
67 This is inspired by Model II in Graham Allison’s classic work (1971). Other scholars have presented the con-
cept that internal, domestic factors are more likely to change China’s nuclear posture than changes in the objec-
tive balance; see Lewis, 2007, p. 142.
68 In complexity science and systems theory, emergence describes patterns or behaviors in complex systems that 
arise out of a large number of comparatively simple interactions. Examples include fractal patterns that emerge 
from continually reapplying a simple algorithm and the flocking behavior in fish or birds.
69 Open-source assessments judge that, circa 1984, China had only three warhead designs: 15-kiloton, 
3-megaton, and 4- to 5-megaton warheads (Lewis, 2007, p. 93). These legacy warhead designs would have to be 
miniaturized to fit in a reentry body as part of a MIRV payload.
70 The 22 Base Headquarters in the Qinling mountain range is responsible for controlling all Chinese nuclear 
warheads. Its central warhead storage facility has been in Taibai since the late 1960s (Stokes, 2010).
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There is some evolution in each of these dimensions. How might the evolving 
bureaucratic landscape described earlier, together with the influence of organizational 
processes and SOPs, work to reinforce or further shift these historical patterns? What 
would the implications be for Chinese nuclear policy and doctrine? The historical char-
acteristics associated with China’s nuclear inventory, quality, and posture have been 
consistent with both China’s minimum deterrent doctrine and its no-first-use policy. 
China’s minimum deterrent requires that only a small number of missiles survive a 
first strike and emerge capable of hitting primarily countervalue targets. Striking these 
targets, which might consist of cities and industrial centers, does not require a high 
degree of precision. And China’s no-first-use policy, combined with its lack of launch 
on warning, suggests that Chinese nuclear forces would not be required to strike 
quickly. As we have seen, Chinese nuclear forces are evolving to meet the demands of a 
more challenging nuclear environment, and there has been significant change already 
in the characteristics described earlier—although most of the changes have to do with 
expanded numbers and greater survivability.
The discussion in the following subsections shows that organizational processes 
could create additional imperatives for greater change in the quality of Chinese nuclear 
weapons and in the posture associated with their deployment. A key question is whether 
these changes, should they occur, will create a force that is more suitable for a limited 
warfighting strategy that might be more flexible and offer more options to Chinese 
commanders but that might also undermine, to an extent, both arms race stability 
and crisis stability. The capabilities associated with such a force might include greater 
missile accuracy to hit and destroy hardened counterforce targets, dynamic targeting 
integrated to ISR networks enabling nuclear forces to attack targets of opportunity, the 
routine mating of missiles with warheads, the regular deployment of launchers, and the 
ability to coordinate and launch large salvos.
While some of these features (e.g., regular deployment of launchers) could be 
useful in cementing a more reliable minimum deterrent capability, they might, when 
combined, also provide China with some nuclear warfighting capability—one that 
might provide a more flexible response to nuclear attack or coercion, rather than one 
oriented to limit damage. New capabilities might lead Chinese nuclear commanders 
to advocate for de facto adjustment of operating concepts and doctrines, even if the 
capabilities themselves were developed without that goal originally in mind. If such 
adjustments are proposed, the technical advances that make the concepts possible will 
make the arguments of advocates more compelling.
PLA Rocket Force
The SOPs, perceptions, and priorities of the Rocket Force (and the Second Artillery 
Force through 2015) could have a profound effect on nuclear force structure. The 
Second Artillery Force began as an organization exclusively concerned with operat-
ing nuclear-armed missiles, but it assumed a conventional missile strike mission in the 
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early 1990s. Since then, it (and now the Rocket Force) has fielded a growing number 
of brigades armed with conventional missiles. By 2016, roughly one-half of the Rocket 
Force’s brigades were armed with conventional missiles, and about two-thirds of its 
launchers were for conventional missile systems.71 While the nuclear mission will 
remain the Rocket Force’s most important task, the balance between nuclear and con-
ventional assets in the ground-based missile inventory will likely continue to evolve 
in favor of the latter. The only specific equipment priority that Xi Jinping mentioned 
in his remarks on the establishment of the Rocket Force called for “strengthening 
medium-range precision strike forces,” which, in the Chinese lexicon, includes both 
medium- and intermediate-range systems.72
The operating procedures developed for these conventional missiles have given 
the Rocket Force experience dispersing ballistic missiles for survivability, maintaining 
communications and sustainment with the dispersed forces, and remaining prepared 
to launch an attack in the face of adversary countermeasures. Greater experience oper-
ating ballistic missile TELs in the field could make the Rocket Force more confident in 
its ability to disperse its nuclear forces during a crisis for survivability and more able to 
support those dispersed forces logistically while they are conducting dispersed opera-
tions. This expanded capability would be a significant step forward for China’s nuclear 
forces. Earlier assessments of China’s nuclear command, control, and communica-
tion networks judged that their technical and operational practice might be weak.73 
Improvements, derived initially from exercises with conventional missile forces, could 
affect the nuclear options presented to Chinese leaders and provide them with some 
elements of a warfighting capability, all without forswearing a no-first-use policy. A 
launch-on-warning option might similarly evolve from the quick-launch capabilities 
developed for the Rocket Force’s conventionally armed ballistic missile force.
In addition, the technologies developed by the Rocket Force for its conventional 
ballistic and cruise missile forces could shape the design requirements set down for 
China’s new nuclear forces. When China fields new nuclear-armed missiles, the designs 
could be influenced by technologies originally developed for conventional TBMs. 
High-quality guidance and control technology (inertial navigation systems, satellite 
navigation systems, postboost maneuvers) could be included in nuclear forces because 
they are “on the shelf” and the research and development organizations associated with 
the Rocket Force have already invested in them. The result could be a next-generation 
nuclear ballistic missiles that are more accurate than the Rocket Force’s legacy ICBMs.
71 The latest open-source assessment credits the Rocket Force with 29 brigades (not including three training 
brigades), at least 15 of which are armed with conventional ballistic or ground-launched cruise missiles. (A 16th 
is armed with an unknown variant of the DF-26, which can be either nuclear or conventionally armed.) It has 
between 142 and 158 launchers (silos and transporter-erector-launchers [TELs]) for nuclear missiles and between 
309 and 325 TELs for conventional missiles (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016).
72 “Meeting to Establish . . . ,” 2016.
73 Lewis, 2007, p. 38.
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Advances in the Rocket Force’s conventional force structure could have a particu-
larly important influence on the two key characteristics cited earlier as being distin-
guishing factors between a minimum deterrent strategy and a counterforce strategy: 
accuracy and dynamic targeting capabilities. Building highly accurate ballistic missiles 
requires mastering a host of different technology and engineering challenges. In addi-
tion to high-quality guidance and control capabilities, a country must make highly 
reliable and consistent components. For example, solid-fueled rockets cannot throttle 
their thrust, so guidance and control systems need to conduct energy-management 
maneuvers to place the missile payload into the correct position with the correct veloc-
ity for it to reach its target. Inconsistencies in the burn rate across missiles can pro-
duce errors that the guidance and control system cannot compensate for, making the 
production of solid rockets to highly consistent specifications critical. China has made 
great strides in all these areas to achieve high accuracies for its conventional ballistic 
missiles. Given the lack of firewalls between the conventional and nuclear sides of 
PLASAF, we might expect to see these same technologies applied to any new nuclear 
missiles China makes.74
Similarly, the Rocket Force has been building its command, control, communica-
tions, computers, and ISR capabilities to strike dynamic targets, such as aircraft carri-
ers, with the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile. The experience, training, and technol-
ogy developed for this conventional mission could expand to apply to more portions of 
the conventional force (starting perhaps with systems that might target dynamic land 
targets, such as the DF-21C) and, ultimately, to include the nuclear force.
Another potential example concerns the development of new classes of IRBMs. 
China rolled out a new IRBM, the DF-26, during its August 2015 military parade, 
and announced that it would have conventional land-attack, antiship, and nuclear 
variants.75 It is likely that, during the design phase, many of the missile’s characteris-
tics (such as accuracy) were determined by the requirements for the conventional vari-
ant. Barring a deliberate requirement to cripple the accuracy of the nuclear variant, 
this would lead to a much more accurate and faster-firing nuclear IRBM than China’s 
legacy DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBMs, which entered service in the 1970s. As the 2016 DoD 
report on Chinese military power notes, if the nuclear version of the DF-26 “shares the 
74 It is possible that centralized authority might exercise influence to prevent a future nuclear missile from 
being equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (to maintain a force structure more clearly aligned with the 
minimum-deterrent approach), but the accumulation of precision across the rest of the missile could still signifi-
cantly increase accuracy over that of legacy Chinese nuclear missiles. This would be particularly true if the Rocket 
Force developed high-quality inertial navigation systems (perhaps with stellar updates, as with the U.S. Trident 
SLBM) out of paranoia about relying too heavily on satellite navigation signals that could be jammed during a 
conflict with the United States.
75 ‹阅兵首次公开: 新型东风26导弹具备反舰能力› [“Revealed Publicly at the Military Review: The New 
DF-26 has Anti-ship Capability”], «新浪军事» [Sina News], September 5, 2015.
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same guidance capabilities” as the conventional version, it “would give China its first 
nuclear precision strike capability against theater targets.”76
According to a rational-actor interpretation, this would be a clear indication that 
China’s leaders intended to move beyond a strict minimum deterrence and develop a 
more flexible and robust nuclear force capable of a range of nuclear warfighting mis-
sions. According to the organizational process model, however, this could simply be the 
result of an organizational proclivity of the Rocket Force, or perhaps even the defense 
industry, to continue incrementally modernizing primary weapon systems, standardize 
and modularize missiles to simplify logistics and support, and continue expanding the 
reach of China’s conventional missile systems. The two possibilities are not mutually 
exclusive, and, more importantly, the implications would be the same.
PLA Navy
As PLAN acquires a more viable and robust nuclear capability, the PLA will likely 
face pressure to change its SOP for handling nuclear weapons—at least in the case of 
SSBNs and possibly more widely. Currently, China maintains most of its nuclear forces 
in a very low state of readiness. If China intends to have its SSBNs conduct deter-
rence patrols, it will have to adapt this SOP to enable the mating of nuclear weapons 
with ballistic missiles more routinely during peacetime.77 If China chooses to send its 
SSBNs on routine patrols, as other nations do, this could have spillover effects on PLA 
Rocket Force practices. If PLAN begins to maintain permanent warhead storage facili-
ties and is routinely mating warheads to its SLBMs for patrols, the Rocket Force might 
see this as a challenge to its status as the nation’s leading nuclear force. The Rocket 
Force might respond by arguing that it ought to start conducting its own “deterrence 
patrols,” regularly mating nuclear warheads to its road-mobile ICBMs and dispersing 
them from their bases more frequently or regularly.
Also, PLAN will likely need its own nuclear warhead storage facilities near SSBN 
bases. This proliferation of nuclear warhead storage facilities might motivate the Rocket 
Force to expand its own storage facilities. Routine SSBN patrols will likely require 
China to improve the technical controls on its warheads. As of the late 1990s, China 
was not believed to have permissive action links on its warheads. Jeffrey Lewis cites 
this as evidence that China does not plan on frequently deploying warheads mated to 
delivery systems, instead relying on physical separation between the launcher and war-
76 OSD, 2016, p. 25.
77 There are, of course, alternatives. China might choose to keep its SSBNs in port during peacetime, perhaps 
in some sort of hardened submarine pens. PLAN might get its own warhead storage facilities near the SSBNs 
but would not mate the warheads except during a crisis. During a crisis, the Chinese could mate the warheads 
with the SLBMs and have the SSBNs deploy. Alternatively, PLAN could choose to have its SSBNs patrol without 
nuclear warheads to create doubt in the mind of potential adversaries: The question would be whether adversaries 
could be sure that there were no warheads on a submarine.
118    China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
head to avoid accidental and unauthorized launches.78 Adding sophisticated technical 
controls to facilitate SSBN patrols could open the door for more regular Rocket Force 
deployments with mated warheads.
Nuclear submarines provide another potential source of nuclear force structure 
creep. China’s first generation Xia-class SSBN was catastrophically noisy, effectively 
negating its deterrent value. The new Jin-class (Type 094) boats are reportedly qui-
eter than the Type 092 but still noisy by modern standards.79 The deployment of at 
least four Jin-class submarines indicates that China judges them adequate for its cur-
rent needs, at least until the future Type 096 SSBN enters service. As China’s ability 
to make quieter SSNs improves, these quieting technologies could be incorporated 
into China’s next-generation SSBN. As its antisubmarine warfare and submarine-qui-
eting capabilities improve, PLAN might gain confidence that its SSBNs could con-
duct deterrence patrols. Improved satellite navigation capabilities and improved bal-
listic accuracies could combine to make China’s next SSBN far more survivable and 
a potent nuclear warfighting platform. China could choose to procure and operate a 
nuclear force structure well below its demonstrated technological capacity but would 
have to make this choice repeatedly and potentially in the face of continuing pressure 
from constituencies that advocate a more robust nuclear warfighting capability.80
PLA Air Force
As noted earlier, PLAAF has already expanded its ability to make long-range strikes by 
fielding a long-range air-launched cruise missile (the DH-10), which can be launched 
from the H-6 medium bomber. Should China miniaturize nuclear weapons to fit on 
cruise missiles, this would provide a weapon with pinpoint accuracy and immense 
flexibility and might provide the PLA with additional nuclear flexibility. It would also 
further stretch the boundaries of China’s nuclear policy and doctrine and set off addi-
tional alarm bells throughout the region about Chinese inventions and direction. With 
perhaps the most obvious implications for nuclear doctrine and thinking, this might 
be a critical test case (although not the only one) for whether Chinese leaders will resist 
nuclear force structure creep.
Conclusion
China’s future nuclear forces will be shaped by both international and domestic fac-
tors. For China, bureaucratic factors are likely becoming more important over time, as 
78 Lewis, 2007, p. 38.
79 ONI, 2009.
80 Lewis (2007, pp. 43–44) cites some voices in the PLA who argue for more operational flexibility for China’s 
nuclear forces.
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the PLA moves farther from its revolutionary roots and as its component organizations 
assume more distinct identities. Regardless of whether the PLA gains additional assets, 
such as SSBNs or strategic bombers, the establishment of the PLA Rocket Force creates 
a far more powerful advocate for nuclear forces and missions. PLAN and PLAAF have 
made incremental gains in overall status over the years, and officers with an interest in 
nuclear missions within these services, especially PLAN, will gain further prominence 
with the evolution of more capable equipment. External events that make China’s 
nuclear environment appear more challenging and bureaucratic drivers are likely to be 
mutually reinforcing.
The development of Chinese nuclear force structure may also be shaped by tech-
nological advances in conventional missile and naval forces, which will pose new ques-
tions for Chinese leadership. Not applying technologies developed for conventional 
systems to nuclear ones would require national leaders to set requirements for less- 
accurate guidance systems, for example, on nuclear-armed ballistic missiles than on 
their conventional counterparts. In earlier decisions regarding China’s nuclear force 
posture, the leadership faced decisions about whether to develop a given capability. 
Now, it is just as likely to face questions about not introducing a capability—all to 
maintain a self-consciously minimum-deterrent strategy and believable no-first-use 
policy.
Unless China’s political leadership maintains strict self-discipline, the PLA could 
develop a range of capabilities associated with disarming first strikes, a damage- 
limitation launch-on-warning posture, or a second-strike approach that embraced 
extended nuclear warfighting or counterforce targeting. Note that this does not 
mean that, even if it did acquire such capabilities, China would discard its no-first-
use pledge, just that the opportunities to discard no-first-use and adopt a new policy 
would emerge. Even without formal changes to policy or doctrine, this could exacer-
bate security dilemmas with neighbors. Developing the capabilities discussed above 
could also open the door for voices arguing for more counterforce options and a more 
robust nuclear policy. It would remove one of the key hurdles preventing such moves, 
the inadequacy of Chinese nuclear force structure for anything other than a mini-
mal deterrent, and would make the arguments of proponents more persuasive and less 
expensive. Maintaining a minimal deterrent would require increasing attention and 
effort to lean against the prevailing winds of precision, responsiveness, mobility, and 
warfighting preparation generated by China’s modernization of its conventional forces.
While the constraint of a single, strong, and enduring political leadership could 
contain dissenting voices in various organizations, should the leadership be strongly 
committed to that goal, the increasing salience of bureaucracies in Chinese decision-
making, especially military decisionmaking, will likely allow greater scope for orga-
nizational process and SOPs to influence outcomes. A number of PLA officers and 
defense researchers have advocated discarding China’s minimum-deterrence strat-
egy in favor of more-robust approaches. While a strict reading of China’s no-first-use 
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pledge concludes that the sole purpose of China’s nuclear forces is to deter a nuclear 
attack on China, there are a variety of views among Chinese strategists about how 
useful nuclear weapons can be in deterring conventional attacks.81 Some Chinese strat-
egist have suggested the PLA should develop limited nuclear warfighting capabilities, 
but the majority couch their recommendations for modernizing the PLA’s nuclear force 
structure in terms of improving its survivability to ensure the credibility of China’s 
deterrent.82 Without sustained intervention from a strong leader who can intervene to 
quell the voices arguing for an expanded nuclear strategy and who can halt incremental 
improvements that could gradually expand the ambition of China’s nuclear strategy, 
significant changes could occur in the practice and meaning of policy, even if the labels 
remain unchanged.
81 James Mulvenon, Murray Scot Tanner, Michael S. Chase, David R. Frelinger, David C. Gompert, Martin C. 
Libicki, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Depart-
ment of Defense, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-340-OSD, 2006, p. 96.
82 Mulvenon et al., 2006, pp. 96–97.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Material Resources and Constraints
To what extent will relevant resources constrain or facilitate change in China’s nuclear 
inventory or strategy? Here we consider two types of resources, financial resources and 
fissile material.
China’s Budgetary Environment
For more than three decades, rapid Chinese economic growth has been one of the key 
features not only reshaping global economic relations but also underwriting a shift in 
the regional and global balance of power. The Chinese economy has slowed in recent 
years, and that trend will likely continue into the future, but most economists believe 
that it will continue to beat the global average for at least the next decade.
Between 1980 and 1999, real Chinese economic growth averaged just over 10 per-
cent, despite chronic battles with inflation and volatility. Between 2012 and 2015, real 
growth slowed to an average of 7.5 percent.1 As of this writing, the economy appears 
to be encountering significant turbulence. There is now general consensus among both 
Chinese leaders and Western analysts that the causes are structural. In March 2007, 
then-Premier Wen Jiabao offered that the Chinese economy was “unstable, unbalanced, 
uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” Of these “four uns,” unstable refers to financial 
instability, particularly the economy’s heavy dependence on excessive investment and 
credit for growth; unbalanced to widening regional and urban versus rural disparities; 
uncoordinated to a poor balance between investment and consumption and to an over-
reliance on exports; and unsustainable to energy and environmental concerns.2 In the 
years since Wen’s speech, these issues have grown more serious. Of particular concern 
to many economists has been the increased reliance on capital investment as growth 
has declined. Gross capital formation averaged 47 percent of GDP between 2010 and 
1 World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %),” data, 2016a.
2 “Premier: China Confident in Maintaining Economic Growth,” Xinhua, March 16, 2007.
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2014, compared with an average of 41 percent during the 2000s and 39 percent during 
the 1990s.3
Given the nation’s economic challenges, Chinese leaders face an increasingly 
pressing question: Should they continue to advance the policies that netted near- 
double-digit growth for the past few decades but may ultimately cause a significant 
shock or dislocation in the future, or should they instead push for serious structural 
reforms that, while addressing the issues Wen raised in 2007, may lead to slower GDP 
growth for a decade or more? Early indicators are ambiguous but appear to suggest a 
continued unwillingness to make a decisive choice. At the Third Plenum of the Party’s 
18th Congress, held in November 2013, the government indicated strong political 
will to make the necessary adjustments, even at the cost of short-term pain.4 But at 
China’s annual legislative sessions in March 2014, Premier Li Keiqiang announced an 
unchanged yearly growth target 7.5 percent, arguing, “We must keep economic devel-
opment as the central task and maintain a proper economic growth rate.”5 Since then, 
the leadership has consistently demonstrated a preference for propping up short-term 
economic growth over market-oriented structural reform.6
In light of so much uncertainty, it is hard to predict how the Chinese economy 
will grow in the coming years. There is, however, broad consensus among economists 
and investors that the days of predictable double-digit growth are over. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund forecasts that growth will decline to between 6.8 and 6.0 
between 2016 and 2020. The World Bank also sees growth declining to 6.9 percent 
by 2017, while the Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that annual growth will fall 
to 5.5 percent by 2019. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment offers to the longest horizon and predicts that growth will reach 5.1 percent by 
2020 and decline further to 3.5 percent by 2030.7 Finally, Beijing University’s Michael 
Pettis, the longtime dean of foreign Chinese economy watchers, suggests that contin-
ued 7.5 percent growth in the short-term can only be sustained by short-sighted policies 
that will further aggravate the economy’s structural imbalances. Pettis estimates that, 
if the party does carry out the necessary reforms, China’s economy will grow by only 
3 World Bank, “Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP),” data, 2016b.
4 See, for example, Arthur R. Kroeber, “Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China,” 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, November 17, 2013.
5 “China Retains 7.5% Growth Target for 2014,” Bloomberg News, March 5, 2014.
6 See, for example, Barry Naughton, “Reform Agenda in Turmoil: Can Policy-Makers Regain the Initiative?” 
China Leadership Monitor, No. 48, Fall 2015.
7 For the International Monetary Fund, Economist Intelligence Unit, and Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development projections, see “China GDP Growth Forecast 2015–2010 and up to 2060, Data 
and Charts,” Knoema.com, 2016. For the World Bank projection, see World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects: 
Forecast Table,” 2015.
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3 to 4 percent a year for the next decade but will establish the foundation for a healthier 
form of growth in the future.8
Barring a military conflict with neighbors or a dramatic change in China’s inter-
national position, growth in military spending is likely to mirror that of the economy 
as a whole. China’s official defense budget has grown substantially in real terms since 
1996 but has not changed significantly relative to total economy. As Table 8.1 indi-
cates, China’s official defense budget fluctuated between 1.2 and 1.4 percent of GDP 
between 2000 and 2015.
Chinese budgets are relatively opaque, and China’s official defense budgets do not 
include a number of military-related expenses—a phenomenon that is not at all unique 
to China.9 Including “off-budget” spending would likely add somewhere between 
50 and 100 percent more to the budget—bringing China’s defense budget to roughly 
2.0 to 2.5 percent of GDP.10 However, the main point here is there is no reason to 
believe that such off-budget spending has grown in proportion to the official budget 
over time and some reason to suspect the opposite. In particular, the overseas purchase 
of military equipment, which comprises one of the largest categories of unaccounted 
expenses, has declined in recent years relative to the defense budget as a whole as 
China’s defense industry has matured and as Russia has grown wary of Chinese intel-
lectual property rights violations. Hence, stability in military budget shares relative to 
the larger economy is real and is consistent with the language and intent of China’s 1997 
National Defense Law, which stipulates that the “growth in national defense funding 
should be based on national defense needs and the level of the civilian economy.”11
8 See Michael Pettis, “China Does Not Need to Grow at 7.5 Percent,” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, July 18, 2013, and Michael Pettis, “Will the Reforms Speed Growth in China?” 
China Financial Markets blog, January 5, 2014.
9 All countries include different items in their published defense spending figures. In the United States case, the 
veterans related expenses alone would add almost 20 percent to the defense budget, and many intelligence- and 
nuclear-related functions are also not included. In the Chinese case, military-related expenditures not included 
in the defense budget include spending on the People’s Armed Police, military family compensation and spend-
ing, government research and development with potential dual-use applications, subsidies to potential dual-use 
industries, arms imports, arms sales profits, intelligence, and some aspects of nuclear spending. The first two of 
these are published in Chinese budgets under separate headings, while some of the others can be estimated. On 
these issues, see Gilboy and Heginbotham, 2012.
10 SIPRI estimates actual Chinese 2014 defense spending at 2.1  percent of GDP (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” 2016); and Gilboy and Heginbotham (2012, 
p. 117) estimates spending at roughly 2.0 percent of GDP, excluding spending on intelligence and nuclear weap-
ons (“strategic programs”). A 2005 RAND Corporation study assessed it at between 2.3 and 2.8  percent of 
GDP (Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt, Modernizing 
China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-260-1-AF, 2005.
11 «中华人民共和国国防法 (1997年3月14日) 第八届全国人民代表大会第五次会议通过» [National Defense 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress], Ch. VI, Art. 35, March 
14, 1997; emphasis added. For a number of years prior to the law’s passage, Chinese defense budgets had declined 
relative to GDP. Some members of the military delegation to the National People’s Congress had sought to for-
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Assuming that economic growth remains at roughly 4 to 6 percent over the next 
ten to 15 years and that defense budget increases track roughly with economic growth, 
Chinese planners will almost certainly have sufficient financial resources for continued 
nuclear modernization (including some growth in strategic system numbers)—without 
mally peg defense spending as a specific percentage (3.0 percent) of GDP in draft versions of the law. Although a 
formal peg was rejected, the language quoted here was inserted. On efforts to peg the defense budget formally to 
GDP, see 迟浩田 [Chi Haotian], ‹关于中华人民共和国国防法 (草案) 的说明› [“An Explanation of the PRC 
National Defense Law (Draft)”], in «中华人民共和国第八届全国人民代表大会第五次文件汇编» [Documents 
on the PRC Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress], Beijing: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1997.
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impinging on other key PLA priorities. First, 4- to 6-percent annual growth, impres-
sive by most standards, will provide some scope for further modernization even if no 
change occurs across services in the distribution of PLA budgets. Second, as other 
analysts have observed, China has traditionally punched well below its weight in the 
nuclear realm, and a modest rebalancing toward nuclear modernization would be well 
within the PLA’s means. Such rebalancing could result from a perceived increase in the 
salience of nuclear weapons or in nuclear threat perception—both of which appear to 
have occurred—and it could be further boosted by recent bureaucratic changes, such 
as the establishment of the PLA Rocket Force and the growth of the SSBN commu-
nity within PLAN. Finally, it should be observed that many improvements (such as 
the deployment of new penetration aids) may be relatively inexpensive, and the cost 
of deploying new missiles may, in part, be offset by retiring antiquated systems (such 
as DF-3A and DF-4 missiles) and converting the force structure to support a more 
modern inventory.
Fissile Material as a Limiting Factor
Estimates of current and future Chinese nuclear capabilities must also take into account 
the amount of fissile material China could have available to devote to modernizing and 
expanding its stockpile of nuclear weapons. Based on available open-source analysis, it 
appears that China has sufficient fissile material to continue modernizing its nuclear 
forces over the next decade, but not enough to “break out” and challenge U.S. or Rus-
sian warhead numbers.
Historically, China produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weap-
ons at two facilities: the Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant and the Jinkouhe-Heping 
gaseous diffusion plant. China also produced plutonium for nuclear weapons at two 
locations: the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex and Guangyuan plutonium production 
complex.12 According to Jeffrey Lewis, the Lanzhou and Jiuquan facilities “were con-
verted to civilian use in the 1980s, then shut down for a period of time. China appears 
to have decommissioned its facilities at Guangyuan; the status of highly enriched ura-
nium production at Jinkouhe/Heping is less clear.”13 The amount of tritium is another 
factor that is relevant in assessing the number of nuclear weapons China could produce 
12 China built the Jinkouhe-Heping plant and Guangyuan plutonium production complex as “third front” 
facilities. This was part of a massive effort in the 1960s to relocate strategic industries to remote areas of China to 
better protect them from U.S. or Soviet attack. On this program, see Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defense 
Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” China Quarterly, Vol. 115, 1988.
13 Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Nuclear Idiosyncrasies and Their Challenges,” Paris: Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales, Proliferation Papers No. 47, November–December 2013.
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and probably also limits the size of China’s nuclear arsenal.14 Today, China has a large 
and growing civilian enrichment program and is moving toward building reprocessing 
facilities to produce fuel for breeder reactors.15
In contrast to the other recognized nuclear weapons states, China has not made 
any official declarations about its production of HEU and plutonium for nuclear weap-
ons.16 China (along with France and Russia) also has not publicly released informa-
tion about its total fissile material stocks.17 Nonetheless, scholars have estimated the 
amount of HEU and plutonium China could have available for its nuclear weapons 
program.18 According to Harvard University’s Hui Zhang, China could have produced 
about 16  to 24 tons of HEU at its Lanzhou and Heping plants. Subtracting about 
4 tons of HEU to account for nuclear-weapon tests, research reactor fuel, and process 
losses would leave China with an estimated stockpile of about 12 to 20 tons of HEU 
for nuclear weapons.19 According to the same assessment, China could have produced 
1.5 to 2.5 tons of plutonium for its nuclear-weapon program, of which it used perhaps 
0.2 tons in its nuclear tests before it stopped testing and signed the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. That would leave China with an inventory of 1.3 to 2.3 tons of plutonium 
for its nuclear-weapon program.20
From these estimates, Hui Zhang concludes that China’s existing stockpile of fis-
sile material, although relatively small, is likely “sufficient for its current modernization 
programs.”21 Notwithstanding the uncertainties inherent in open-source estimates of 
Chinese fissile material stockpiles, this judgment is consistent with official U.S. state-
ments, which indicate that China’s stockpile of fissile material is likely adequate to 
modernize and increase the size of its nuclear arsenal.22 For example, in March 2009, 
14 According to Hans Kristensen, “China probably only produces enough Tritium at its High-Flux Engineer-
ing Test Reactor (HFETR) in Jiajiang to maintain an arsenal of about 300 weapons” (Hans M. Kristensen, “No, 
China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear Weapons,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 3, 2011).
15 Hui Zhang, “Reprocessing in China: A Long, Risky Journey,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 10, 
2015b; Hui Zhang, China’s Uranium Enrichment Capacity: Rapid Expansion to Meet Commercial Needs, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Project on Manag-
ing the Atom, August 2015a.
16 International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency 
of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step Toward Disarmament, Princeton, N.J., 2013.
17 IPFM, 2013, p. 31.
18 Hui Zhang, “China’s HEU and Plutonium Production and Stocks,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
2011.
19 IPFM, 2013, p. 13.
20 IPFM, 2013, p. 20.
21 Hui Zhang, 2011, p. 83.
22 For example, DoD’s January 2001 report on proliferation issues noted, “China currently is not believed to 
be producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, but has a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to improve or 
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the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated: “China likely has produced 
enough weapon-grade fissile material to meet its needs for the immediate future.”23
These statements, as well as assessments by nongovernmental experts, suggest that 
China likely possesses enough fissile material to expand its arsenal in line with its near-
term requirements but not enough to match the size of the U.S. or Russian nuclear 
arsenals, which are limited to 1,550 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons 
under the New START Treaty.24 The specific number of nuclear weapons that could 
be produced with a given amount of fissile material, of course, depends on the amount 
required for each weapon. For example, based on Hui Zhang’s fissile material stockpile 
estimates and the assumption that Chinese nuclear weapons are similar to the hypo-
thetical modern nuclear warhead design described in a recent IPFM report, China’s 
nuclear arsenal would be limited to about 575 nuclear weapons.25
While specific numbers are necessarily speculative given China’s lack of trans-
parency, this hypothetical example illustrates that fissile material is a constraint that 
must be taken into account when assessing China’s current and future nuclear weapon 
capabilities. This may become even truer as China deploys additional MIRVed war-
heads, which may not require more aggregate fissile material than a smaller number of 
unitary ones but may require a different mix of material. This analysis suggests China 
has the capacity to increase its deployed warhead numbers but would not be able to 
reach numerical parity with the United States and Russia during the period covered 
by this report (through the 2020s). In the longer term, China could produce signifi-
cant additional weapon-grade fissile material if, for example, it moves forward with 
and completes the large commercial reprocessing plant under discussion with French 
firm Areva—or if it simply embarked on specialized plants optimized to produce such 
material.26 Even if the Areva plant proceeds, however, it will not be in operation until 
roughly 2030, and other facilities would also take considerable time to complete.27
increase its weapons inventory” (OSD, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2001, p. 14).
23 Michael D. Maples, “Annual Threat Assessment,” statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
March 10, 2009, p. 2.
24 See Kristensen, 2011. Kristensen notes that China’s stockpiles of fissile material are insufficient to support 
the higher estimates of its inventory of nuclear weapons that have been put forward by some U.S. and Russian 
analysts.
25 IPFM, 2013, pp. 93–94, posits a notional nuclear warhead design that requires 4 kg of plutonium and 25 kg 
of HEU, an estimate that is based on publicly available information about U.S. and Soviet fissile material stock-
piles and the number of nuclear weapons the two countries deployed during the Cold War.
26 Victor Gillinsky and Henry Sokolski, “How France Is Fueling Japan and China’s Nuclear ‘Race,’” National 
Interest, November 6, 2015.
27 “Chinese Reprocessing Plant to Start up in 2030,” World Nuclear News, September 24, 2015.
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Conclusions
In the case of the financial resources, China has the ability to adjust priorities within the 
military establishment, and even significantly reduced economic growth is unlikely to 
impinge on the quantitative or qualitative development of nuclear capabilities through 
2030. (An economic collapse or widespread disorder could, however, change the pic-
ture.) China’s stockpile of fissile materials, although less certain, appears to limit the 
possibility of a nuclear breakout, or massive Chinese nuclear expansion, that might 
see the country pursue parity with the United States and Russia. However, the stock-
pile would probably permit more modest growth, which could nevertheless prove sig-
nificant strategically, as we discuss in Chapters Nine and Ten. Given the available 
resources, the range of adjustments discussed in the preceding chapters—which could 
see China effectively hold the line at modest improvements to its nuclear survivability 
or embark on more-significant changes to inventory size and quality—are well within 
the limits of the nation’s capabilities.
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CHAPTER NINE
Outputs: Potential Developments in China’s Nuclear Future
While the previous chapters summarized the current state of China’s nuclear poli-
cies and forces and analyzed key drivers of China’s nuclear modernization, this chap-
ter examines potential future outcomes. It begins with an examination of six specific 
changes that could occur to Chinese policy, force structure, or operational practice: 
adding broader caveats on or modifying China’s no-first-use policy; modifying or 
ending the lean-and-effective formulation and accelerating weapon building; moving 
toward limited warfighting capabilities and concepts; creating a nuclear triad; estab-
lishing a Chinese missile defense system; and incorporating new technologies, such as 
HGVs and space-based early warning systems. Some of these are more or less likely 
than others, but all are possible under certain conditions, and all would be consequen-
tial. In each case, we address relevant Chinese literature or commentary on the subject, 
the Chinese logic for and against change, the conditions that might the outcome in 
question, and the consequences should the development come to pass—a question we 
address further in the chapter following this.
China’s Discussions of the No-First-Use Policy
Of the potential developments considered, perhaps none has been discussed more than 
modifying China’s long-held no-first-use policy. This does not, however, necessarily 
make this the most likely aspect of China’s nuclear policy or programs to change in 
the coming years. It may, rather, reflect the foundational nature of the policy, together 
with the important implications that flow from either maintaining or revising it. Ulti-
mately, China is highly unlikely to abandon no-first-use formally but could effectively 
redefine it by adding caveats or increasing the ambiguity (already considerable) with 
which it is discussed.
A number of Chinese analysts have raised questions about the circumstances 
under which China might, or should, consider deviating from its no-first-use policy. In 
a 2005 article, Fudan University’s Shen Dingli argued that the U.S. military’s develop-
ment of precision-guided weapons and their potential use against nuclear assets “begins 
to blur the boundary” between conventional and nuclear weapons. This, he says, has 
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put China’s no-first-use policy “under unprecedented pressure” and had “stirred up a 
debate on the validity of NFU [no-first-use].”1 Major General Peng Guangqian has 
argued that a conventional attack on a country’s nuclear forces could be considered 
equivalent to the first use of nuclear weapons: “On the surface, this is merely a con-
ventional attack, but in effect, its impact is little different than suffering a nuclear 
strike and incurring similarly heavy losses.” As a result, he argues, the party suffering 
the attack would “find it difficult to refrain from a nuclear counterattack.”2 Others 
have made similar comments about conventional strikes against China’s strategic 
command-and-control structure.3
Comments by outspoken retired military figures have occasionally triggered spec-
ulation about whether China would consider employing nuclear weapons to protect 
core interests even when an enemy has not used nuclear weapons first. In 1995, Gen-
eral Xiong Guangkai, former deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, told a U.S. 
official that China would consider using nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan. 
Then–U.S. ambassador Chas Freeman said later that Xiong’s statement was made “in 
a deterrent context and it is consistent with no first use.”4 In 2005, Major General Zhu 
Chenghu said, “if the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammuni-
tion on to the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with 
nuclear weapons.”5 Beijing later distanced itself from Zhu’s statement and reiterated its 
commitment to no-first-use.6 It is, however, possible that some Chinese strategists may 
share Zhu’s views.7
Since 2013, a number of Chinese articles have suggested that China should tailor 
its no-first-use policy in ways that protect China’s core national interests.8 Shen Dingli, 
1 Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security, Vol. 1, 2005.
2 Rong Yu and Peng Guangqian, “Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited,” China Security, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, p. 85.
3 Interviews with Chinese strategists, China, 2006.
4 Freeman’s statement is quoted from Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, 2008, p. 175.
5 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes,” New York Times, July 15, 2005.
6 The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that China “will not first use nuclear weapons at any time and under 
any condition” (“Beijing Says General’s Words His Own,” Xinhua, July 17, 2005, and “China Affirms ‘No First 
Use’ Nuke Policy,” China Daily, July 22, 2005).
7 For views on Zhu’s statement by three Chinese military thinkers, see Pan Zhenqiang, “China’s Insistence on 
No-First-Use,” China Security, Vol. 11, 2005; Shen Dingli, 2005, pp. 10–14; and 孙向丽 [Sun Xiangli], “China’s 
Nuclear Strategy,” China Security, Vol. 1, 2005. Zhao, for example, also writes of using nuclear weapons “to main-
tain the unity of the nation, territorial integrity, and national dignity.” See Zhao, 2005, pp. 42–43, and Chase, 
Erickson, and Yeaw, 2009, p. 98.
8 龙兴春 [Long Xingchun], ‹中国核政策, 不妨讲清楚› [“There Is No Harm in Speaking Clearly About Chi-
nese Nuclear Policy”], «环球时报» [Global Times], January 15, 2013; 王大可 [Wang Dake], ‹中国核政策与核
心利益› [“China’s Nuclear Policy and Core Interests”], China.org, January 18, 2013; ‹鹰派少将称核心利益
受根本危害时中国或用核武› [“Hawkish Major General States That When China’s Core Interests Are Funda-
mentally Threatened, China May Use Nuclear Weapons”], Duowei News, April 17, 2013; 沈丁立 [Shen Dingli], 
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for example, argues that China’s neighbors would be less likely to violate China’s sov-
ereignty in territorial disputes if Beijing did not explicitly take the use of nuclear weap-
ons off the table in such disputes.9 Others argue that Beijing should define mainland 
attacks that might cause mass casualties—such as attacks on the Three Gorges Dam—
as constituting “first use.”10 Although China has pledged never to use nuclear weapons 
against a nonnuclear state, some Chinese analysts also contend that a country that is 
allied with a nuclear weapon country, houses nuclear weapons, or provides basing for 
a nuclear adversary should not be seen as a nonnuclear country. Most of the articles 
accept no-first-use in principle. They argue for specific exemptions, such as attacks 
on nuclear weapons or on the Three Gorges Dam or, alternatively, advocate a greater 
degree of ambiguity to achieve a broader deterrent effect.11
These articles do not represent the Chinese government’s official position. Most 
of the articles cited above are either by academics or retired military officials, and most 
likely represent only the most hawkish views within the strategic community. Beijing 
has repeatedly affirmed its adherence to no-first-use principles.12 Rather, these articles 
highlight the frustration some Chinese strategists feel about China’s current inability 
to use diplomatic and conventional military means to successfully resolve territorial 
disputes in China’s favor. And they suggest that at least some see nuclear weapons as 
a potential source of leverage that China has not fully exploited because of its adher-
ence to the no-first-use policy. Indeed, some believe that Chinese nuclear forces should 
be employed to deter conventional attack, although that would require a dramatic 
increase in the number of weapons and improvement in their quality.13
In a 2015 article on no-first-use, Pan Zhenqiang, a retired PLA major general and 
professor at PLA National Defence University’s Institute for Strategic Studies, suggests 
that support for abandoning the policy, which he says accords with rising nationalist 
sentiment, can be found within the military. Pan, who argues forcefully for main-
taining the no-first-use policy, says that those who would abandon the policy see it as 
having failed to deter U.S. containment and the encirclement of China. Further, they 
see mid- and small-sized countries destabilizing the region by leaning on U.S. sup-
port and provoking China. Ultimately, they argue, “China must consider establishing 
‹改善核威慑, 吓阻对我主权挑衅› [“Improve Nuclear Deterrence, Prevent Provocations to Our Sovereignty”], 
«环球时报» [Global Times], August 2, 2013b; 乔良 [Qiao Liang], ‹专家: 中国应学习俄罗斯 用核武保证安全
发展› [“Expert: China Should Learn from Russia, Use Nuclear Weapons to Ensure Secure Development”], «中
国航空报» [China Space News], January 17, 2014.
9 Shen Dingli, 2013.
10 Long Xingchun, 2013.
11 One author (Qiao Liang, a noted hawk and author of Unrestricted Warfare) advocates abandoning no-first-use 
(Qiao Liang, 2014).
12 See, for example, Yao Yunzhu, 2013.
13 Xu Weidi, 2016, p. 39.
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power on the basis of a first-use policy, as Russia does, before it can compete with the 
United States effectively and protect China’s sovereignty and territorial unity.”14 How-
ever, even most Chinese analysts who would like to see some adjustment of the policy 
reason that China is unlikely to abandon its no-first-use policy anytime soon. Shen 
Dingli, for example, argues that “the political cost to the Chinese leadership due to 
such a change would be prohibitive, which acts as a real restraint against China’s alter-
ing its professed position.”15
And many officials would agree with the logic of Pan Zhenqiang, who offers five 
reasons Beijing should continue to adhere to the no-first-use policy. First, he said, the 
no-first-use policy is consistent with China’s views of nuclear no-first-use as instru-
ments of deterrence, not tools for warfighting. Second, even modifying no-first-use 
would have an immediate effect on “the future strategic stability between China and 
the United States.”16 Third, changing the no-first-use policy would undermine China’s 
broader arms control policy. Fourth, it would “tarnish China’s international image 
. . . and would not be conducive to its overall strategic goal of building an enduring 
peaceful and a stable international environment.”17 And fifth, “a change of the no-
first-use approach would further threaten and complicate, rather than stabilize, the 
situation across the Taiwan Strait.”18 Xu Weidi, a senior colonel at China’s National 
Defence University, puts the case more simply. Adding conditions to the no-first-use 
policy would be, he says, “effectively equivalent to the first use of nuclear weapons. . . . 
The United States does not say that it supports the unconditional first use of nuclear 
weapons.”19
China continues to adhere to a no-first-use nuclear policy and deterrence through 
assured retaliation. It is unlikely to formally disavow the no-first-use policy over the 
next 15 years. Increased discussion of caveats to the policy by strategists or military fig-
ures or threats by retired officers that China might use nuclear weapons first in the face 
of some particular challenge would, however, undermine the credibility of the no-first-
use policy. Such actions might have some of the same effects or implications as aban-
doning the no-first-use policy, especially given skepticism within some U.S. official 
circles about the likelihood China would actually strictly follow the policy in the event 
of war. Official amendments to the no-first-use policy would be most likely to occur in 
response to a significant deterioration in China’s external security position, especially 
14 潘振强 [Pan Zhenqiang], ‹中国不首先使用核武器问题研究› [“Research on the Problem of China’s No-
First-Use”], «空天力量杂志» [Air and Space Power Journal], Spring 2015.
15 Shen Dingli, 2005, p. 12.
16 Pan Zhenqiang, 2005, p. 6.
17 Pan Zhenqiang, 2005, p. 7.
18 Pan Zhenqiang, 2005, p. 7.
19 Xu Weidi, 2016, p. 38. 
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if that deterioration included security crises involving the United States. Alternatively, 
modification of no-first-use could come in the context of disputes with other regional 
powers, such as India, Japan, or Russia, especially if China’s adversary were to threaten 
strikes against high-value Chinese targets. Regardless of any changes to the no-first-use 
policy, however, Chinese scholars suggest that Beijing would approach any actual deci-
sion to use nuclear weapons with great caution and that such a decision would only be 
made under the most extreme circumstances.20
Accelerated Buildup of Nuclear Systems
As noted previously, China’s strategic nuclear modernization already includes a sig-
nificant expansion of missile and strategically deliverable warhead numbers, in addi-
tion to qualitative improvements. Heightened perceptions of external security threats, 
together with greater confidence about its own domestic resources and capabilities, 
could encourage China to accelerate further the expansion of its nuclear inventory 
and, possibly, to move away from the lean-and-effective formulation for nuclear suffi-
ciency. Specific external drivers could be significantly increased tensions in U.S.-China 
relations or heightened security competition involving China, India, and Pakistan or, 
alternatively, China and Russia.
While most analysts do not favor dramatically increasing the size of China’s 
nuclear arsenal, which would be costly, this has not been ruled out. According to Li 
Bin, who does not favor a buildup, the logic of building a larger inventory would be 
that the
buildup option is so mathematically simple to understand and so certain to work. 
So, in the Chinese debate, this idea would easily win some support from nontech-
nical people. Another advantage is that the buildup would be visible to the outside 
and would therefore discourage any first strike against China.21
Shen Dingli suggests that China should increase its nuclear capabilities for less-
tangible but, in a sense, more-traditional reasons: national status, influence, and 
respect. Shen argues that, despite improvements to Chinese military capabilities, its 
efforts have been insufficient to deter neighbors from challenges to territorial sover-
eignty. Only by bolstering efforts to further strengthen both conventional and nuclear 
capabilities can China avoid such challenges and protect its sovereignty. He writes, “in 
actuality, we have not yet sufficiently developed our capabilities. . . . Now is the time 
20 For example, Rong and Peng state that a decision to launch nuclear weapons would be “only imaginable if 
core national interests are in peril, such as the survival of the state or nation” (Rong Yu and Peng Guangqian, 
2009, p. 88).
21 Quotation from Li Bin (2001) is cited in Rong Yu and Peng Guangqian, 2009, p. 174. 
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to greatly improve our nuclear deterrent in keeping with increased national power.”22 
Shen believes this can be accomplished without embarking on a costly nuclear arms 
race with the United States, “but it will be necessary to redouble the increase of our 
strategic strike forces if we want to convince our adversary to abandon any misguided 
efforts at armed intervention in our sovereign [affairs] and in our territorial unity.”23
In December 2014, China’s Huanqiu Shibao newspaper summarized comments 
from a roundtable on “How Many Nuclear Weapons China Needs.” None of the 
participants suggested a major nuclear “breakout” or parity with the United States 
or Russia, but opinions—and more important, the standards employed to judge 
sufficiency—varied significantly. Some focused almost exclusively on China’s retalia-
tory capacity and the need for continued modernization in light of U.S. missile defenses 
and strike capability—a line of argumentation consistent with China’s lean-and- 
effective formulation. In contrast, Yang Chengjun, a researcher associated with the 
Council for National Security Policy Studies, listed seven criteria that should be consid-
ered in sizing the inventory, including the resources available to China. He concluded 
that the inventory should not only be capable of meeting retaliatory requirements but 
also be “commensurate with China’s standing as a country and the international obli-
gations it shoulders.”24
In the same meeting, Teng Jianqun, director of the Arms Control and Interna-
tional Security Research Center at the China Institute of International Studies, said 
that he too had heard “certain new demands, such as ‘build a nuclear force commen-
surate with China’s great power status.’”25 Having made this observation, Teng’s own 
views appeared skeptical, if somewhat ambiguous. While saying that “such calls are 
worthy of everyone’s consideration,” he stipulated that China aimed for a small but 
highly capable force and that, in any case, it was unclear how many weapons would be 
commensurate with “great power status.”26 Finally, Yang Lianxin, former deputy direc-
tor of the naval nuclear safety bureau, injected a parochial naval perspective, suggest-
ing, “it would be a strategic mistake not to fully develop an underwater nuclear force.”
These views may or may not necessarily represent mainstream views within Chi-
na’s strategic community. Li Bin, for one, has recently argued against any dramatic 
expansion of China’s force structure, saying that qualitative improvements trump the 
expansion of warhead numbers in addressing issues related to vulnerability and stra-
22 Shen Dingli, 2013b.
23 Shen Dingli, 2013b.
24 “PRC Experts Discuss ‘How Many Nuclear Weapons China Needs,’” Huanqiu Shibao, December 18, 2014.
25 “PRC Experts Discuss . . . ,” 2014.
26 “PRC Experts Discuss . . . ,” 2014.
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tegic stability.27 But the very existence of a forum on the appropriate sizing China’s 
nuclear forces, as well as the participation of established figures in China’s strategic 
community, is significant.28 And Li Bin’s public defense of a lean nuclear force struc-
ture may reflect pressure on China’s limited approach to force building as much as 
broad support for it.
In “right sizing” its nuclear forces, China is likely to key primarily on its retalia-
tory capability. The speed and scale of growth in its inventory are, therefore, likely to 
depend largely on developments in U.S. missile defenses and strike capabilities. Nev-
ertheless, some developments could bring considerations of status and influence more 
powerfully into the mix and strengthen the voice of those who might seek a more 
robust nuclear force. As we observed in Chapter Six, China may or may not be willing 
to accept Indian nuclear parity in the same way that it does U.S. or Russian nuclear 
superiority. The rapid growth in India’s nuclear arsenal could, even without signifi-
cantly exacerbated tensions, lead China to accelerate its nuclear force building. More 
broadly, China may pay more attention to escalation management and control as its 
national strength enables it to develop a broader range of capabilities. And increased 
territorial tensions in East Asia, especially in the event Beijing encounters setbacks and 
frustrations, could also strengthen calls for increased nuclear efforts.
Nuclear Warfighting Capability or Concepts
China has traditionally eschewed nuclear warfighting concepts in favor of deterrence 
through an assured capability to survive enemy nuclear strike and launch a punishing 
counterattack. However, Chinese strategists have debated other approaches in the past, 
and there is at least some discussion of limited warfighting concepts today.29 There 
are a number of reasons to consider the possibility that China could move toward 
27 Li Bin argues that the only rationale for substantial expansion of the force structure would be a quest for 
status or primacy like that pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, with all the 
attendant pernicious consequences (李彬 [Li Bin], ‹相比数量技术是王道：理解中国核思维对战略稳定的追
求› [“Compared with Quantity, Technology Is King: Understanding China’s Thinking on the Pursuit of Strate-
gic Nuclear Stability”], «澎湃新闻» [The Paper], April 2, 2016).
28 “PRC Experts Discuss . . . ,” 2014.
29 Retired Major General Pan Zhenqiang highlights the potential dilemma of how China, with a largely coun-
tervalue retaliatory strategy, might respond to a limited attack on naval targets at sea (or some other military 
target). “Under these circumstances,” he asks, “would our nation’s leaders be able to quickly make the decision to 
strike the ultimate targets, causing hundreds of thousands or even millions of casualties?” Expanding the menu 
of targeting options and rungs on the nuclear ladder might, Pan reports, allow China to mitigate the dilemmas 
posed by limited nuclear use, but would require China to adjust its force structure and might be affect strategic 
stability (Pan Zhenqiang, 2015).
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such concepts in the future, albeit probably only partially and perhaps not even fully 
intentionally.30
Given that various writers in the United States and elsewhere have used the term 
nuclear warfighting in different ways, it is important to establish parameters for its use 
here. In the Chinese context, we do not mean a strategy centered on a massive first 
strike to eliminate or severely degrade an enemy’s ability to strike back with nuclear 
weapons. Indeed, none of the available evidence indicates that China is interested in 
pursuing the capabilities that would be required for a disarming first strike against a 
major power nuclear adversary. Instead, the term refers to an approach that involves 
conducting multiple waves of strikes of various scales against different types of targets 
in a nuclear conflict of extended duration, designed to control escalation or to compel 
an end to hostilities on favorable terms. Although Chinese writings already call for the 
ability to conduct multiple waves of attacks, China has maintained minimal capabili-
ties to achieve this objective and has only the crudest of counterforce capability.
As noted previously, engineers and procurement officials are likely to “spin-on” 
technologies relevant to limited nuclear warfighting capability out of the conventional 
and into the nuclear missile force unless there is a conscious decision made to prevent 
it—and such decisions would likely have to come from the highest political levels.31 
Relevant technologies could include improved accuracy, higher readiness levels, rapid 
response capability, and maneuvering reentry vehicles. Importantly, such capabilities 
are not limited only to warfighting but might also help China improve its nuclear retal-
iatory capabilities in ways that are more consistent with its current approach to nuclear 
deterrence.32 At the same time, the fact that these capabilities have existed for years on 
the conventional side means that commanders and other officers who have previously 
worked with conventional missiles may bring some ideas about how to fight conven-
tional missile campaigns to the nuclear missile force.
In addition to technological drivers that might make such a shift in approach 
easier, dynamics with regional nuclear powers might provide motivation. Chinese ana-
lysts have noted Russia’s thinking about using tactical nuclear weapons in a warfight-
ing role. Trends in South Asia might affect Chinese thinking more directly. Pakistan 
has explicitly embraced nuclear warfighting and this, in turn, puts pressure on India 
to modify its strategy of massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response. Whether in 
30 Most notably, see Johnston, 1995–1996.
31 Spin-on would be most likely to occur when the PLA Rocket Force deploys or is likely to deploy nuclear and 
conventional missiles of approximately the same ranges. This would most likely emerge with respect to MRBMs 
and IRBMs, because the Rocket Force would be responsible for conventional and nuclear versions of MRBMs 
and IRBMs; it would not be relevant with respect to short-range ballistic missiles, so long as they are all conven-
tional, or to ICBMs, so long as they are all nuclear.
32 For example, a higher level of readiness or a rapid-response capability could increase survivability, and maneu-
vering reentry vehicles could strengthen China’s ability to counter missile defenses. Nonetheless, such improve-
ments would also give China at least a somewhat greater warfighting capability.
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response to Pakistan or simply as a function of bureaucratic inertia, India is acquiring 
some of the capabilities that would be necessary for warfighting. Indian moves to adopt 
a nuclear warfighting doctrine (or to acquire significant nuclear warfighting capability 
without formally changing doctrine) could further pressure China to do the same—
especially if relevant Indian systems were deployed near disputed areas.
A shift in the direction of warfighting concepts or capabilities would not neces-
sarily be particularly rapid or dramatic. It also would not necessarily represent as fun-
damental a departure from current Chinese concepts and capabilities as some observers 
have assumed. Chinese military publications already incorporate some elements of a 
warfighting approach. For example, Chinese military writings on nuclear counterat-
tack campaigns envision the possibility of nuclear counterattack campaigns of various 
scales, potentially small or large, depending on the circumstances.33 They suggest that 
a wide range of targets could be struck, including enemy command centers, commu-
nications nodes, transportation hubs, military bases, political and economic centers, 
important industrial facilities, and other strategic and campaign targets.34 Chinese 
military publications also suggest that multiple waves of strikes might be required and 
that some of China’s nuclear missile forces would be held in reserve to deter further 
escalation or to launch follow-on strikes.35
A more concerted move to gain technologies consistent with limited nuclear war-
fighting would give Beijing a somewhat wider range of options during crises or con-
flicts. It might also give rise to debates among China’s military and civilian nuclear 
specialists about more-fundamental questions, such as the scope of nuclear deterrence 
and possible amendments to China’s no-first-use policy. There is little reason to believe 
that China would reject its long-standing approach to nuclear deterrence outright. On 
the other hand, it is possible that some Chinese strategists might conclude that a more 
robust nuclear force and a more flexible strategy could provide additional leverage and 
deterrent power during crises.
33 According to one Chinese military publication, for example, apart from dividing nuclear counterstrike cam-
paigns into those that are executed independently by the PLA Rocket Force or jointly with the other services, such 
campaigns may also be categorized as large-scale [da guimo he fanji zhanyi] or small-scale nuclear counterattack 
campaigns [xiao guimo he fanji zhanyi]. See Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 384.
34 Note that this list of targets includes “countervalue” targets (political and economic centers, industrial assets) 
and what many U.S. strategists would refer to as “countermilitary” targets (bases and command and control 
capabilities) but does not appear to envision disarming or damage-limiting strikes against enemy nuclear “coun-
terforce” targets (such as the enemy’s ICBMs).
35 Follow-on strikes could consist of repeat strikes against targets that had not been destroyed by the initial 
nuclear strike or could be carried out “to maintain a huge amount of pressure and psychological fear against the 
enemy.” See Yu Jixun, 2004, p. 307.
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Investing in a Nuclear Triad
As Chinese nuclear capabilities continue to improve, China may face the question of 
whether it should acquire a nuclear triad like those of the United States and Russia. 
Chinese missile force publications sometimes suggest that a joint nuclear counterat-
tack campaign could involve naval and air units in addition to China’s strategic mis-
sile force. However, most outside observers believe that PLAAF does not possess a 
dedicated strategic bomber force and currently lacks a nuclear mission.36 The writings 
of some PLAAF authors appear to confirm this assessment. For example, in compar-
ing PLAAF to the U.S. Air Force, one Chinese air force analyst notes that, in contrast 
to the U.S. Air Force’s role in the American nuclear triad, which includes its strategic 
bombers and silo-based ICBMs,
China’s “air-based” nuclear force is a blank space [kongbai], and China’s “ground-
based” nuclear force is under an independent branch, one that, due to its long his-
tory of building and development, plays a role no less important than that of the 
air force in China’s national strategic power.37
Currently, PLAAF’s quest to become a “strategic air force” places a premium on 
its ability to contribute to the strategic deterrence mission of China’s military. In Chi-
nese writings on military strategy, however, strategic deterrence is not synonymous 
with nuclear deterrence. Indeed, many Chinese strategists argue that the role conven-
tional military forces play in strategic deterrence is increasing. PLAAF’s growing capa-
bilities to conduct conventional offensive operations enhance its ability to contribute to 
China’s overall strategic deterrence posture.
Although PLAAF authors have written about the nuclear role of other coun-
tries’ air forces, there is no consensus evident in the available writings about whether 
PLAAF needs its own nuclear deterrence and nuclear strike capabilities to become a 
truly strategic air force. Some Chinese air force strategists point out that the modern 
36 For example, DoD’s annual reports on Chinese military power state that PLASAF and PLAN have nuclear 
deterrence missions and capabilities but do not attribute a nuclear mission to PLAAF. Although some of the 
reports have stated that Chinese cruise missiles could be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, they have not indi-
cated that any nuclear-armed cruise missiles are currently deployed with PLAAF. Similarly, during the question-
and-answer session following a January 2014 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing 
on Chinese military modernization, a senior analyst from NASIC indicated that PLAAF is currently assessed as 
lacking a nuclear mission but that one would be feasible. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission, “China’s Military Modernization and Its Implications for the United States,” hearing before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 30, 2014.
37 Huang Sujian and Zhang Zhengping, ‹美国战略空军内涵的发展及其对我空军建设的启示› [“The 
Development of the Essential Properties of the U.S. Strategic Air Force and Its Lessons for China’s Air Force 
Building”] in 朱晖 [Zhu Hui], ed., «战略空军论» [Strategic Air Force], Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009, p. 280.
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air forces of nuclear powers typically have nuclear strike capabilities.38 According to 
these sources, air force platforms also offer some advantages over those of the other 
services: “Compared with ground-based ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines, [air 
force long-range attack forces] offer advantages in concealment, suddenness, control-
lability, and flexibility, and its rapid reaction capability is stronger.”39 Other PLAAF 
analysts appear to be somewhat less concerned with nuclear capabilities, noting that 
the trend of worldwide air force developments is toward improving capabilities for 
launching long-range conventional precision strikes.40
PLAAF analysts, however, do see a clear need for modern and capable bombers. 
They see missiles and manned aircraft as complementary, noting that, although mis-
siles possess a number of desirable attributes and are superior to bombers in some ways, 
bombers are superior to missiles in others. They note, for example, that bombers are 
reusable platforms, while missiles can be used only once. PLAAF analysts point out 
that long-range bombers can be useful not only for conventional strike missions but 
also for deterrence or intimidation of potential rivals and to send messages diplomati-
cally.41 Russia, they note, employs long-range bombers to perform these functions.42 
Some PLAAF analysts call for China to develop strategic bombers for status reasons: 
“China, as a major country in the world, has a need, and also an urgent need, to 
develop its own strategic bombers to boost the strategic assault power of its air force.”43
And at least two military officers at high-profile military academic institutions 
have publicly called for China to field a next-generation nuclear-capable bomber. Colo-
nel Fu Guangwen, a professor at PLA National Defence University, argues that China’s 
next-generation bomber should be capable of conducting not only conventional preci-
38 胡建生 刘进军 [Hu Jiansheng, and Liu Jinjun], ‹战略空军应重视空中远程进攻力量建设› [“A Strategic 
Air Force Should Attach Importance to Building Long-Range Offensive Air Power”], in 朱晖 [Zhu Hui], ed., 
«战略空军论» [Strategic Air Force], Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009, p. 119.
39 Hu Jiansheng and Liu Jinjun, 2009, p. 120.
40 As Dong Wenxian puts it, “the strategic air forces of various nations are equipped with nuclear weapons, 
including nuclear bombs and nuclear cruise missiles, but no nation dares to cross the nuclear threshold lightly, 
and the main mission of nuclear weapons is strategic deterrence” (Dong Wenxian, ‹攻防一体: 战略空军的基本
特征› [“Part Two of the ‘Strategic Air Force’ Series: Integration of Offense and Defense: The Basic Characteris-
tics of a Modernized Strategic Air Force”], «空军报» [Air Force News], February 16, 2008, p. 2).
41 王明亮 杨芋杰 汪旭东 郭金锁 [Wang Mingliang, Yang Yujie, Wang Xudong, and Guo Jinsuo], ‹关于战略
空军的若干命题› [“A Few Propositions Concerning the Strategic Air Force”], in 朱晖 [Zhu Hui, ed.], «战略空
军论» [Strategic Air Force], Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009, p. 64.
42 Wang Mingliang et al., 2009, p. 64.
43 施克如 刘刚马宏刚 [Shi Keru, Liu Gang, and Ma Honggang], ‹提高空军战略作战能力› [“Increase the 
Strategic Combat Capability of the Air Force”], in 朱晖 [Zhu Hui], ed., «战略空军论» [Strategic Air Force], 
Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009, p. 115.
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sion strikes but also nuclear attacks.44 In April 2016, an article on the People’s Daily 
website cited Western press reports claiming China had begun design work on a strate-
gic bomber.45 In the article, Senior Colonel Du Wenlong, a researcher at the Academy 
of Military Science, argues that it should have three characteristics:
(1) long range and the capability to conduct intercontinental strikes; (2) a large 
bomb-load capacity (with a munitions capacity of at least 10 tons) and the ability 
to conduct highly effective strikes; and (3) the ability to employ nuclear weap-
ons—the strategic bomber is an important part of the strategic strike triad.46
The probability of China moving toward a triad would be increased by a 
number of possible factors. There could, for example, be mutually reinforcing dynam-
ics between it and several of the other potential developments discussed previously. 
Moving to expand the inventory, toward limited warfighting concepts, or toward a 
broader view of the function of nuclear weapons and the modification of no-first-use 
could all increase the probability that PLAAF might gain a nuclear bomber mission. 
Similarly, the development of a triad would make an increase in overall numbers and 
the broadening of views on the functions of nuclear weapons more likely. Given the 
service issues involved, anything that increased interservice rivalry might also contrib-
ute to this outcome. If, for example, structural reform produced an expanded role and 
higher profile for the air force, navy, and Rocket Force within the PLA, as appears to 
be occurring, they might compete more vigorously for roles and missions—including 
those in the nuclear domain.
Establishing a Chinese Missile Defense System
China has been developing missile defense technology and could potentially proceed 
with deployment.47 To date, Beijing has conducted four midcourse missile defense 
interception tests.48 China’s antisatellite tests have employed the same kill vehicle, and 
44 “Senior Officer: China’s Next-Generation Strategic Bomber Combat Radius Needs to Cover Second Island 
Chain,” People’s Daily, December 20, 2013.
45 ‹专家: 中国新型战略轰炸机至少要达到B-2水平› [“Specialist: China’s New Strategic Bomber Should, at a 
Minimum, Match the Performance of the B-2”], People’s Daily online, April 29, 2016.
46 “Specialist: China’s New Strategic Bomber Should . . . ,” 2016.
47 This section draws heavily from Twomey and Chase, 2015.
48 China conducted its first missile defense interception test in January 2010, then additional tests in January 
2013, July 2014, and November 2015 (“China Conducts Test on Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Interception,” 
Xinhua, January 11, 2010; “China Carries Out Land-Based Midcourse Missile Interception Test,” Xinhua, Janu-
ary 28, 2013; Zachary Keck, “China Conducts Third Anti-Missile Test,” The Diplomat, July 24, 2014; ‹中国中
段反导拦截试验现场画面首次公布› [“China Makes Public a Midcourse Missile Intercept Test for the First 
Time”], Tiexue Net, July 25, 2016).
Outputs: Potential Developments in China’s Nuclear Future    141
the technology for the two tasks overlaps considerably (with the chief distinctions 
being the relative ease of intercepting satellites and, depending on the specific target, 
the required altitude).49
According to Li Bin, these tests “demonstrated that the country had acquired 
[hit-to-kill] technology, but that does not mean China has a conceptual missile defense 
system that can target incoming missiles from any specific country.”50 Li suggests that 
there are at least three paths Beijing could follow in the future: (1) continue to refine 
its missile defense technology while refraining from deploying an operational system; 
(2) deploy an NMD system intended to protect the entire country, at least from a 
small-scale ballistic missile attack; or (3)  deploy a small number of missile defense 
interceptors in a point-defense role to provide some level of protection for key strategic 
targets, such as its ICBMs or strategic command and control facilities.51
If China were to deploy a missile defense system, perhaps the least likely outcome 
would be deployment of a full-scale NMD system. Li Bin argues that, if China wants to 
limit damage from U.S. strategic missiles, it would need many more interceptors than 
the United States would need for the same purpose.52 Instead, a point-defense system 
designed to defend a handful of small areas against ballistic missile attack would seem 
more logical and affordable. According to Li, such a system “could also be used to pro-
tect some of China’s strategic nuclear weapons and increase their survivability.”53 The 
employment of midcourse missile defense interceptors might similarly be positioned 
to protect China’s nuclear forces. China’s approximately 20 silo-based ICBMs would 
seem to be the best candidates for this protection, given that China sees them as more 
vulnerable to a first strike than its road-mobile ICBMs are. Employing missile defense 
in this role could be less difficult—and less expensive—than even a limited NMD 
system.
Chinese analysts argue that deploying a missile defense could—unlike U.S. 
deployment—strengthen strategic stability. Given the large number and sophistica-
tion of U.S. strategic missiles, the U.S. ability to conduct nuclear retaliatory strikes 
would not be in question, even with the deployment of Chinese missile defense. Conse-
quently, China’s deployment would not undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence or prompt 
the United States to deploy additional offensive capability—unless the United States 
does consciously seek the capability to conduct a disarming first strike. A senior colo-
nel with the PLASAF Command College suggests that Chinese missile defenses might 
49 Tamir Eshel, “Expanding Strategic Defense in Space—China’s Missile Interceptors and Satellite Killers,” 
Defense Update, July 28, 2016.
50 Li Bin, “What China’s Missile Intercept Test Means,” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, February 4, 2013.
51 Li Bin, 2013.
52 Li Bin, 2013.
53 Li Bin, 2013. For a similar point made a decade earlier, see Li Bin, undated. 
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enable China to “maintain a relatively small number of nuclear weapons, given its 
increasing defensive capabilities.”54 Hence, used in a judicious and strategic way, Chi-
nese missile defenses could potentially decrease Chinese force requirements and thus 
reduce the probability of arms racing.
But to the extent that either symbolic motivations or bureaucratic processes drive 
Chinese procurement, there is a chance that Beijing might simply deploy capabili-
ties as they become operationally viable, regardless of other considerations. While not 
likely to create the same kind of structural instability that U.S. missile defenses could, 
Chinese missile defenses might simply become another means of competition. In July 
2016, just days after South Korea and the United States announced the deployment of 
THAAD to the Korean Peninsula, China posted videos of its first missile defense test 
in 2010 and briefed reporters on Chinese missile defense progress. According to Senior 
Colonel Chen Deming, who has been involved in China’s missile defense program 
since its inception in 2007, “Missile defense is the strong shield of strategic defense 
and an important bargaining chip in the great power game. It holds the ‘commanding 
heights’ in world military competition, and the Chinese people must have their own 
missile defense system.”55
Incorporating New Technology
Finally, China will also likely face questions on how to incorporate and use new tech-
nologies to enhance its nuclear deterrent. Two examples of Chinese technology in 
development that could shape Chinese nuclear policy and its nuclear capabilities are 
HGVs and a space-based early warning system.
China is developing HGVs, an effort that appears to be a high priority, given 
that it has conducted seven HGV flight tests since 2014.56 Chinese media have char-
acterized the HGV as an asymmetric “assassin’s mace” weapon. One senior colonel 
explained that the new weapon could allow longer-range precision strikes, including 
against targets at sea.57 How China arms its HGVs will have critical strategic impli-
cations. Deploying nuclear-armed HGVs would likely strengthen China’s confidence 
in its nuclear retaliatory capability, since HVGs would likely be better at penetrat-
54 “China’s Missile Interception Test Enhances Strategic Deterrence,” People’s Daily, January 30, 2013.
55 ‹反导试验专家陈德明: 科技强军尖兵› [“Missile Defense Expert Chen Deming: Build a Strong, Elite 
Force Through Science and Technology”], «瞭望» [Liaowang], July 25, 2016.
56 Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching U.S. Missile Defense Systems,” The 
Diplomat, April 28, 2016.
57 ‹中国高超音速武器背后的玄机› [“The Mystery Behind China’s Hypersonic Weapon”], Xinhua, January 
16, 2014.
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ing adversary missile defenses.58 Potentially, this could enable China to counter mis-
sile defenses with a smaller number of systems and mitigate (to an extent) concerns 
about a regional arms race. The deployment of both nuclear and conventional HGVs 
to the same units, on the other hand, would be of greater concern. In a crisis, this 
could lead to ambiguity about whether particular actions were intended as nuclear 
or conventional signals. In a conflict, U.S. forces might have high incentives to strike 
conventionally armed HGVs before they could be used. But it might be difficult to 
distinguish such weapons from HGVs armed with nuclear warheads (especially if both 
had flushed from garrison), creating the possibility of an accidental attack on Chinese 
nuclear forces. Deployed HVGs could also provide a capability for limited nuclear 
warfighting because they could be launched in flexible, small salvos and still have an 
expectation of penetration.
A second type of new technology that could be deployed is a space-based early 
warning system.59 According to a June 2014 segment on China’s Shenzhen TV, China 
is working on a space-based early warning system but, according to the same report, 
is unlikely to have fully resolved a number of problems in the next eight to ten years. 
The financial and technical hurdles design and launch issues, as well as protection from 
interference, are considerable.60 Yan Shiqiang, a professor at PLAAF’s Early Warn-
ing Academy, notes that any early warning system must be able to detect an increas-
ing range of targets, face a complex electromagnetic environment, and survive various 
types of attacks.61 The establishment of the Strategic Support Force, which is respon-
sible for most space missions and has former Second Artillery officers at the helm, may 
provide an important boost for China’s early warning prospects. At least in theory, a 
space-based early warning system, along with improvements in command, control, 
and communications and rapid-response capabilities, could enable China to consider a 
launch-on-warning policy at some point in the future, which at least one Chinese mili-
tary publication states would be consistent with China’s no-first-use policy.62
58 “The Mystery Behind . . . ,” 2014.
59 朱和平 [Zhu Heping], ‹构建空天预警体系› [“Constructing the Air-Space Early Warning System”], in 朱
晖 [Zhu Hui], ed., «战略空军论» [Strategic Air Force], Beijing: Blue Sky Press, 2009, pp. 158–162.
60 ‹曝中国反导有三只眼 预警卫星差距超过10年› [“Revealed That China Has Three Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Eyes, Still over Ten Years Away from Early Warning Satellite System”], 凤凰新媒体 [Phoenix TV], June 11, 
2014.
61 ‹解放军预警能力建设面临多重挑战› [“PLA Efforts to Establish an Early Warning Capability Faces Many 
Hurdles”], «中国青年报» [China Youth Daily], October 2, 2013.
62 Shou Xiaosong, 2013.
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Conclusions
Some of the possibilities discussed above are more likely than others. China is likely 
to incorporate new technologies into its force structure, assuming they are technically 
feasible. It is less likely to drop its lean-and-effective standard of sufficiency for force 
planning. Of course, judgments about probabilities and likelihoods depend in part on 
where the thresholds are drawn. There could be some movement toward a given out-
come, even if not all the manifestations of that particular change become evident. For 
example, increased nonauthoritative appeals for exceptions to the no-first-use policy 
could raise new questions about how the policy might be applied in crises, even in the 
absence of formal policy change. And the PLA could gain greater nuclear warfighting 
capability without articulating anything that looks like a warfighting strategy.
The potential developments discussed above are interrelated. Any move to attach 
conditionality to the no-first-use policy could encourage more explicit thinking about 
warfighting options, since deterrence and retaliation would no longer be the only 
nuclear operations considered. The emergence of a nuclear triad could also encourage 
an accelerated building program, given that PLAAF would likely stipulate a mini-
mum inventory, as some in the navy are doing today. Some outcomes could potentially 
be negatively correlated. For example, a limited missile defense system or the incor-
poration of new penetration capabilities (including HGVs, decoys, or MIRVed sys-
tems) could discourage China from accelerating a buildup of offensive systems, since 
defenses or penetration capabilities could mitigate the challenges to a secure retaliatory 
capability. In Chapter Ten, we discuss how different constellations of drivers might 




Chinese thinking on nuclear issues has remained relatively stable for decades, and there 
is little sign that leaders in Beijing anticipate dramatic changes to policy or doctrine. 
However, as Chapters Four through Six illustrate, global and regional nuclear dynam-
ics, some fed by China’s own actions, will place new pressures on Chinese policy and 
practice. The bureaucratic environment has evolved, providing nuclear constituencies 
somewhat greater voice, while bureaucratic structures and processes (particularly the 
prospects for applying technologies and practices associated with China’s conventional 
missile elements to its nuclear forces) are likely to produce forces with increased, if still 
limited, warfighting capabilities. Developments outlined in Chapter Nine illustrate 
that there has been an uptick in public discussion of adjustments to force structure and 
policy, providing some evidence that the factors outlined above may already influence 
thinking. The establishment of the Rocket Force is emblematic of these changes and 
will itself have consequences for the future development of China’s nuclear forces.
These overall conclusions are probabilistic, and readers should bear in mind that 
there are strong elements of continuity in China’s fundamental thinking on the role of 
nuclear weapons and the policies that guide nuclear development. This thinking will 
continue to shape outcomes despite changing circumstances. A variety of changes to 
capabilities can be accommodated under existing policy frameworks. And while the 
continued evolution of Chinese forces and thinking is likely—and will have significant 
strategic implications—policy and doctrinal frameworks are likely to continue limit-
ing the extent and nature of change in many areas.
The primary purpose of this report is to analyze the drivers that will shape Chi-
nese decisionmaking on nuclear issues in the coming years, rather than to develop 
detailed scenarios or predictions about China’s future force structure, doctrine, or 
policy. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we offer some thoughts on the likelihood of par-
ticular developments and, based on them, what China’s nuclear forces and posture 
could look like 15 years from now (or by roughly 2030). After discussing probabilities 
with regard to individual drivers and sets of drivers, we outline three possible sce-
narios depicting a range of potential outcomes based on key variables. While these are 
intended to illustrate how different combinations of drivers could produce different 
outcomes, they are not designed to be extreme cases or “bookends” for the entire range 
146    China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States
of possibilities. Importantly, there are significant changes from current force structure 
in each. We believe that a scenario assuming full continuity or no significant change 
in China’s force structure and thinking is virtually unthinkable.
Drivers and Probabilities
Most, though not all, of the drivers examined in the preceding chapters are likely to 
encourage China to continue modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. Some-
what less clear is whether the pace will remain relatively constant or whether nuclear 
issues will assume a higher priority and produce accelerated change in force structure 
and thinking. Given the recent deployment of MIRVed missiles and the deployment or 
testing of new classes of missiles (especially the DF-26, DF-41, and HGV), acceleration 
seems, on balance, more likely. While the development of China’s capabilities and the 
evolution of its thinking are likely to have significant strategic implications (outlined 
further later), a number of factors are nevertheless likely to limit the extent of change.
Although domestic drivers may be less well understood than external drivers in 
terms of the specific mechanisms by which they could influence policy, they may also 
be somewhat more predicable in terms of their general impact. Chinese economic 
growth and defense spending are not likely to be major constraints on China’s nuclear 
modernization. Even reduced rates of Chinese economic growth will provide sufficient 
funds to allow China to continue to modernize its nuclear force—especially when 
one considers that it has generally invested less in its nuclear forces than its resources 
already allow. China’s stocks of fissile material are, however, just as likely to constrain 
a dramatic buildup and make anything resembling a race for parity highly unlikely.
Bureaucratic and organization factors will also push toward the development of a 
more modern, diverse, and capable nuclear force. Political leaders are likely to play an 
important role in key policy decisions but are also likely to remain less involved in pro-
curement and doctrinal decisions than they were from the 1960s through the 1980s. 
This will leave greater scope for bureaucratic factors to influence outcomes. The insti-
tutional changes discussed previously, especially the creation of the PLA Rocket Force, 
create a larger and more capable constituency for nuclear weapons. And technological 
spillovers from China’s conventional missile force could enhance China’s nuclear mis-
sile force and encourage the development of nuclear warfighting concepts.
Domestic factors are, therefore, likely to push in the direction of steady and accel-
erating, if still measured, evolution of Chinese nuclear forces and thinking, with a 
relatively high degree of probability. Contingent events—such as the emergence of 
leaders with dramatically different priorities or economic collapse—could produce sig-
nificantly different results, but such events have relatively low probability.
Chance, contingency, and a wider range of possibilities would appear possible in 
the external environment. In that realm, the behavior of two or more actors together—
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China and others—will contribute to outcomes. For decades, a mix of cooperation and 
competition has characterized Sino-American relations, the biggest driver for Chinese 
nuclear decisionmakers. That mix is unlikely to change fundamentally. However, com-
petition could either be a central aspect of the relationship or a less immediate, more 
contingent feature of hedging, depending on the tenor of China’s relations with its 
neighbors and the nature of U.S. and, especially, Chinese leadership priorities. Beyond 
the political relationship, U.S. decisions on strategic capabilities, especially missile 
defense and conventional strike, will also be important drivers for Chinese nuclear 
policy. A broad range of considerations, many having nothing to do with China, will 
shape U.S. strategic decisions. The United States could find itself embroiled in prob-
lems elsewhere in the world or focused on domestic priorities. But crises or clashes 
between Washington and Beijing could also occur, with the probabilities influenced 
not only by state policies and behavior but also by blind chance, and these could set the 
U.S. relationship with China on an entirely new track.
China’s political and nuclear relations with other states and how these relations 
influence Chinese nuclear decisionmaking are even less predictable. As we have dis-
cussed elsewhere in this report, India and its rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities 
could be a potentially important driver of Chinese nuclear policy. India’s rapid nuclear 
development confronts China with what is, for it, an entirely new situation: the rise 
of a new, neighboring nuclear power that is narrowing the gap in capabilities with 
China and that will ultimately confront Beijing with choices about whether and how 
to respond. Russia currently plays a relatively modest role in Chinese nuclear thinking, 
but uncertainties about Russia’s long-term political direction, highlighted by recent 
events in Ukraine and the Middle East, make this too a wildcard. And North Korea, 
Japan, and Pakistan, as well as Southeast Asian states, could also impinge on Chinese 
nuclear thinking either directly or through their effects on China’s broader interna-
tional circumstances.
Overall, however, while external variables are inherently unpredictable, there is 
every indication that most will (like domestic variables) push China in the direction 
of further modernization and the expansion of its nuclear inventory. Barring an end to 
North Korean nuclear and missile development—and possibly even if it does occurs—
the United States is likely to pursue improved missile defenses. China’s willingness to 
employ coercive means to achieve its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea and 
East China Sea shows little sign of abating and may further erode U.S. willingness 
to compromise on key strategic issues. Japan continues to strengthen missile defense 
cooperation with the United States and is looking for ways to balance against Chinese 
power more broadly. And neither nuclear competition nor the evolution of nuclear 
forces and thinking shows any signs of abating in South Asia.
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Chinese Nuclear Futures: Three Scenarios
Building on potential drivers and our assessment of their probabilities, the scenarios 
in this subsection illustrate a range of possible outcomes. We do not present bookends, 
extreme cases with low likelihood. Instead, we developed three scenarios that represent 
a range of outcomes, based on possible developments with regard to the most impor-
tant internal and external drivers discussed in earlier chapters. While some scenarios 
may be more likely than others, each represents views that may be described as main-
stream among analysts of Asian security issues.
The scenarios vary in the degree and type of perceived external threat on the one 
hand and in the extent of civilian political oversight and intervention in key nuclear 
decisions on the other. In the first scenario, a relatively stable and pacific external 
environment combines with strong political leadership to keep China on its current 
trajectory. In the second, increased external challenges, especially a deterioration in 
Sino-American relations, combine with a moderately engaged leadership in Beijing 
to produce accelerated nuclear modernization and some limited shifts in the inter-
pretation of the no-first-use policy. In the third scenario, a challenging external envi-
ronment, increased competition from a rapidly rising India, continuing issues with 
the United States, and a divided and relatively hands-off civilian leadership in Beijing 
produce both an acceleration of nuclear programs and the rapid evolution of doctrinal 
thinking.
Scenario 1: Current Trajectory
China could remain on its current trajectory. This would require a stable and relatively 
benign international environment combined with relatively strong political control of 
not only nuclear policy but also of important procurement and doctrinal questions.
Hypothetical Conditions
While there are many specific forms this scenario could take, it is worth imagining 
one specific possibility. In this world, the Sino-American relationship is character-
ized by a high degree of cooperation. The cross-strait relationship is basically stabi-
lized and is characterized largely by growing economic cooperation and cross-strait 
exchanges. Japan and China have not resolved the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue but have 
agreed to refrain from potentially dangerous activities in the vicinity. Likewise, China’s 
ties to India have improved. In an effort to maintain growth, Beijing has focused on 
economic cooperation with both India and Japan, and they have responded in kind. 
Chinese economic growth continues to edge downward but remains high enough to 
support domestic requirements and military modernization. Changes in North Korea 
have diminished concerns about Pyongyang and led the United States to freeze its mis-
sile defenses at roughly current levels. The leadership in Beijing takes a relatively hands-
on approach to important military decisions, including those in the nuclear realm.
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Outcome
Even in this optimistic scenario, China will likely continue to modernize its nuclear 
force. Chinese leaders see a survivable second-strike capability as an essential pillar of its 
strategic deterrence posture and remain concerned that, although U.S. missile defenses 
have not expanded in scale, qualitative improvements might nevertheless jeopardize 
Chinese retaliatory capabilities. But in this scenario, China adopts a portfolio approach 
that emphasizes qualitative improvements and countermeasures, rather than a rapid 
increase in numbers of offensive systems. By 2025, China has continued to upgrade its 
silo-based ICBMs and has deployed more-survivable road-mobile ICBMs, including 
the MIRVed DF-41 road-mobile ICBM. Additionally, PLAN SSBNs conduct regular 
nuclear deterrence patrols, and China begins to deploy a small number of HGVs in a 
nuclear deterrence role.
Beijing continues to adhere to its no-first-use policy but remains resistant to the 
idea of participating in bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations. At 
the same time, however, China is becoming more open to dialogue on nuclear issues. 
Indeed, U.S.-China exchanges on nuclear and strategic deterrence issues have become 
more regularized, including the establishment of an annual dialogue between U.S. 
Strategic Command and PLA Rocket Force and PLAN leaders. Beijing’s approach also 
includes increased willingness to discuss confidence-building measures and informal 
understandings intended to increase strategic stability between the two sides, such as 
agreeing to deploy conventional and nuclear global strike capabilities at different bases. 
Although China still resists pressure to participate in formal arms control negotiations, 
it has suggested it might be willing to reach a less-formal understanding in which 
it would impose a voluntary ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear weapons it 
deploys based on a given set of U.S. NMD, nuclear, and CPGS capabilities.
Scenario 2: Accelerated Buildup
Several developments could lead to an acceleration of China’s nuclear programs. The 
most important would be a worsening of Beijing’s external security environment paired 
with a political leadership that maintained a firm hand on nuclear policy but was less 
involved in the details of nuclear procurement and doctrine.
Hypothetical Conditions
Once again, there are many specific forms that such a scenario could take, and it 
is useful to specify one concrete example. In this world, Beijing’s continuing high-
handed actions in the South China Sea and East China Sea have further exacerbated 
tensions with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, drawing the United States into 
more frequent and bitter confrontation with China. Beijing still seeks to avoid outright 
conflict, if possible, but it is deeply concerned that the United States aims to contain 
China. Some in Beijing argue that a military conflict with the United States is inevi-
table. Japan hugs its U.S. ally more closely, and the two cooperate on building a more 
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robust TBM system. The United States also enhances its NMD program, with a tiered 
defense against ICBMs, following North Korea’s testing of ICBMs. One bright spot 
for Beijing is a flourishing trade and political relationship with India and progress 
on settling the disputed frontier boundary. Economic growth is robust, only slightly 
lower than 2016 rates. Xi Jinping is succeeded by another strong leader who insists 
that the “military challenge” from the United States must be met but believes that any 
fundamental departure from the no-first-use policy will damage China’s international 
position.
Outcome
In 2030, China is the world’s third largest nuclear power, with about 500 nuclear 
weapons, about one-third the number of warheads deployed by either Russia or the 
United States. The cornerstone of China’s nuclear force is still the PLA Rocket Force, 
which operates more than 100 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States, but does 
not gain control of SSBNs. Many of the Rocket Force missiles carry MIRVs. China 
has also begun deploying a small number of ICBM-class HGVs. Chinese SSBNs rou-
tinely conduct deterrent patrols in areas that allow them to hold U.S. strategic targets 
at risk. The development of Chinese theater nuclear forces has been heavily shaped 
by advances China has made with its conventional missile force, resulting in more-
advanced missiles with improved accuracy.
In addition to further enhancing the diversity, survivability, and flexibility of 
its nuclear force, China has tweaked its interpretation of its no-first-use policy. Key 
PLA texts note U.S. advances in strike and missile defense and stipulate explicitly that 
China reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if its nuclear infrastructure or forces 
are attacked by conventional means. China does not explicitly adopt a nuclear war-
fighting strategy but has many technologies compatible with such a strategy. China 
has an increasingly robust early warning system, and Chinese strategists increasingly 
discuss developing and exercising a launch-on-warning capability. This outcome would 
have significant ramifications for U.S. extended deterrence in Asia.
Scenario 3: Broader Transformation
Broader changes to Chinese policy, doctrine, and force structure are also possible, 
although this scenario is significantly less likely than either of the preceding ones. This 
scenario would probably require a worsening of China’s external security environment, 
strong bureaucratic advocacy, and either the absence of strong political oversight or 
active political support for adjusting nuclear strategy.
Hypothetical Conditions
In this scenario, Chinese elite politics are characterized by increasingly open fissures. 
Xi Jinping’s successor is a weak leader who seeks, with uneven success, to buy military 
support with larger budgets and more autonomy. China’s relations with the United 
States are strained by maritime and other disputes in Southeast Asia. Washington 
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undertakes modest efforts to buttress missile defense but is limited by pressure on 
defense budgets. Much of Beijing’s attention is centered on India. India’s economic 
growth rate has remained higher than China’s for most of the past decade. Paki-
stan’s relations with India have worsened with a second Mumbai-style terrorist attack. 
Responding to Indian conventional threats that follow the attack, Pakistan has aggres-
sively expanded its nuclear arsenal. India responds by modernizing and significantly 
enlarging its nuclear force and by declaring a policy of flexible response.
India and China have increased military deployments along their mutual border, 
and several crises have occurred as patrols confront one another along the Line of 
Actual Control. Indian Air Force officers showcase the deployment of nuclear-capable 
attack aircraft to bases along the border with China and strongly hint that nuclear 
weapons have also been forward deployed with them. More broadly, India’s flexible 
response, its introduction of new classes of tactical nuclear weapons, and the deploy-
ment of an Indian missile defense system (with U.S. technological support) raise fun-
damental doubts in Beijing about India’s continued adherence to a no-first-use policy. 
By 2030, India has also deployed more than two dozen intermediate and interconti-
nental range nuclear missiles capable of targeting Beijing and other key coastal Chinese 
cities.
Outcome
In 2030, China is the world’s third-largest nuclear power, after the United States and 
Russia. PLASAF deploys close to 100 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States 
and nearly 75 IRBMs capable of targeting India. Some of these are silo-based, but 
most are road mobile, including a growing number of IRBMs and ICBMs that carry 
MIRVs. Beijing has also developed an increasingly credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, 
which now includes new Type-096 SSBNs and JL-3 SLBMs. Additionally, PLAAF has 
equipped a portion of its H-6 bomber force with nuclear-armed air-launched cruise 
missiles and has rolled out the prototype of a new stealthy, long-range bomber. China 
now possesses a triad composed of PLASAF land-based missiles, PLAN SSBNs, and 
PLAAF bombers and is further enhancing the diversity, survivability, and flexibility 
of China’s nuclear force. The Areva reprocessing facility has moved forward and will 
begin operation by 2035, raising concerns about whether some of its production might 
be devoted to expanding the warhead inventory.
China has formally retained its no-first-use nuclear policy, but signs of evolution 
in actual policy and doctrine are evident. The policy is qualified by explicit exceptions 
for attacks on Chinese nuclear forces and infrastructure. Discipline has also eroded. 
There are more retired officers and pundits willing to make public threats that are 
either not compatible with or ambiguous about the no-first-use policy, and the no-first-
use policy is no longer regarded as credible by non-Chinese audiences. There is an ener-
getic discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese defense circles. Some Chi-
nese strategists describe the potential for nuclear counterattacks against India that are 
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far more counterforce than countervalue. These strategists describe damage limiting 
strikes on certain types of Indian nuclear assets and on conventional force concentra-
tions. A combined exercise by nuclear elements of the Rocket Force in western China 
and SSBNs deployed to the Indian Ocean appears to posit an extended warfighting 
exercise against an unnamed adversary in South Asia.
These activities and discussions raise questions about the direction of Chinese 
military thinking, especially in the context of evolving capabilities, raising alarm in 
many regional states and placing the United States and China on a more confronta-
tional path. They also present the United States with questions about crisis stability 
and its ability to assure allies without undertaking significant adjustments to declara-
tory policy and, possibly, nuclear deployments.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
China’s Accelerating Nuclear Modernization: Implications
China’s future nuclear direction will have implications for arms control, arms races, 
crisis stability and escalation, deterrence, and the reassurance of U.S. allies. As we sug-
gested in Chapter Ten, China’s strategic forces and thinking could take a number of 
different paths, and the implications will depend on which path it takes. The discus-
sion of implications in this chapter does not attempt to parse these differences, but 
rather treats current trends and direction and provides more-limited comments on 
some of the potential wildcard developments discussed in Chapter Ten. Following the 
discussion of implications, we outline what U.S. and Chinese leaders could do differ-
ently to mitigate new risks.
Arms Control and Arms Racing
Developments in China’s nuclear inventory will have significant effects on global 
nuclear arms control efforts. China has shown some increased willingness to discuss 
arms control issues with the United States but demonstrates little readiness to enter 
serious negotiations with Washington. Chinese strategists suggest that, given the gap 
between the nuclear inventories of the two sides, the United States and Russia would 
first have to agree on and implement another round of deep cuts, above and beyond 
New START, before China would agree. In light of China’s expanding nuclear inven-
tory, however, some in the United States and even more in Russia are reluctant to 
pursue a follow-on U.S.-Russian agreement without China’s participation in multilat-
eral talks. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its proxy war with Ukraine, its withdrawal 
from the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and concerns 
about potential violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty have cast 
a pall on U.S.-Russia arms control. To the extent that China continues to buttress its 
own offensive capabilities, considerations related to China will complicate any poten-
tial second reset between Moscow and Washington. Indeed, some observers have made 
the case that Russia’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty violations are largely 
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aimed at China.1 At the same time, increased tensions between Moscow and Wash-
ington will further discourage Beijing from engaging in serious arms control dialogue.
On balance, U.S. strategic decisions are more likely to influence China’s programs 
and policy than China’s are to affect those of the United States. However, as China’s 
nuclear forces continue to evolve, the dialogue within the United States, especially on 
BMD, could shift. U.S. analysts, pundits, and elected leaders may begin to discuss 
missile defense capabilities in the context of nuclear conflict with China, especially if 
the broader political relationship also deteriorates. Building missile defenses against 
China would be far more demanding than establishing them to address North Korean 
threats and would face enormous challenges associated with technology, feasibility, 
and scale. Such an effort would likely trigger an action-reaction dynamic between 
U.S. defenses and Chinese offensive systems, possibly leading to a very rapid increase 
in Chinese system numbers. Alternatively, China might consider accelerating HGV, 
decoy, mobility, early warning, and other programs designed to improve survivability 
or counter defenses with new technologies.
We have already noted that China could adopt a different standard of nuclear 
sufficiency against a rising India than it has with regard to Russian and U.S. capabili-
ties. At a minimum, India’s growing nuclear capabilities will pose new problems that 
will be discussed and debated in Chinese strategic circles. The perspective from India 
is clearer. Many Indian nuclear analysts openly cite Pakistan and China as the two 
primary contingencies against which Indian nuclear forces are designed. Although the 
gap between Chinese and Indian nuclear capabilities remains large, India is arguably 
narrowing the relative difference by building at roughly the same rate as China and 
improving the range and quality of its delivery systems. If, however, renewed Chinese 
efforts begin to reverse India’s relative gains, India might feel pressure to redouble its 
already substantial effort—and Pakistan could follow suit.
The point is not that China is the potential initiator of action-reaction dynamics 
or the primary obstacle to arms control. It is, rather, that China is enmeshed in nested 
security dilemmas that are interconnected. Causality can run various directions, 
with consequences potentially reaching states that do not interact directly. Dynamics 
between China and its neighbors or between Beijing and Washington could also affect 
global nonproliferation efforts. The global nonproliferation regime gains a measure 
of moral strength from the efforts of existing nuclear powers to reduce the roles and 
sizes of their own nuclear arsenals. Clearly, the thinking of leaders in such countries 
as North Korea will be little affected by such trends, but the impact may be greater on 
support for efforts to contain or roll back the nuclear and missile programs of “rogue” 
states.
1 “Why China Should Join the INF Treaty,” East Asia Forum, April 6, 2016.
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Crisis Stability and Escalation
In addition to concerns about arms racing and its potential to affect the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, we also need to consider how China’s nuclear developments 
might affect crisis stability and prospects for conflict escalation. Crisis stability can be 
described as the degree to which mutual deterrence between adversaries can hold in a 
military confrontation that has not yet become lethal. Put another way, it is “a mea-
sure of the countries’ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in 
order to beat the attack of the enemy.”2 Concerns about escalation, on the other hand, 
come into play if stability fails and states find themselves in armed conflict. Escalation 
is the tendency of combatants to increase the force or breadth of their attacks to gain 
advantage or avoid defeat. The potential consequences of crisis instability and conflict 
escalation are especially grave when the potential belligerents have nuclear weapons, as 
would be the case in confrontations involving China and the United States or India.
The term structural stability refers to the degree to which preexisting material or 
physical conditions are conducive to crisis stability when an interstate military con-
frontation occurs.3 These conditions include whether the region’s geography would 
make it easy or difficult for an enemy to attack and the size, composition, technology, 
and doctrine of each side’s force structure.4 Conditions that cause national leaders to 
believe opponents are not inclined to attack and that successful attack would be more 
difficult than successful defense contribute to structural stability. The lack of these con-
ditions signals structural stability.5
Given these considerations, we have ample cause for concern about structural 
stability in Asia. The structure, composition, disposition, and doctrines of Chinese 
and U.S. conventional military forces are one concern. Chinese doctrine increasingly 
emphasizes offensive action as a means of gaining and maintaining the initiative in 
war, and its thinking on space and cyber issues blurs the line between deterrence and 
combat.6 U.S. air forces in the theater consist largely of short-range fighters for strike 
2 Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 45.
3 For detailed discussion of what constitutes stability, in terms of both definitions and nuclear and conven-
tional structural elements, see Robert Axelrod, “The Concept of Stability in the Context of Conventional War in 
Europe,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1990.
4 Robert J. Powell, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 
March 1989; Schelling, 1966, pp. 244–245; Laurence S. Seidman, “Crisis Stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 1990. This concept closely parallels what van Evera identifies as the dynamics of 
offense and defense dominance (Stephen van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International 
Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, p. 6).
5 See Stephen van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1999, pp. 35–38.
6 Dean Cheng, “China’s Newest Defense White Paper Suggests Fundamental Change in Perspective,” 
Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, Issue Brief 4428, July 6, 2015; Taylor M. Fravel, “China’s Changing 
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and defensive counterair operations in defense of allies. Once mobilized for combat 
operations, their proximity to potential adversaries would pose a serious threat of a 
high-intensity air campaign with little tactical warning and could, at the same time, 
expose U.S. aircraft to preemptive attack by China’s ever-growing force of precision-
guided, conventional missiles. The doctrines of both sides’ military forces are offen-
sively oriented, emphasizing striking enemies deep, hard, and fast. These are classic 
conditions for instability and, potentially, rapid escalation. Regional crisis stability may 
be further undermined by nonstructural factors: Potential belligerents continue to deal 
with the profound memories and deep consequences of World War II, the Chinese 
revolution, the Korean War, and the Indo-Pakistani wars. National leaders and their 
publics often suspect malicious intent when dustups occur.
Within this geostrategic context, we can examine how China’s nuclear modern-
ization and the factors that drive it could affect crisis stability and escalation dynam-
ics in Asia. First, it is important to point out that several aspects of Beijing’s nuclear 
policies are broadly conducive to crisis stability. As discussed in Chapter Two, Chinese 
leaders appear to remain committed to their no-first-use policy, insisting they will 
not use nuclear weapons in a confrontation or conflict except in response to a nuclear 
attack on China. To be sure, there are circumstances that would place no-first-use 
under immense strain, especially the attrition of Chinese strategic capabilities during 
the course of a conflict. But assuming U.S. leaders are equally committed to avoiding 
the nuclear threshold and are sensitive to the kinds of activities that would put the 
greatest pressure on China’s no-first-use position, we should, in principal, not have to 
worry about a confrontation or conflict between the United States and China escalat-
ing to a nuclear exchange. In a similar vein, although Chinese military leaders have a 
growing voice on nuclear issues, the CMC remains in control of nuclear policymaking 
and the party general secretary plays a central role in his capacity as CMC chairman. 
To the extent that China’s political leaders maintain firm control over decisions regard-
ing the use of nuclear weapons, the chances of inadvertent and accidental escalation 
decrease.7
China’s programs to expand and modernize its nuclear capabilities can also be 
seen as stabilizing in certain respects. As previously explained, China appears com-
mitted to maintaining a lean-and-effective nuclear counterstrike capability, which has 
Approach to Military Strategy: The Science of Military Strategy from 2001 to 2013,” in Joe McReynolds, ed., 
China’s Evolving Military Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2016.
7 Theoretical treatments of escalation dynamics often overlook the risks of inadvertent and accidental escala-
tion, but they are very real. For the seminal work on the dangers of inadvertent escalation at the end of the Cold 
War, see Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” International 
Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Autumn 1982, and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear 
Risks, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991. For development of a framework for managing the risks of 
deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental escalation, see Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, 
Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger Cliff, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-614-AF, 2008.
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often been characterized as a “minimum deterrent,” once defined largely in existential 
terms but increasingly by a perceived requirement for assured retaliation. This is con-
sistent with a no-first-use policy in that, were Beijing planning to conduct a damage- 
limiting nuclear first strike against the United States, Russia, or probably India, it would 
need an arsenal much larger than it is currently building. However, lean and effective 
does not mean “small” in any absolute sense. To remain effective in deterring a nuclear 
attack, China needs to persuade prospective opponents that it has enough weapons and 
sufficient capability to survive an enemy’s first strike, penetrate its defenses, and inflict 
unacceptable damage in a counterstrike. Consequently, as the United States develops 
BMD and CPGS capabilities, Chinese leaders are responding by enlarging their arse-
nal, MIRVing their missiles, developing penetration aids and other new capabilities, 
and making their systems more survivable.
To the extent that these measures make Chinese leaders feel less vulnerable to a 
nuclear first strike and therefore less susceptible to use-or-lose pressures during a crisis 
or war, the factors outlined immediately above reduce the prospect of nuclear escala-
tion during conflict. This could be particularly important in the event of inadvertent 
losses to Chinese nuclear forces, command and control, or support structure during 
a conflict. To the degree that Chinese leaders have confidence in the redundancy of 
PLA second-strike capabilities, they may be more willing to assume a wait-and-see 
posture toward retaliation in the face of incremental losses. On the other hand, crisis 
stability could be undermined at lower levels if more-robust nuclear capabilities pro-
vided Chinese leaders an exaggerated belief in their ability to deter U.S. intervention 
in a conflict or deter U.S. escalation during a conflict. Such confidence could increase 
Beijing’s willingness to use force against regional states, a possibility we address in the 
next subsection.
Policy changes could also undermine stability, especially if paired with corre-
sponding shifts in capabilities. Beijing remains committed to no-first-use, but argu-
ments Chinese military analysts occasionally make for adding caveats—to include cer-
tain types of conventional strikes or even an impending conventional defeat—could 
blur the no-first-use policy. Such arguments, similar to U.S. threats to use nuclear 
weapons against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe in the early Cold War, may be 
calculated to deter the United States from attacking China and could make U.S. lead-
ers more cautious in a crisis or more restrained in a conventional conflict. On the other 
hand, to the extent that Chinese capabilities and actions are consistent with a weaker, 
conditional no-first-use policy, the original stabilizing value of the no-first-use policy 
itself could be undermined. If part of the value of a no-first-use policy and its associ-
ated force structure lies in diminished incentives for nuclear preemption on the part 
of opponents—since the opponent assumes little risk from suffering a first strike—
adjusting the policy will work against that logic and could, under particular circum-
stances, restore some incentive for preemption.
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More-tangible risks of instability and conflict escalation can be seen in certain 
characteristics of China’s force structure. For instance, one of China’s principal sources 
of strength is its growing arsenal of precision-guided conventional cruise and ballis-
tic missiles. In the event of a war with the United States, Chinese forces would likely 
launch sudden, intense strikes on air bases and other military facilities in the Asia-
Pacific theater in efforts to unhinge U.S. and allied warfighting capabilities. The offen-
sive punch that these missiles carry, juxtaposed against the potent strike capabilities 
embodied in U.S. airpower, create mutual vulnerabilities that could drive both sides 
toward conventional preemption in a crisis and intense, escalatory attacks once a war 
has begun.
China’s comingling of its conventional and nuclear missile forces at the base level 
exacerbates the problem. It is important to note here that “bases” are not single facilities 
and that Chinese conventional and nuclear missiles are not mixed in the same brigades. 
Nevertheless, U.S. attacks against Chinese command-and-control centers to suppress 
the conventional missile threat could inadvertently degrade Chinese nuclear command 
and control, generating use-or-lose pressures in Beijing and potentially stumbling over 
one of China’s lowered first-use thresholds. At the same time, China’s increased reli-
ance on mobile launchers could make the comingling of forces a serious problem. At 
some point during an escalating confrontation with the United States, China could 
be expected to flush its mobile launchers to hide sites and dispersed launch positions. 
Theoretically, such a move should be stabilizing in that it would reduce the chances of 
a successful U.S. attack. However, once a conflict has begun, China’s dispersal of mis-
sile systems in “hides” could further complicate the task of distinguishing nuclear from 
conventional and increase the probability of inadvertent attacks on the latter.
China’s efforts to expand its nuclear capabilities by developing a sea-based deter-
rent in the form of a fledgling SSBN force presents another potential source of instabil-
ity and escalation. In the event of a future crisis, PLAN would likely flush its SSBNs, 
putting them on station at sea. Again, such a move should, in principal, make them 
more survivable and available for a nuclear counterstrike, thereby deterring a U.S. 
attack. However, given the technological inferiority of China’s SSBNs, U.S. SSNs 
might detect and begin shadowing these boats as they put to sea. U.S. leaders would 
likely have the option of ordering their destruction with a high probability of success. 
Were the crisis to escalate, U.S. leaders might feel increasing pressure to remove this 
sea-based threat despite the escalation risks involved. Alternatively, SSBNs might be 
destroyed accidentally in the heat and confusion of battle. Given China’s increased reli-
ance on SSBNs for nuclear deterrence and the special ability that attacks with SSBNs 
might have to avoid U.S. missile defenses, the loss of even one or two boats might push 
China toward the employment of nuclear weapons in a demonstration role. This risk 
represents a strong argument for U.S. caution in the treatment of adversary subma-
rines, should a conflict occur.
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Implications for Extended Deterrence of Nuclear and Regional Political 
Stability
China’s nuclear modernization and the expansion and diversification of its forces pose 
growing challenges to the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. If enough Chinese 
nuclear forces could survive a U.S. retaliatory strike to conduct a powerful retaliatory 
strike of their own against U.S. targets, Japanese leaders might ask whether Chinese 
leaders would take a U.S. threat to strike on Japan’s behalf seriously: Would Washing-
ton really risk losing Seattle and/or Los Angeles to retaliate after an attack on Tokyo?
An extension of this logic may raise questions in Tokyo and other allied capitals 
about how changes in the nuclear balance will affect conventional deterrence and the 
credibility of U.S. alliance commitments more generally. The United States has dis-
tanced itself from the threat of nuclear use in the context of conventional attack in 
recent years, most notably in the 2010 NPR. Nevertheless, any prudent Chinese leader 
would certainly consider the risks of U.S. escalation to the nuclear level. The deter-
rent value of these doubts may, however, decline significantly in the context of a more 
secure and robust Chinese second-strike capability. Chinese leaders might thus accept 
a higher degree of risk in political and “gray zone” crises with a more robust nuclear 
force than without. This logic lies at the heart of the so-called stability-instability para-
dox, within which a more stable nuclear structure may lead to increased instability at 
lower levels.8
With Chinese conventional capabilities improving rapidly and with their ability 
to threaten significant losses against U.S. forces in a more limited conflict increasing, 
the shift in nuclear calculations might also become more salient.9 The United States 
would probably only consider escalating to the nuclear level if it were losing a conven-
tional conflict or had sustained severe losses (and probably not even then), and the 
probability of such scenarios, while low today, is growing over time. Hence, nuclear 
escalation in the context of conventional warfare (i.e., intrawar deterrence or escalation 
control) may assume greater importance for Chinese leaders as the PLA’s conventional 
capabilities improve.
Questions about how Chinese conventional and nuclear modernization affect 
both nuclear and conventional deterrence have already become more prominent in 
South Korea and, especially, Japan. In response to regional concerns, the United States 
began separate dialogues on strategic issues with both Tokyo and Seoul in 2009. 
Although elite opinion in Japan is divided, some have suggested a more “NATO-like” 
8 Michael Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Stimson Center, May 2003. For an application to China and East Asia, see Thomas J. Christensen, 
“The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 2012.
9 For an assessment of the evolving balance of conventional forces, see Heginbotham et al., 2015.
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approach to extended deterrence.10 While it is unclear exactly what that would look 
like in East Asia, two features of extended deterrence in the NATO context are promi-
nent: first, the independent possession of nuclear weapons by Britain and France (in 
addition to the United States) and, second, the participation of a subgroup of NATO 
allies in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements.
Should allied concerns continue to grow in Asia, it is likely that five possible 
responses will, to one extent or another, be discussed. First, there may be appeals for 
the United States to adjust or clarify its declaratory policy, possibly to include implicit 
but nevertheless clear nuclear deterrence of conventional attack. Second, there may be 
calls for the United States to maintain an array of deployable tactical nuclear weapons 
to signal a credible response in the event of limited Chinese use of nuclear weapons. 
Third, some regional voices will call for the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to 
East Asia or onboard naval U.S. surface ships or attack submarines, a position that, 
under current circumstances, large segments of the populations of allied countries 
would oppose. Fourth, there will be increased momentum to develop long-range con-
ventional strike capabilities designed to provide at least some punishment capability 
in the event of Chinese conventional attack. And fifth, should regional actors come to 
fundamentally question the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, South Korean or 
Japanese support for nuclear armament is likely to grow more widespread.11
Each of these measures would have significant consequences, including some 
upside potential for deterrence and alliance solidarity and negative consequences for 
the U.S. relationship with China and for U.S. global disarmament and nonproliferation 
efforts. In addition, any unilateral moves by South Korea or Japan would likely affect 
the thinking and military behavior of the other, given the mutual suspicions between 
America’s two Northeast Asian allies. While the United States will need to balance 
potential positive and negative consequences to changes in its approach to China and 
the region, its leaders should understand that the status quo with regard to U.S. nuclear 
policy and forces will also have consequences. Both the conventional and nuclear bal-
ances of power are evolving, and allies may begin to pursue independent options more 
seriously should the United States appear unresponsive to their concerns. The conse-
quences of some of the possibilities mentioned here would be far more momentous 
than others, and U.S. leaders should look to shape developments proactively.
Recommendations
The foregoing examination raises questions about what U.S. and Chinese leaders might 
do to reduce the prospects for arms racing and the dangers of crisis instability and con-
10 Roberts, 2016, p. 206.
11 For a slightly different list of topics under discussion, see Roberts, 2016, pp. 204–213.
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flict escalation, as well as what U.S. strategists might do to mitigate the impact of Chi-
nese nuclear modernization on deterrence and extended deterrence.
First, note that simply telling national leaders that they should abandon certain 
technologies, programs, or strategies because they are destabilizing will have little or 
no effect. That is especially true of programs that are well advanced. China will not 
stop modernizing and expanding its nuclear counterstrike capabilities. Beijing will, 
rather, continue pursuing the programs in keeping with available resources and per-
ceived threats (as interpreted and filtered through the prism of political and bureau-
cratic lenses). U.S. leaders will not cancel such programs as BMD and CPGS. These 
systems support a wide range of mission requirements that are separate from the U.S.- 
Chinese strategic relationship. U.S. leaders may, however, continue to limit or restrict 
these programs. North Korean leaders are unlikely to embrace nuclear disarmament, 
unless squeezed far more severely by sanctions. Similarly, the United States and the 
Republic of Korea will not accede to North Korean demands to cease combined mili-
tary exercises because they serve to ensure effective coordination of allied forces.
Yet, despite these structural rigidities, there are several actions that U.S. and 
Chinese leaders can take to reduce the dangers of crisis instability. The United States 
maintains a highly potent offensive force posture in Asia but one that is relatively 
brittle and highly exposed to potential adversary attack. To the extent that the United 
States can reposture its forces to reduce their exposure to enemy attack and increase 
operational resilient, it can reduce the potential benefits of a first strike against it and 
improve crisis stability. The ability to disperse aircraft is already improving with new 
options in the Philippines, Japan, and Australia. New operational concepts are being 
explored, and some hardening of military facilities in Guam has also occurred. This is 
a promising start but should be further developed. Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s emphasis 
on “distributed lethality” helps reduce Chinese incentives to target any given forma-
tion (potentially with nuclear weapons). These types of adjustments could be made as 
part of an active denial strategy, which might be considered as an alternative to more 
offensive options.12
On the Chinese side, the new PLA Rocket Force should work toward visibly 
separating its conventional and nuclear missile force elements. Although PLA leaders 
might worry that providing this observable separation would make it more likely that 
an enemy would conduct conventional attacks on the Chinese homeland, that risk is 
mitigated by the high levels of survivability that conventional and nuclear mobile mis-
sile launchers enjoy. Separating these forces would reduce the more serious risk of rapid 
escalation toward the nuclear threshold, should a conflict occur.
As Chinese nuclear forces become more robust and survivable, U.S. leaders must 
take positive steps to fortify the credibility of extended deterrence commitments to 
12 Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, “Deterring Without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventur-
ism Under Austerity,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2015.
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regional friends and allies, particularly Japan. Combined exercises treating nuclear 
deterrence and escalation topics should be conducted to supplement nuclear dialogues 
within the alliance and increase the level of mutual understanding of each ally’s think-
ing and concerns. The modernization of the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal will likely 
increase regional confidence in the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence and miti-
gate, to an extent, concerns about extended deterrence. While U.S. leaders will want 
to be cautious about any changes to U.S. declaratory policy that might increase the 
emphasis on nuclear deterrence, they may find some adjustment preferable to inde-
pendent actions by Japan and/or South Korea.13 At the same time, the United States 
should engage Japan proactively on Tokyo’s development of conventional long-range 
strike capabilities to ensure that, if Japan pursues strike capabilities, it develops systems 
that are secure from attack and, therefore, do not encourage preemption in crisis.
One area where the United States should exercise caution is in the future develop-
ment of BMD systems. The sizing of U.S. NMD should be strictly limited to the threat 
North Korea poses. The United States has expanded its inventory of ground-based 
interceptors to 44, despite the fact that North Korea has yet to deploy a single ICBM 
capable of reaching the United States. In the minds of Chinese leaders, this com-
mitment of resources to NMD raises questions about the true intent of U.S. missile 
defense efforts. Missile defense is the largest single external factor driving the expan-
sion of China’s ICBM and SSBN force. Washington should continue to emphasize to 
Chinese leaders the importance to all parties of limiting North Korean missile and 
nuclear advances and commit to no further expansion of NMD should the DPRK’s 
nuclear and missile programs be frozen—and possibly to reducing the number of inter-
ceptors should North Korean programs be dismantled.
At the same time, it is incumbent on Beijing to acknowledge this message. Since a 
key strategic concern for China is U.S. missile defense capabilities, it is imperative that 
Beijing recognize that the key regional driver for these is the development of North 
Korean nuclear programs. Both further nuclear testing and the development of ICBM 
capabilities by Pyongyang will intensify U.S. missile defense efforts, which in turn will 
deepen the spiral driving Chinese modernization. Beijing should employ all available 
leverage, including its ability to restrict oil supplies, to discourage Pyongyang from 
making further nuclear and missile advances.
China should also specify the calculus it uses to size its forces and should pri-
oritize means other than increasing numbers to buttress survivability. Without such a 
calculus, there is no logical upper limit to the “lean” force to which China is pledged. 
Hence, such metrics will not only help U.S. and other states understand China’s nuclear 
logic but will also help Chinese leaders avoid the danger that bureaucratic forces and 
incrementalism will hijack nuclear force development. As for specific measures to 
13 See Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Washington, D.C.: Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016.
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increase survivability, China will almost certainly adopt a portfolio approach, but it 
should emphasize, for example, higher alert levels (while maintaining tight control 
over warheads), improved penetration aids, and possibly even point defenses, rather 
than deploying larger numbers of offensive systems. To the extent that numbers are 
increased, China should deploy survivable single-warhead delivery systems, rather than 
MIRVs. To be sure, MIRVing may provide the most efficient use of scarce funds, mea-
sured in terms of warheads produced per yuan. But the gains to second-strike surviv-
ability would not be proportionate to the number of warheads built because missiles 
with MIRVs would represent concentrated targets. And the political costs in terms of 
aggravated regional and U.S. suspicion would be very high.
While the policy measures described here should be encouraged, our research 
suggests that many of the drivers we have discussed in this report will persist and that 
the two sides will likely find themselves in a deepening nuclear arms competition. 





BMD ballistic missile defense
CCTV China Central Television
CMC Central Military Commission
CPGS conventional prompt global strike
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
FBX forward-based X-band
GDP gross domestic product
HEU highly enriched uranium
HGV hypersonic glide vehicle
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MIRV multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
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NMD national missile defense
NPR Nuclear Posture Review
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty; more formally, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAC Patriot Advanced Compatibility
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PLASAF PLA Second Artillery Force
PRC People’s Republic of China
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SOP standard operating procedure
SSBN ballistic missile submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TBM theater ballistic missile
TEL transporter-erector-launcher
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
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China’s approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first nuclear 
test in 1964. Key elements are its no-first-use policy and reliance on a small force of nuclear 
weapons capable of executing retaliatory strikes if China is attacked. China has recently 
accelerated nuclear force building and modernization, and both international and domestic 
factors are likely to drive faster modernization in the future. Chinese nuclear planners are 
concerned by strategic developments in the United States, especially the deployment of 
missile defenses. Within the region, Beijing is also an actor in complex multilateral security 
dynamics that now include several nuclear states, and the improving nuclear capabilities of 
China’s neighbors, especially India, are a growing concern for Beijing. Constituencies for 
nuclear weapons have gained in bureaucratic standing within the People’s Liberation Army. 
With few, if any, firewalls between China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces, new 
technologies developed for the former are already being applied to the latter, a trend that 
will almost certainly continue. Given these changes, China is likely to increase emphasis 
on nuclear deterrence, accelerate nuclear force modernization, and make adjustments 
(although not wholesale changes) to policy.
